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INTRODUCTION
Armed only with boxcutters, the nineteen al Qaeda hijackers on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, killed almost 3,000 people and caused tens of billions
of dollars in damage to New York City, the Pentagon, and the global
economy.' This toll would be dwarfed by a "nuclear 9/1 l"-a nuclear
attack launched by a terrorist state or group. Detonation of a small, crude
nuclear weapon in a major city could kill more than 500,000 people and
cause over one trillion dollars in damage.2
1. See, e.g., CHARLES MEADE & ROGER C. MOLANDER, RAND CTR. FOR TERRORISM
RISK MGMT. POLICY, CONSIDERING THE EFFECTS OF A CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACK XVi,
6 (2006), http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2006/RANDTR391 
.pdf.
2. See, e.g., MATTHEW BUNN, ANTHONY WIER & JOHN P. HOLDREN, NUCLEAR
THREAT INITIATIVE, CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND MATERIALS: A REPORT CARD
AND ACTION PLAN 15-16, 18 (2003), http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/cnwm.pdf (esti-
mating that terrorist detonation of a ten-kiloton nuclear bomb at New York City's Grand
Central Station on an average workday would likely kill more than half a million people and
that its "direct" economic costs would be well over one trillion dollars); MEADE & MO-
LANDER, supra note 1, at xvi, 6 (estimating that the "early costs" of a ten-kiloton nuclear
detonation in the Port of Long Beach, California, "could exceed $1 trillion"). A ten-kiloton
[Vol. 28:337
Averting Catastrophe
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)3 has, since its entry into
force in 1970, been at the heart of international efforts to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. During its first twenty-five years, the NPT
played a central role as nuclear nonproliferation efforts met with re-
markable success. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy predicted as many
as "fifteen or twenty" states could possess nuclear weapons by 1975.4 In
fact, the number of states possessing nuclear weapons grew by only one
(from six to seven) between 1970 and 1995.' The NPT deserves much of
the credit for this outcome.6 The NPT's membership grew from forty-
three states at the time of its entry into force in 1970 to 181 by the end of
1995.' Only a handful of major countries-including India, Israel, and
Pakistan 8-had failed to become NPT parties by the end of 1995. NPT
explosion can be achieved with a relatively crude design. Id. at 2. The yields of the nuclear
weapons used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 12.5 and twenty-two kilotons respec-
tively. Id. at 1. The Pakistani nuclear weapons tested on May 28, 1998 reportedly had yields of
approximately ten kilotons each. FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(2002), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke.
3. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT].
4. President Kennedy stated as follows at a press conference on March 21, 1963: "I
am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful there may be ten nuclear
powers ... and by 1975, fifteen or twenty." RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT KENNEDY: PROFILE
OF POWER 477 (1993) (quoting PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
JOHN F. KENNEDY, CONTAINING THE PUBLIC MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE
PRESIDENT, JANUARY 20 TO NOVEMBER 22, 1963 280 (1963)).
5. The additional state was India, which detonated a single nuclear explosive device in
1974. GEORGE PERKOVICH, INDIA'S NUCLEAR BOMB 178 (1999). Britain, China, France, the
Soviet Union, and the United States all had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon
prior to January 1, 1967, and were thus admitted to the NPT as "nuclear-weapon states." Israel
is a unique case in that it manufactured nuclear weapons during the 1960s, before the NPT
opened for signature, but it still has not announced its nuclear arsenal, either by way of a deto-
nation or a public declaration, and it has never joined the NPT. See AVNER COHEN, ISRAEL
AND THE BOMB 273-76 (1998) (noting that Israel had a deliverable nuclear weapon capacity in
June 1967, more than a year before the NPT was'opened for signature and more than two
years before the NPT entered into force); William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Fraying of Old
Restraints Risks a Second Nuclear Age, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, at A I I (noting "Israel had
the bomb by 1967"); MICHAEL KARPIN, THE BOMB IN THE BASEMENT X (2006).
6. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004) [herein-
after UN High-Level Panel Report] ("The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
is not as effective a constraint as it was .... The strong non-proliferation regime-embodied
in IAEA and the Treaty itself-helped dramatically to slow the predicted rate of prolifera-
tion.").
7. See United Nations, Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament
Agreements, http://disarmament2.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (follow "NTP" hyperlink in left
frame; then follow "chronological order by deposit" hyperlink in left frame) [hereinafter
United Nations, Status].
8. At the end of 1995, two other major countries-Brazil and Cuba-also still had not
joined the NPT. Brazil joined in 1998 and Cuba in 2002. See id.
Winter 2007]
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members induced North Korea to remain within the treaty after it threat-
ened to withdraw in 1993. 9 A rigorous international inspections regime
begun in 1991 kept Iraq's nuclear weapons program in check.' Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine found themselves with nuclear weapons on
their territory when the Soviet Union collapsed but chose in the early
1990s to transfer the weapons to Russia and join the NPT as non-nuclear
weapons states."
In January 1992, the Security Council announced that "the prolifera-
tion of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to
international peace and security" and that the Council members "commit
themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the
research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate ac-
tion to that end."'2 "Threat" to "international peace and security" is the
threshold legal test for exercise of the Council's sanctions authority un-
der Chapter VII of its Charter.'3 By equating nuclear proliferation with a
"threat to international peace and security," the Council put potential
nuclear proliferators on notice that the Council deemed itself legally au-
thorized to sanction any proliferant activity, regardless of whether or not
that activity violates the NPT or any other legal instrument.4
By May 1995, when an NPT Review Conference voted to extend the
treaty in perpetuity,'5 a robust nuclear nonproliferation regime had arisen,
9. See infra Section IV.B.
10. See infra Section V.A.
11. See, e.g., William C. Martel, Why Ukraine Gave Up Nuclear Weapons: Nonprolif-
eration Incentives and Disincentives, in PULLING BACK FROM THE NUCLEAR BRINK:
REDUCING AND COUNTERING NUCLEAR THREATS 88 (Barry R. Schneider & William L.
Dowdy eds., 1998); Ctr. for Nonproliferation Studies, Nuclear Threat Initiative Country Pro-
files, http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles (follow "Belarus," "Kazakhstan," and "Ukraine"
hyperlinks).
12. The President of the Sec. Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, at
4, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992). The Security Council President made the statement "on
behalf of the members of the Council." Id. at 2. The Council later used similar formulations in
S.C. Res. 1172, U.N. Doc. S/RES/i 172 (June 6, 1998) ("[r]eiterating' in response to the In-
dian and Pakistani nuclear tests, "that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction
constitutes a threat to international peace and security") and S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006) ("[r]eaffirming," in response to the North Korean nuclear test,
"that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of
delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security").
13. See infra Section III.B.
14. See infra Section Ifl.B.
15. This step was taken pursuant to NPT Article X, paragraph 2, which provides:
Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be con-
vened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a
majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
[Vol. 28:337
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consisting of a vibrant NPT, several related multilateral treaties, 6 argua-
bly a customary international legal norm of nonproliferation, 7 and the
Security Council's notice that it had legal authority to take action against
any nuclear proliferation activity. This regime, with the NPT at its fore-
front, seemed to have succeeded in converting the acquisition of nuclear
weapons from an act of national pride into an act of international out-
lawry.'"
The last ten years have been less successful for the nuclear nonpro-
liferation regime, which by now has lost much of its capacity to hinder
proliferation.' 9 The UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change recently warned of "the erosion and possible
collapse of the whole [nuclear nonproliferation] Treaty regime," explain-
ing: "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-
proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of
proliferation.""0
The first major step in the decline of the nuclear nonproliferation re-
gime involved a set of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons detonations
in 1998.2 Although India and Pakistan were not parties to the NPT, their
flagrant proliferation, and the world's weak response, shook the NPT
and did considerable damage to the nuclear nonproliferation regime." In
2003, North Korea announced both that it was withdrawing from the
NPT and that it possessed nuclear weapons.23 The Security Council
failed to respond to either announcement. 4 In October 2006, North Ko-
rea took another step toward a nuclear arsenal by detonating a nuclear
weapon.25 The Security Council responded with weaker sanctions than it
had previously imposed in response to lesser threats to international
peace and security.26 In June 2003, the Director General of the
See NPT, supra note 3, art. X, 2.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part I.
18. See Thomas Graham, Jr., Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Terrorism, 17
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 89, 90 (2004).
19. See, e.g., Chamundeeswari Kuppuswamy, Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Shaking at Its Foundations? Stock Taking After the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 11 J. CON-
FLICT & SECURITY L. 141 (2006) (describing despondence about NPT's future at a December
2005 conference, hosted by the United Kingdom, which included senior IAEA officials, dip-
lomats from various countries, and nongovernmental organizations).
20. UN High-Level Panel Report, supra note 6, at 39-40.
21. See infra Section IV.D.
22. See infra Section IV.D.
23. See infra Section IV.B.
24. See infra Section IV.B.
25. See Evan Ramstad, Jay Solomon & Gordon Fairclough, North Korean Claim of Test
Imperils Nuclear-Control Effort, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2006, at 1; infra Section IV.B.
26. See infra Section IV.B.
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determined that Iran had
violated its NPT safeguards agreement." For more than three years
thereafter, the Security Council stood mute while Iran failed to redress
those violations and refused to take various steps required by the IAEA
Board of Governors.2 ' The sanctions the Security Council finally im-
posed on Iran in December 2006 and March 2007 were among the
weakest it had ever enacted.29
Today, the risk of a nuclear 9/11 is high and rising. Graham Allison,
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration
and former dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, wrote in
2004 that "on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in
the decade ahead is more likely than not."3 ° Robert Gallucci, the Dean of
the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service who led U.S. ne-
gotiations with North Korea during the Clinton administration, estimated
in September 2006 that "it is more likely than not that al Qaeda or one of
its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a U.S. city within the next
five to ten years.'
Two regimes which are hostile to the West and exceptionally com-
fortable with civilian deaths-the totalitarian North Korean regime32 and
27. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, at 7, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2003/40 (June 6, 2003) [hereinafter IAEA DG Report of June 6, 2003] ("Iran has failed
to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear
material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities
where the material was stored and processed.").
28. See, e.g., IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, at 19-20, IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/83 (Nov.
15, 2004) (noting that "it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended
period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the re-
porting of nuclear materials, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities
where such material has been processed and stored," and listing fifteen different failures by
Iran to meet its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement); IAEA, Implementation of
the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director Gen-
eral, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/53 (Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter IAEA DG Report of Aug. 31,
2006] (describing continued Iranian noncompliance with steps required by the Board of Gov-
ernors and UN Security Council).
29. See infra Section IV.C.
30. GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE CATAS-
TROPHE 15 (2004).
31. Robert L. Gallucci, Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Re-
sponses to U.S. Vulnerability, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci., Sept. 2006, at 51, 52.
32. See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD COUNTRY REPORT: NORTH
KOREA (2005), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=
2005&country=6767 (stating that North Korea is "one of the most tightly controlled countries
in the world" and "the regime denies North Koreans even the most basic rights"). During the
1990s, a period when the North Korean government was investing heavily in its nuclear weap-
ons program, an estimated one million North Koreans died from famine. See, e.g., HUMAN
[Vol. 28:337
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the terrorist-supporting Iranian regime 33-are well on their way to devel-
oping nuclear arsenals capable of use against a U.S. or other Western
city. North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon and is estimated to pos-
sess sufficient plutonium for six to eight additional atomic bombs,34 and
Iran continues to defy efforts to stall development of its nuclear arsenal.3"
North Korea's nuclear weapons program raises several concerns, in-
cluding fear that the unpredictable North Korean regime may attempt to
blackmail its neighbors or the United States with threats of nuclear at-
tack, or even use nuclear weapons against them. Perhaps the foremost
concern currently is that North Korea may sell a nuclear weapon to a
terrorist group or rogue state. The North Korean regime on several occa-
sions has expressed willingness to sell nuclear weapons to the highest
bidder,3 6 and it reportedly sold processed uranium to Libya 17 and missiles
to Iran, Syria, and Libya.38 William J. Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defense
during the Clinton administration, wrote in September 2006:
RIGHTS WATCH, A MATTER OF SURVIVAL: THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OF
FOOD AND THE RISK OF HUNGER 9 (May 2006).
33. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM: 2005 173 (2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/cl7689.htm (noting "Iran remained the most
active state sponsor of terrorism"); William J. Broad, Plowshare or Sword?, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 2004, at FI (quoting Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear Control Institute, as stating
"[i]f Iran goes nuclear, you worry that Hezbollah goes nuclear"); Bret Stephens, Questions for
Ahmadinejad (That Mike Wallace Didn't Ask), WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2006, at A13 ("Numer-
ous Iranian sources allege that in the 1980s [Ahmadinejad] worked as an interrogator and
executioner in Evin Prison in Tehran. They say [he] earned the nickname Tir Khalas Zan, or
'The Terminator,' for [his] methods there."); FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD
COUNTRY REPORT: IRAN (2006), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?
page=22&year=2006&country=6982 ("Ahmadinejad signaled his intent to further erode po-
litical and civil liberties by awarding the powerful ministries of Information and the Interior to
hard-liners who have been implicated directly in the extrajudicial killings of dissidents and
other egregious human rights abuses.").
.34. See, e.g., LARRY A. NIKSCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND DIPLOMACY 1 (2007).
35. See infra Section IV.C.
36. See Glenn Kessler & John Pomfret, North Korea's Threats a Dilemma for China;
Ally's Nuclear Gamesmanship Rankles Beijing, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2003, at Al; David E.
Sanger, A Strategic Jolt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at AI ("North Korea... has never devel-
oped a weapons system it did not ultimately sell on the world market, and it has periodically
threatened to sell its nuclear technology.").
37. North Korea reportedly provided Libya in 2001 with nearly two tons of uranium
processed into a gas that can be fed into centrifuges for enrichment into bomb fuel. David E.
Sanger & William J. Broad, Evidence is Cited Linking Koreans to Libyan Uranium, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2004, at Al; Broad, supra note 33, at Fl.
38. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Ctr. for Nonproliferation Studies, North Korea Pro-
file: Missile Exports (July 2003), http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles/NK/Missile/
66_1279.html; Thom Shanker, Russia Was Leader in Arms Sales to Developing World in '05,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2006, at A12 ("North Korea ... shipped about 40 ballistic missiles to
other nations in the four-year period ending in 2005, the only nation to have done so.").
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The growing nuclear arsenal in North Korea is a security disaster
... the overriding reason is the possibility that a North Korean
nuclear bomb will end up in one of our cities, not delivered by a
missile, but by a truck or freighter .... [W]e must take seriously
the consequences of... a terror group gaining access to nuclear
weapons, and the only plausible avenue for doing so is to buy or
steal them from a nuclear power. If North Korea proceeds un-
checked with building its nuclear arsenal, the risk of nuclear
terrorism increases significantly.39
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons also raises several concerns. A nu-
clear umbrella might embolden Iran to step up its already aggressive
support for terrorism, and an Iranian nuclear arsenal seems likely to spur
proliferation by its neighbors. In addition, some have raised concerns
that Iran's leadership, or rogue elements able to transfer nuclear arms to
Iran's terrorist allies, might welcome a nuclear war as a means of achiev-
ing their goal of wiping the United States and Israel off the map.4 ° While
mutual deterrence kept the United States and the Soviet Union from at-
tacking each other during the Cold War,4' some in Iran might be
39. William J. Perry, Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North Korean Nuclear Crises,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci., Sept. 2006, at 78, 84-85.
40. See Iranian Leader: Wipe Out Israel, CNN.coM, Oct. 27, 2005, http://
www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/26/ahmadinejad/index.html (quoting Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as saying, "God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall
soon experience a world without the United States and Zionism."); Iran: Tehran's Nuclear
Recklessness and the U.S. Response, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov 't
Info. & Int'l Sec. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong.
(2005) (testimony of former CIA Director R. James Woolsey) (including the following quote
from Hassan Abbassi, chief strategist for Iranian President Ahmadinejad: "We have a strategy
drawn up for the destruction of Anglo-Saxon civilization."); Yossi Verter, Aznar: Khamenei
Said in 2001 Iran Aimed to 'Set Israel Alight', HAARETZ, Mar. 15, 2006, available
at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=694562 (former
Spanish Prime Minister Aznar reported that Iran's current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khame-
nei, told him in a meeting that "Iran must declare war on Israel and the United States until
they are completely destroyed."); Iran: Rafsanjani warns of high cost of US support for Israel,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Dec. 15, 2001 (documenting a speech by Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, former Iranian President and current Expediency Council Chair, at Tehran Univer-
sity December 14, 2001, that included the following statement: "the use of even one nuclear
bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is
not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality."); see also An Apocalyptic Religious Zealot
Takes on the World, SPIEGEL ONLINE, May 30, 2006, http://scrvice.spiegel.dc/cache/
intemational/spiegel/0,1518,418691,00.html; Amir Taheri, The Frightening Truth of Why Iran
Wants a Bomb, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 16, 2006, at 22 ("Ahmadinejad... boasts
that the [Hidden] Imam gave him the presidency for a single task: provoking a 'clash of civili-
zations' in which the Muslim world, led by Iran, takes on the 'infidel' West, led by the United
States, and defeats it .... ).
41. But cf Scott D. Sagan, How to Keep the Bomb from Iran, FOREIGN ALE., Sept.-Oct.
2006, at 45, 46 ("Although deterrence did work with the Soviet Union and China, there were
[Vol. 28:337
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undeterrable.42 Despite these concerns, the international community con-
tinues to respond with remarkable passivity as the North Korean and
Iranian nuclear weapons programs proceed and the nuclear nonprolifera-
tion regime nears collapse.43
What has caused this dangerous decline of the nuclear nonprolifera-
tion regime and what can be done to save it?
Nuclear nonproliferation scholarship has thus far focused largely on
the choices made by proliferators and somewhat on the content of nu-
clear nonproliferation norms, but it has largely ignored the choices made
by those states in a position to enforce the norms and otherwise prevent
proliferation. It is as if domestic criminal law scholarship were to focus
mostly on decisionmaking by criminals, somewhat on the behavior
criminal law prohibits, and little or not at all on the investigative author-
ity, charging discretion, and sentencing decisions of police, prosecutors,
and judges. For example, the literature contains several excellent studies
of why and how individual countries have engaged in nuclear prolifera-
tion." There are also several excellent comparative analyses of why
45various countries have chosen to give up nuclear weapons programs.
None of these studies adopts a legal perspective, however, and few, if
any, compare or attempt to draw lessons from the international commu-
nity's set of responses to proliferation by India and Pakistan, North
Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya.
This Article analyzes from a legal perspective the responses of the
international community, and especially the Security Council, to these
examples of nuclear proliferation and the impact of those responses on
the vitality of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In doing so, the Arti-
cle identifies and focuses on two key, interrelated themes. The first
theme is the effect on these responses of the NPT's remarkably weak
many close calls; maintaining nuclear peace during the Cold War was far more difficult and
uncertain than U.S. officials and the American public seem to remember today").
42. See, e.g., Bernard Lewis, August 22: Does Iran Have Something in Store?, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 8, 2006, at A10 (in which Lewis, a leading expert on Islam, describes "the apoca-
lyptic worldview of Iran's present rulers" and asserts that "[flor people with this mindset,
MAD [mutual assured destruction] is not a constraint, it is an inducement").
43. See infra Sections IV.B & IV.C.
44. See PERKOVICH, supra note 5; JOEL S. WIT, DANIEL B. PONEMAN & ROBERT L.
GALLUCCI, GOING CRITICAL: THE FIRST NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS (2004).
45. See THE NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT: WHY STATES RECONSIDER THEIR NUCLEAR
CHOICES (Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn & Mitchell B. Reiss eds., 2004); T.V. PAUL,
POWER VERSUS PRUDENCE: WHY NATIONS FORGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2000); PULLING BACK
FROM THE NUCLEAR BRINK: REDUCING AND COUNTERING NUCLEAR THREATS (Barry R.
Schneider & William L. Dowdy eds., 1998); MITCHELL B. REISS, BRIDLED AMBITION: WHY
COUNTRIES CONSTRAIN THEIR NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES (1995); Ariel E. Levite, Never Say
Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited, INT'L SECURITY, Winter 2002-03, at 59.
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mechanisms for detecting violations of NPT obligations. The second
theme is the frequent strong reluctance of the international community,
including the Security Council, to impose serious sanctions for prolifera-
tion activity when it does come to light.
Part I provides an overview of the NPT and the obligations it im-
poses on state parties. Part II analyzes the verification weaknesses of the
NPT. Part III introduces sanctions, including a delineation of what sanc-
tions can potentially accomplish and a description of the sanctions
authority and practice of the Security Council. Part IV examines the
three most salient examples (North Korea, Iran, and India/Pakistan) of
the international community's reluctance to impose sanctions for viola-
tions of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Part V examines three
instances in which sanctions, or the prospect of sanctions, contributed to
stopping or slowing the progress of a country's nuclear weapons pro-
gram. The first example is Iraq, where UN sanctions prevented Saddam
Hussein from reconstituting his nuclear weapons program following the
1991 Gulf War. The second example is Libya, which was influenced by
sanctions to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in 2003. The third
example is India, where the prospect of sanctions played a crucial role in
deterring nuclear weapons testing between 1974 and 1998. Part VI draws
lessons from these six case studies and suggests several measures which
could help save the nuclear nonproliferation regime by increasing its
capacity to deter violations.
I. NPT OVERVIEW
The NPT-the international agreement at the heart of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime46-represents a grand bargain struck between
46. Other legally binding multilateral agreements which are generally considered part
of the nuclear nonproliferation regime include the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125;
Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1995,
1981 U.N.T.S. 129; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature Aug. 6,
1985, 1445 U.N.T.S. 177; Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America, opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S.
281; Final Text of a Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, G.A. Res. 426, U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc A/50/426 (Sept. 13, 1995); and the Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, opened for signature Aug.
5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not yet
entered into force and will not until acceded to by forty-four specified states, only thirty-four
of which have acceded as of August 20, 2006. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty art. XIV &
annex 2, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1443. Since the NPT is at the heart of
the regime and is by far the most relevant of the agreements to the current decline of the nu-
clear nonproliferation regime, it will be the focus of this Article.
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two groups of states: the five states (China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) that had manufactured and exploded a
nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967 (nuclear-weapon states, or
NWSs), and states that had not manufactured and exploded a nuclear
device by that date (non-nuclear-weapon states, or NNWSs). 47 The three
basic elements of the bargain involve nonproliferation, the sharing and
development of nuclear energy technology for peaceful purposes, and
disarmament.
NPT Articles I through III contain the key nonproliferation commit-
ments. In Article I, each NWS undertakes not to transfer nuclear
weapons "to any recipient whatsoever" and "not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce" any NNWS "to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons. ' 8 In Article II, each NNWS undertakes "not to manu-
facture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons" and "not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture" of such weapons.49 In Article
III, each NNWS undertakes to conclude a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its
obligations" under the NPT.5°
Article IV contains the principal commitments related to the devel-
opment and sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Article
IV, paragraph 1 provides that "[n]othing in this Treaty shall be inter-
preted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of
this Treaty."'" Paragraph 2 provides that all parties to the NPT "undertake
to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible ex-
change of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
'52
Article VI contains the key commitments related to disarmament,
providing as follows: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessa-
tion of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament un-
der strict and effective international control.
5 3
47. NPT, supra note 3, art. IX.
48. Id. art. I.
49. Id. art. II
50. Id. art. III.
51. Id. art. IV, para. 1.
52. Id. art. IV, para. 2.
53. Id. art. VI.
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Article X specifies that each party has "the right to withdraw from
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its coun-
try."5 Notice must be given to the other parties and to the Security
Council three months in advance of withdrawal, and shall include a
"statement of the extraordinary events" the withdrawing state regards as
having jeopardized its "supreme interests."55
The nuclear nonproliferation regime's success in its heyday led sev-
eral experts to argue that nuclear nonproliferation had evolved into
binding customary international law. David Koplow wrote in 1993 that
"it is possible to argue that the norm of nuclear non-proliferation is now
so well-established that it has evolved into a binding facet of customary
international law, enveloping even non-parties and providing an inde-
pendent source of authority even if the treaty itself were to succumb.
5 6
Thomas Graham, Jr., who served for fifteen years as general counsel of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and led the
U.S. government's successful efforts to extend indefinitely the NPT in
1995, described the era prior to the 1998 Indian and Pakistani tests as
follows:
[D]espite the Indian test [of 1974] and the refusal of India, Israel
and Pakistan to join the treaty, an international norm of behavior
developed establishing that: the number of nuclear-weapon
states, as defined by international agreement, would remain at
five; that all other parties would be pledged to not acquire nu-
clear weapons; and that three states [Israel, India, and Pakistan]
in an ambiguous status would be tolerated outside the NPT re-
gime.57
George Bunn, the first ACDA general counsel, accused India and
Pakistan, in the wake of their 1998 nuclear tests, of having "violated a
global norm against any more countries with nuclear weapons.""
Is nuclear nonproliferation customary international law today? Cus-
tomary international law is commonly described as law that results from
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them out of a
54. Id. art. X.
55. Id.
56. David A. Koplow, Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article VI of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 301, 390.
57. Thomas Graham, Jr., South Asia and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, May 1998, at 3.
58. " George Bunn, Letter to the Editor, Nuclear Tests Violate International Norm, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, May 1998, at 26, 26-27.
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sense of legal obligation." State practice in the early 1990s, and indeed
still today, manifests more compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation
regime than with many of the most widely recognized customary inter-
national law norms.60 In a 1996 opinion on the legality of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons, 6 ' however, the ICJ undercut the argument that
nuclear nonproliferation has evolved into a binding norm of customary
international law. The ICJ held, by eleven votes to three, that "[t]here is
in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehen-
sive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as
such.,6 ' By seven votes to seven, a tie broken by the vote of the ICJ
President, the Court held that while "the threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict," nevertheless, the Court could not "con-
clude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which
the very survival of a State would be at stake.
63
If customary international law did not in 1996 prohibit in all
circumstances the threat or use of nuclear weapons, it surely did not
prohibit their possession, and if nuclear nonproliferation was not
customary international law in 1996, it is hard to imagine that it is
59. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. I(b), concluded on June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1179.
60. For example, the prohibitions on slavery, genocide, and torture are among the most
commonly listed examples of jus cogens (peremptory norms of general international law). See,
e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring); ANTHONY
AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 257-58 (2000); BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-09, 126 (4th ed. 2003). There are,
however, an estimated twenty-seven million slaves worldwide. See Andrew Cockburn,
21st-Century Slaves, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2003, at 2, available at http://
magma.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0309/feature 1. Iranian President Ahmadinejad has re-
cently advocated the genocidal destruction of Israel (see supra note 40), and genocide
continues to be perpetrated in Sudan (see, e.g., Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls
Killings in Sudan Genocide, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at AI), in both cases with relatively
little interference by the international community. Amnesty International in 2004 claimed that
132 countries "engage in torture and ill treatment of prisoners." War on Terror Called War on
Rights, CBS NEWS, May 26, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/26/world/
main619714.shtml. With just three significant nonparties to the NPT prior to North Korea's
defection, no new nuclear-weapons-possessing states in the twenty-four years prior to the
1998 South Asian detonations, and only one new nuclear-weapons-possessing state since 1998
(North Korea in 2006), nuclear nonproliferation is thus, despite its present challenges, cur-
rently enjoying better compliance than most if not all of thesejus cogens prohibitions.
61. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8).
62. Id. at para. 105.
63. Id.
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customary international law today.6 However, the Security Council has
deemed nuclear proliferation to be a "threat to international peace and
security," and thus nuclear proliferation is subject to its Chapter VII
sanctioning authority regardless of whether or not the proliferation
activity violates the NPT, another treaty, or customary international law.
The rest of this Article examines the international community's use of
the tools legally available to it to detect and sanction the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The Article aims to shed light on the practice of the
international community in the use of these tools and, hopefully,
contribute to their effectiveness and enhancement.
II. THE NPT's VERIFICATION WEAKNESSES
The NPT's verification weaknesses are a function of the NPT's his-
tory, the overlaps between military and civilian nuclear technology, and
the tensions between the nonproliferation and "peaceful use" provisions
of the NPT. The NPT and its principal verification tool, the safeguards
agreement, were developed in the 1960s and 1970s, when the technology
for constructing a nuclear weapon was not widely available and the
greatest proliferation risks were thought to be from technologically ad-
vanced "countries like Germany and Sweden, democratic states that
were fairly open. 65 With such countries, it was relatively easy to both
trust and verify.
Today, more than sixty years after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
detonations, detailed descriptions of how to construct a nuclear weapon
are widely available, including over the Internet.66 It is relatively easy to
create every part of a nuclear weapon except the weapons-grade fissile
material-highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium-at the
weapon's core.67 From a technological perspective, then, only the acqui-
sition of weapons-grade fissile material stands between most states (and
61
sophisticated terrorist groups) and manufacturing a nuclear weapon.
64. One would presumably have to rely on the Security Council and other condemna-
tions of the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests and the Iranian nuclear program
as representing a kind of opinio juris.
65. See Wade Boese, Paul Kerr & Daryl G. Kimball, Reviving Disarmament: An Inter-
view with Hans Blix, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July-Aug. 2006, at 7, 56, available at http:II
www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/Blixlnterview.asp?print (quoting Hans Blix, former
IAEA Director General).
66. See ALLISON, supra note 30, at 93.
67. Id. at 93-95.
68. See COMM. ON ScI. & TECH. FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, MAKING THE NATION SAFER: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 40 (2002).
[Vol. 28:337
Averting Catastrophe
Civilian nuclear power technology and the nuclear technology
needed to develop weapons-grade fissile material overlap considerably.
Any nuclear power program that operates fully independently (with a
"full fuel cycle") includes technology readily adaptable to the production
of weapons-grade fissile material. The fuel cycle stages most readily
adaptable to producing such material are the enrichment and reprocess-
ing stages.69 Yet, under NPT Article IV as currently interpreted, state
parties (including NNWSs) are not prohibited from possessing enrich-
ment or reprocessing technology, or even weapons-grade nuclear
material, so long as the technology and material are "for peaceful pur-
poses" and "in conformity with articles I and II" of the NPT. As IAEA
Director General El Baradei puts it: "[u]nder the current regime ... there
is nothing illicit in a non-nuclear-weapon state having enrichment or re-
processing technology, or possessing weapon-grade nuclear material."7°
The overlap between civilian and military nuclear technologies poses
perhaps the most significant challenge facing the nuclear nonprolifera-
tion regime: the ease with which a state-in the guise of conducting a
peaceful nuclear weapons program---can acquire either weapons-grade
fissile material or the technologies necessary for its production.
Article X provides each state party the right to withdraw from the
NPT at its own discretion. Therefore, once a state bent on developing
nuclear weapons has acquired the requisite material or technologies, it
can withdraw from the NPT and quickly proceed to construct a nuclear
bomb.7 Alternatively, a state progressing towards developing nuclear
weapons might decide to remain within the NPT in order to further ad-
vance its weapons program clandestinely.
72
The NPT's principal tool for detecting cheating by member states on
their nonproliferation obligations is the safeguards agreement, which
Article III requires each NNWS to conclude with the IAEA for the pur-
pose of "verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under
this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
69. See, e.g., BABUR HABIB ET AL., WOODROW WILSON SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, STEMMING
THE SPREAD OF ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY 5 (2005), available at http://www.princeton.edu/
-rskemp/StemningtheSpread of Enrichment Plants.pdf; NuclearFiles.org, The Nuclear
Fuel Cycle, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/
fuel-cycle/ index.htm.
70. Mohamed El Baradei, Towards a Safer World, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 48.
71. Per El Baradei: "Should a state with a fully developed fuel-cycle capability decide,
for whatever reason, to break away from its non-proliferation commitments, most experts
believe it could produce a nuclear weapon within a matter of months." Id.
72. A state may prefer this "cheating" approach for two related reasons: 1) putting off
as long as possible any anti-proliferation pressures that its withdrawal from the NPT might
elicit, and 2) continuing to benefit from nuclear technology trade within the NPT framework.
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peaceful uses to nuclear weapons." The IAEA's model for this safe-
guards agreement is contained in an IAEA document usually referred to
as INFCIRC/153. 7' The safeguards agreements for individual states,
commonly known as "INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements," have
rarely deviated from the model.
Under INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements, parties must report to
the IAEA on their nuclear facilities and the nuclear material that moves
through them. The INFCIRC/153 agreements are significantly flawed,
however, in that they contain no effective mechanism for the IAEA to
assess whether the reports are complete." The agreements operate on the
assumption that all states declare all relevant facilities and materials.76
The lack of IAEA verification authority under the INFCIRC/153 agree-
ments is compounded by the fact that neither the INFCIRC/153
agreements, the NPT, nor international law in general provide specific
penalties for lying to international organizations. The international
community's failure to detect the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the
1980s demonstrated the verification weaknesses of the INFCIRC/153
safeguards agreements. According to Pierre Goldschmidt, former Deputy
Director General of the IAEA, in 1991 "the world discovered that Iraq
had been developing over more than a decade, a secret nuclear weapon
programme completely separate from its civil nuclear programme de-
clared to and inspected by the IAEA.'77
The verification shortcomings prompted the IAEA to issue a model
protocol in 1997 to be appended to the INFCIRC/153 agreements (the
Additional Protocol)."8 The Additional Protocol expands the IAEA's ac-
cess rights and requires parties to submit a broader range of information
to the IAEA about their nuclear programs. 79 As the IAEA explained:
73. IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States
Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA
Doc. INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (June 1972).
74. See IAEA, 1AEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, available
at www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/SI-Safeguards.pdf [hereinafter IAEA Safe-
guards Fact Sheet]; see also Ephraim Asculai, Rethinking the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Regime, 70 JAFFEE CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUD. 1, 30-31 (2004).
75. Asculai, supra note 74, at 31.
76. Id.
77. Pierre Goldschmidt, Former Deputy Dir. Gen. of the IAEA, Address Before the
Charlottesville Committee On Foreign Relations: Is the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime in
Crisis? If so, why? Are there remedies? (May 11, 2006), available at http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/GoldschmidtCCFRIMay_2006.pdf.
78. IAEA Safeguards Fact Sheet, supra note 74; Asculai, supra note 74, at 31; IAEA,
Model Protocol Addition to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540 (corrected) (Sept.
1997).
79. See IAEA Safeguards Fact Sheet, supra note 74.
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"While the chief object of safeguards under INFCIRC/153 is to verify
that declared nuclear material was not diverted, the chief object of the
new measures ... is to obtain assurance that the State has no undeclared
activities."80 The IAEA did not make adherence to the Additional Proto-
col mandatory for NPT members,8 ' however, and 121 of the 189 NPT
member states, including many states of proliferation concern, have yet
82
to join.
One NPT state party which has refused to adhere to the Additional
Protocol is Iran. As the IAEA discovered in 2002 through a tip from a
dissident group, Iran "concealed a considerable number of nuclear facili-
ties, materials and activities" from the IAEA for eighteen years in
violation of Iran's NPT safeguards obligations.83 According to Gold-
schmidt, "[a]s it stands, the investigating authority of the agency is too
limited with regard to Iran. To do its job properly it needs to have more
authority than is currently available to it.' 8
The IAEA's long failure to detect Libya's nuclear weapons program
also illustrates the weaknesses of the IAEA's standard verification re-
gime. Libya became an NPT party in 1975,85 but it did not adhere to the
Additional Protocol until 2006.86 Until late 2003, Libyan officials
80. IAEA, International Nuclear Verification Series: The Evolution of IAEA Safe-
guards, at 27, IAEA Doc. IAEA/NVS/2 (Nov. 1998).
81. For a compelling argument that the NPT could have been interpreted to make the
Additional Protocol compulsory for all NPT members, see George Bunn, Inspection for Clan-
destine Nuclear Activities: Does the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Provide Legal Authority
for the International Atomic Energy Agency's Proposals for Reform?, NUCLEAR L. BULL.,
June 1996, at 9.
82. IAEA, Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols, http:/
www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg-protocol.html (updated Mar. 22, 2007) [hereinafter
IAEA, Strengthened Safeguards System]. States of potential proliferation concern which did
not have the Additional Protocol in force as of March 22, 2007, included Belarus, Brazil,
Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Yemen.
83. Goldschmidt, supra note 77, at 5.
84. Con Coughlin, UN Inspectors "Powerless to Stop Atom Bomb Plans in Iran ", SUN-
DAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 9, 2005, at 25. With respect to Iran, the IAEA now believes
that even the Additional Protocol would be insufficient to ensure the absence of a nuclear
weapons program. The IAEA Director General recently stated as follows:
Without full transparency that extends beyond the formal legal requirements of the
Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol ... the Agency's ability to ... ver-
ify the correctness and completeness of the statements made by Iran, particularly
with regard to its centrifuge enrichment programme, will be limited ....
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Report by the Director General, at 11, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15 (Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter
IAEA DG Report of Feb. 27, 2006].
85. See United Nations, Status, supra note 7.
86. IAEA, Strengthened Safeguards System, supra note 82.
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insisted that their nuclear research was "aimed at developing a domestic
nuclear power industry. 8 7 Earlier that year, Libyan leader Muammar
Qaddafi8  denied any interest in the possession of nuclear weapons,
claiming "they are of no use to us, and we don't have enough money to
manufacture weapons of mass destruction., 89 But in December 2003,
under pressure from sanctions imposed by the United States, the Libyan
government admitted that it had been pursuing a nuclear weapons pro-
gram and agreed to dismantle it.' Libya opened the program to
international inspectors, who found it "unexpectedly advanced."9' Con-
trary to its NPT obligations, Libya for more than a decade had failed to
report required developments to the IAEA.92 "Our experience with Libya
shows," stated Goldschmidt, "that it is almost impossible for the agency
to decide whether a country's nuclear intentions are peaceful or other-
wise .... If the Libyans had not admitted [that they were trying to build
a nuclear bomb], we would not have been able to prove it."93
The overlaps between military and civilian nuclear technology, ten-
sions between nonproliferation and "peaceful use" provisions of the
NPT, and safeguards agreement weaknesses combine to make it very
difficult to demonstrate definitively that a country is pursuing a non-
peaceful nuclear program. "In hindsight," wrote IAEA Director General
El Baradei, "a number of the premises of the [NPT] seem less than opti-
mal .... [I]t relied on the promise of the signatories to use nuclear
materials for peaceful purposes only."94 Unfortunately, that reliance
largely continues to this day.
III. INTRODUCTION TO SANCTIONS
Parts IV and V of this Article examine case studies of the interna-
tional community's responses to nuclear proliferation and the pivotal
87. Coughlin, supra note 84.
88. There is no standardized way to spell the last name of Libya's dictator. The Wash-
ington Post spells it "Gaddafi," the Wall Street Journal spells it "Gadhafi," and the New York
limes spells it "Qaddafi." This Article adopts the New York limes' spelling but retains the
original spellings in all quotes.
89. Lally Weymouth, The Former Face of Evil, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 2003, at 36.
90. See infra Section V.B.
91. Peter Slevin & Walter Pincus, Libya Made Progress in Nuclear Goal, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 2003, at Al.
92. Peter Slevin & Dan Williams, Libya Agrees to Rapid Nuclear Inspections; U.S.
Says Sanctions Cannot be Lifted Until Disarmament is Confirmed by Monitors, WASH. POST,
Dec. 23, 2003, at AI4.
93. Coughlin, supra note 84.
94. El Baradei, supra note 70.
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impact of those responses on the vitality of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. In order to fully understand the international community's
choices, however, it is essential first to understand the full range of the
international community's sanctioning options. This Part sets the stage
for the rest of the Article, beginning with a general discussion of the
purposes of sanctions, and then turning to the specific sanctioning au-
thorities and practices of the UN Security Council.
Policymakers have four primary tools for responding to proliferant
or other objectionable behavior on the international plane: statements,
soldiers (military force), and two middle options: economic sanctions
and positive incentives. While Parts IV and V will consider all of these
tools in assessing the international community's responses to nuclear
proliferation, this Article focuses primarily on economic sanctions. Mere
condemnatory statements are unlikely to have a meaningful impact on
objectionable behavior, especially when the stakes are as high as with
nuclear proliferation. In contrast, while the application of overpowering
military force can end most objectionable behavior, the recent U.S. ex-
perience in Iraq has reminded us that the cost of military action can be
high and the consequences uncertain.
Positive incentives run the risk of creating moral hazards. For exam-
ple, offering a benefit to a noncompliant state in exchange for its
compliance-a benefit not available to a similarly situated compliant
state-can encourage noncompliance. Positive incentives should there-
fore only be offered in exchange for commensurate concessions by the
target state. These could include 1) in exchange for commensurate com-
pliance, lifting sanctions that were imposed on the noncompliant state as
a consequence of its noncompliance (Part VI discusses how this was
done with Libya); or 2) in exchange for concessions that go beyond the
target's legal obligations or other baseline of acceptable international
behavior, providing incentives that go beyond what is available to simi-
larly situated states that have remained compliant or otherwise within the
bounds of acceptable behavior (Part IV discusses how this was done
with North Korea). The prospect of a complete lifting of sanctions in
exchange for compliance can be a powerful incentive. Rewarding partial
compliance with a partial easing of sanctions can also have a useful role,
by building mutual confidence and encouraging a bargaining process
which will lead to further concessions.95
95. See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions:
Lessons from the 1990s, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 1, 16
(David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002).
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Sanctions may be imposed unilaterally, by an ad hoc coalition of
states, by a regional organization such as the European Union, or by the
Security Council. The entity imposing the sanctions is often referred to
as the "sender," and the entity upon which the sanctions are imposed is
often labeled the "target." Senders are often authorized by law to impose
sanctions only after a determination that such sanctions will advance
certain specified goals. For example, as Section B.2 of this Part details,
the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to impose sanctions only
if it determines that such measures are necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. However, the legally mandated thresh-
old rationales for sanctions are not always the sender's sole or even
primary motivations for imposing the sanctions. A realistic assessment of
sanctions practice must take into account both the legally authorized ra-
tionales and the senders' actual and potential goals. Scholarly
assessments of the efficacy of sanctions often focus on only a few of the
16broad range of purposes for sanctions, therefore providing an incom-
plete picture of sanctions motivations and effectiveness. The following
Section delineates a full list of potential sanctions goals, which are then
applied in Part IV to assess the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on
North Korea and Iran by the Security Council.
A. Sanctions Goals
The major goals potentially served by the imposition of sanctions in
the international arena include: coercion, containment, deterrence, pav-
ing the way politically for future stronger sanctions, creating a legal
foundation upon which some senders will immediately be able to build
additional stronger sanctions, retribution, and satisfying the sender's
domestic audience by "doing something."
1. Coercing a Change in Target Behavior
Sanctions can be imposed for coercive purposes, such as forcing the
target to withdraw from occupied territory, hand over suspects, or com-
ply with nonproliferation measures. Sanctions contribute to the
achievement of coercive foreign policy goals when the total costs im-
posed or threatened by the sanctions activity are higher than the costs the
target expects to incur from complying with the sender's demands.97 It is
important to note that if the sender is demanding regime change, the tar-
96. For example, Cortright and Lopez exclude from their analyses the role that sanc-
tions can serve in deterring future wrongdoing. Id. at 7.
97. See Kimberly Ann Elliott, Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions, in SMART
SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, supra note 95, at 171, 171.
[Vol. 28:337
Averting Catastrophe
get leadership's costs of compliance are likely to be higher than the costs
of defiance, and coercive sanctions are unlikely to succeed.98 It should
also be noted that the use of the pain of sanctions to coerce target behav-
ior tends to assume those subject to sanctions perceive their self-interest
in Western capitalist terms (e.g., they value economic prosperity and
physical pleasure). Alternate potential target state motivators, such as
nationalism, religious conviction, and other ideologies that exalt martyr-
dom and suffering can raise the level of pain necessary to achieve
coercion or even render coercion impossible.
2. Reducing or Containing Target Ability to
Implement Objectionable Policies
The classic sanction designed to reduce or contain a target's ability
to implement objectionable policies is an arms or fuel embargo imposed
on an aggressor. Another example is a restriction on the export of sensi-
tive nuclear technologies to a target attempting to develop nuclear
weapons. The idea is that regardless of whether the sanctions achieve
other goals, such as coercively changing the target leadership's plans,
they will change its capabilities. Sanctions contribute to containment
when they materially reduce the target's supply of goods necessary to the
implementation of the objectionable policies. The success of sanctions
designed to contain target behavior depends on the target's inability to
produce or acquire substitute goods of an acceptable quality and compa-
rable price.
3. Deterring Other Actors That Might Contemplate
Objectionable Actions
Regardless of whether sanctions succeed in changing the target lead-
ership's intentions or capabilities, they can change the cost-benefit
calculations of, and thus deter, other actors that might be contemplating
objectionable activities. Sanctions contribute to achieving deterrence
when such other actors, observing the imposition of sanctions on the
target, increase their assessments of the likelihood or cost of sanctions
being imposed on them if they engage in activities objectionable to the
sender.
Sanctions may have an enhanced deterrent or "demonstration" effect
on actors contemplating objectionable actions similar to those under-
taken by the target. In this sense, sanctions imposed in response to a
target violating a particular norm can be said to reaffirm that norm by
98. Id. at 173.
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helping deter future violations of it. Sanctions can also have a deterrent
effect vis-A-vis unrelated potential actions objectionable to the sender.
Deterrent sanctions achieve their goals when the total estimated
costs of the potential objectionable activity (the recalculated likelihood
and cost of sanctions plus any other costs of the activity) are deemed by
the potential actor to be higher than the value the potential actor expects
to accrue from the activity. As with coercively focused sanctions, the
deterrent use of sanctions tends to rely on the target perceiving its self-
interest in Western capitalist terms and may be less applicable to actors
motivated by nationalism, religious conviction, and other ideologies that
exalt values including martyrdom and suffering.
4. Paving the Way Politically for Future Stronger Sanctions
In this variant, senders impose a relatively weak first set of sanctions
with the view that even if this first set does not fully achieve its primary
goal, such as changing the target leadership's intentions or capabilities
(or deterring other actors), it will help pave the way politically for future
stronger sanctions more likely to fully achieve those goals. For example,
a sender that believes the use of force will likely be required to end a
target's objectionable behavior may first impose economic sanctions on
the target so as to ensure that the use of force not only is, but is also seen
to be, a measure of last resort.
Thus, the intended audience for such a first set of sanctions is at least
in part those whose political support would be sought for stronger sanc-
tions (for example, other Security Council members or other potential
senders or politically powerful entities in the sender's own country that
may be skeptical about imposing the stronger set of sanctions). A first set
of sanctions that does not fully achieve its goals is likely to help build
support for stronger sanctions when it is seen by some or all of this audi-
ence as implemented in good faith, effectively, and for a period of time
sufficient for this first set of sanctions to take hold.
The use of a first set of sanctions to build support for future stronger
sanctions assumes that irreversible harm, of a magnitude unbearable to
the sender's interests, will not occur while waiting for the first set of
sanctions to run its course and the stronger set of sanctions to be ap-
proved and implemented. The risk of such an interim harm may lead a
sender who would like, but is not dependent on, political support for
stronger sanctions (e.g., a state that is willing to use force in the absence
of Security Council authorization) to consider skipping this first set of
sanctions, particularly if the sender is not certain that trying a first set
would make a pivotal difference in garnering audience support.
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5. Creating a Legal Foundation Upon Which Some Senders
Can Immediately Build Additional Sanctions
Even if a set of sanctions does not fully achieve its primary goals,
such as changing the target leadership's intentions or capabilities (or de-
terring other actors), it may provide some senders with the requisite legal
authority to immediately impose stronger sanctions more likely to
achieve those goals. For example, the domestic laws of some UN mem-
ber states make it difficult for their governments to impose sanctions in
the absence of a UN Security Council sanctions resolution but make it
relatively easy, once such a resolution exists, for those governments to
impose sanctions broader than the resolution's specific requirements."
Similarly, several UN member states, including the United States,
have interpreted the specific measures required by Security Council
resolutions as both a nonderogable minimum requirement of interna-
tional law and as a "general grant" of international legal "authority to
impose restrictions which may go beyond the terms of the relevant reso-
lutions."''0° This can be critical when such additional sanctions might
otherwise be deemed to violate sender obligations under another interna-
tional agreement.
6. Imposing Retributive Punishment on the Target
The reasoning behind using sanctions to impose retributive punish-
ment on international actors is analogous to the reasoning behind using
sanctions to impose retributive punishment on domestic criminals. There
are three major theories as to when retribution is achieved.' °' Under the
assaultive retribution variant, retribution is achieved when the criminal is
made to suffer.'0 2 Under the protective retribution variant, retribution is
achieved when a criminal pays his debt to society by enduring punish-
ment proportional to the crime committed.' 3 Under the victim
vindication variant, retribution is achieved when the criminal receives
punishment proportional to the offense to the victim.'4 The idea of retri-
bution as a motivation for sanctions in the international arena is that
regardless of whether the sanctions achieve any other goals, they will at
99. See infra Section IV.C (which discusses how this was a factor with respect to the
December 2006 Security Council Iran sanctions resolution).
100. Gian Luca Burci, Senior Legal Officer, World Health Org., Address at the Lauter-
pacht Center for International Law: Legal Aspects of UN Economic Sanctions (Feb. 11, 2000),
available at http://lcil.law.cam.ac.uk/Burci.doc.
101. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 17-18 (3d ed. 2001).
102. Id. at 17.
103. Id. at 17-18.
104. Id. at 18.
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least impose that suffering, reclaim that debt, or enforce that propor-
tional punishment.
In contrast with the use of international sanctions to coerce, contain,
or deter, the use of sanctions to punish is only appropriate when the tar-
get's behavior is not only objectionable but also violates international
law. As with coercively focused and deterrent sanctions, the retributive
use of sanctions seems at least partially reliant on the actor sharing
Western capitalist values. Suffering and proportional punishment devised
from a Western perspective may not have the desired retributive impact
when applied to actors motivated by nationalism, religious conviction,
and other ideologies that exalt values including martyrdom and suffer-
ing.
7. Satisfying a Sender's Domestic Audience by "Doing Something"
Sanctions can also serve principally as "a steam valve to relieve
[sender] governments from the pressure of their populace," with coer-
cion, containment, and deterrence "of secondary concern."'' 5 This is the
only "non-substantive" sanctions goal, in that it does not seek to further
substantively the repair or containment on the international plane of the
harm done by the act that gave rise to the sanctions.
It is important to note in connection with the disparate sanctions
purposes described above that the sender's goals for imposing a particu-
lar sanction often change over time. It is also important to note that even
when a group of states acts together to impose sanctions, through the
Security Council for example, each state may have different motivations
for doing so. This can lead to disputes when evaluating whether sanc-
tions should be modified or lifted in response to a concession by a target
state or another development that may better satisfy one sending state's
motivations than another's.'06
B. Sanctions Authority and Practice of the UN Security Council
1. Security Council Sanctions in Historical Perspective
More than one hundred sanctions regimes have been imposed by a
variety of senders during the past one hundred years. The most compre-
hensive and still the most influential study of sanctions regime efficacy
was produced by the Institute for International Economics (IIE), which
105. See DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 12 (1999).
106. See Simon Chesterman & Beatrice Pouligny, Are Sanctions Meant to Work? The
Politics of Creating and Implementing Sanctions Through the United Nations, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 503, 506 (2003).
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examined 115 cases of economic sanctions, beginning with World War I
and ending in 1989. '07 The liE's assessment of the efficacy of sanctions
was quite pessimistic, as were a number of other scholarly assessments
based on the pre-1990 sanctions record.'0 9 However, the vast majority of
the pre-1990s cases involved unilateral sanctions," ° which are, if en-
forced with equal rigor, inherently less effective than Security Council
sanctions binding on all UN member states. In assessing the potential
effectiveness of UN sanctions, this Article will therefore focus on the
record of UN sanctions themselves.
Between the founding of the UN in 1945 and the end of the Cold
War, the Security Council imposed mandatory economic sanctions
against only two targets: a broad economic embargo against Rhodesia...
and an arms embargo against South Africa.' 2 Cold War tensions pre-
vented agreement on sanctions in even exceptionally compelling cases.
For example, following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Iran in No-
vember 1979, the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution
calling for economic sanctions. 3
In 1990, with the Cold War ice broken, the United States and the So-
viet Union together voted to impose comprehensive trade sanctions on
Iraq in response to its occupation of Kuwait." 4 Since then, the Security
Council has adopted more than seventy sanctions resolutions in relation
to at least fifteen target states.'
5
2. The Security Council's Legal Authority to Impose Sanctions
a. Overview
The circumstances under which the Security Council may impose
binding sanctions are set forth in Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
l 6
which requires the Council to make three legally distinct determinations
107. See GARY HUFBAUER, JEFFREY SCOTT & KIMBERLY ELLIOTT, ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (1990).
108. See Kimberly Elliott, Economic Leverage and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,
2003 INST. FOR INT'L ECON. 1, 3.
109. See DREZNER, supra note 105, at 10-11.
110. Elliott, supra note 108, at 3.
Il1. See S.C. Res. 232 (Dec. 16, 1966).
112. S.C. Res. 418 (Nov. 4, 1977).
113. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Unilateral Versus Collective Sanctions: An American's
Perception, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 95 (Vera Gowl-
land-Debbas ed., 2002).
114. See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
115. See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humani-
tarian Impact of Sanctions, http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?site=sanctions.
116. Chapter VII contains Charter Articles 39-51.
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in the course of imposing sanctions. First, the Council must determine
that there exists a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of ag-
gression." 7 Second, the Council has to "decide what measures shall be
taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security."
' ' 8
Third, the Council must decide what measures are "to be employed to
give effect to [the Council's] decisions."" 9 Article 41 provides an illus-
trative list of "measures not involving the use of armed force" that may
be employed by the Security Council to give effect to its decisions. l0
Article 42 provides an illustrative list of measures involving the use of
force that may be employed by the Security Council to give effect to its
decisions.
21
Articles 25 and 103 provide Security Council sanctions with legal
force. Article 25 provides that "the Members of the United Nations agree
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accor-
dance with the present Charter."'122 Article 103 provides that "in the event
of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Na-
tions under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail." 121 In other words, Article 25 makes Council decisions binding
on all member states and Article 103 provides that compliance with such
decisions takes precedence over member obligations under any other
international agreement.
Article 103's specification that Security Council decisions take
precedence over existing international law is consistent with Article 1(1),
which implies that the Council is bound to act, but only in certain cir-
cumstances, "in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law."'21 4 The reference to the principles of justice and inter-
national law only appears in the part of the paragraph that relates to the
peaceful settlement of disputes and situations under Chapter VI,12' and
thus does not apply to the binding measures taken by the Council under
Chapter VII to prevent or remove threats to the peace. According to one
expert on Charter history, "the rejection of such a provision stemmed
from concerns by the United States and others that when the Council
117. U.N. Charter art. 39.
118. Id.
119. Id. art. 41.
120. Id. In Charter parlance, "decision" is a term of art for binding measures imposed
under the authority of Chapter VII.
121. Id. art. 42.
122. Id. art. 25.
123. Id. art. 103.




acts under Chapter VII to respond to threats to the peace, it need not feel
constrained by existing law. "' As a result, the measures the Council im-
poses under Chapter VII need not be consistent with any existing non-
Charter international law other than peremptory norms.117
The rest of this subsection will analyze the language of, and practice
under, each of the three determinations necessary to imposition of a
sanction. By delineating the extraordinary breadth of the Security Coun-
cil's authority to impose sanctions, this analysis informs subsequent
discussion of the Council's reluctance to use more than a fraction of that
authority to counter nuclear proliferation.
b. Determining The Existence of a Threat to the Peace,
Breach of the Peace, or Act of Aggression
In order to impose binding sanctions under Chapter VII, the Council
first must determine that there exists a "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression." The Charter does not define what consti-
tutes a threat to the peace."' One prominent scholar opined that in
practice this phrase has "come to mean whatever situations can com-
mand an affirmative vote of the Council."'
129
The Council has been willing to find a "threat to the peace" in the
absence of existing or even imminent armed conflict, in the absence of a
clear transnational element, and in the absence of any breach of
international law. This was crystallized in a statement by the president of
the Council at the conclusion of a special Council meeting held in 1992
at the level of heads of state and government. Speaking on behalf of the
Council, the president declared that the "absence of war and military
conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and
security," that the "non-military sources of instability in the economic,
social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace
and security," and that the "proliferation of all weapons of mass
destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security."'3° As
Hans Kelsen has pointed out, the purpose of enforcement action under
Chapter VII "is not to maintain or restore the law, but to maintain or
126. Steven R. Ratner, The Security Council and International Law, in THE UN SECU-
RITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21sT CENTURY 591, 592 (David M. Malone ed.,
2004).
127. Iran is therefore incorrect in arguing that its rights under the NPT take priority over
the Security Council's decision that it curtail its nuclear program. See infra Section IV.C.2.
128. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, UN Sanctions and International Law: An Overview, in
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 113, at 1, 8.
129. See Lowenfeld, supra note 113, at 96.
130. The President of the Security Council, supra note 12.
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restore peace, which is not necessarily identical with the law."'' Thus, if
an act of nuclear proliferation constitutes a threat to international peace
and security, the Security Council can sanction the proliferant regardless
of whether the act is a violation of the NPT or any other international
legal instrument.
c. Deciding What Measures Shall Be Taken to Maintain
or Restore International Peace and Security
The Council must next "decide what measures shall be taken ... to
maintain or restore international peace and security."'' 32 These measures
typically involve actions by the target state to correct its objectionable
acts (for example, by reversing the acts or forfeiting any advantage
gained from them). The measures often involve the target state bringing
itself into compliance with preexisting legal obligations, but may also
require the target state to go beyond some preexisting legal obliga-
tions."'
d. Deciding What Measures Are to Be Employed to
Give Effect to the Council's Decisions
The third determination the Council must make in imposing sanc-
tions is a decision as to what measures are "to be employed to give effect
to [the Council's] decisions.' 34 These measures are typically economic
sanctions, the use of force, or other steps designed to coerce, contain, or
deter. The determination to impose such measures is sometimes made in
a later resolution, after it has become clear that the target state is not
complying with the measures specified by the Council as necessary to
maintain or restore internationl peace and security.1
31
As the above analysis reflects, the Council is, as a matter of law,
vested with considerable but not complete discretion as to when, for
what purposes, and how it may deploy its sanctioning authority. In prac-
tice, that discretionary power is even greater. UN member states, acting
within the Security Council, "have carefully avoided recognizing that the
Council's authority may be subject to limits. ' According to StevenRatner, "the concern that the Council might act either beyond its powers
131. See HANS KELSEN, THE LAw OF THE UNITED NATIONS 294 (1964).
132. U.N. Charter art. 39.
133. For an example of the latter, see the discussion at Section V.B., infra, of S.C. Res.
1718, supra note 12 (responding to North Korea's nuclear test).
134. U.N. Charter art. 41.
135. See Burci, supra note 100, at 5.
136. See Bartram S. Brown, Book Reviews: UN Sanctions in International Law, 96 AM.
J. INT'L L. 506, 506 (2002).
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in the Charter or in violation of other norms of international law" is
"considered rather irrelevant by government officials and political scien-
tists.'', 3 7 Some scholars, including Erika de Wet, have argued that the
Council is not insulated from the possibility of acting ultra vires and in
fact regularly engages in illegal behavior."' De Wet favors judicial re-
view of Council resolutions by the ICJ, but recognizes that the ICJ's role
in "enforcing limitations to the powers of the Security Council will re-
main limited for some time to come."'39 The ICJ's limited role in
reviewing the Council's discretion is fortunate, as the Security Council
even in the absence of judicial review already finds itself incapable of
effectively addressing many of the difficult challenges it faces (including
nuclear proliferation). 40 If judicial review of Security Council action
becomes established, critical "action may be irreparably delayed while
the target state challenges the lawfulness of that action."'
' 4
'
At present, the most significant external check on the Security
Council's sanctions authority appears to be the Council's dependence on
the perception by UN member states that the Council's dictates arel •• 142
legitimate. Since the Council is often dependent for the enforcement of
sanctions on the good will of states, including states neighboring the
target that may not be Council members, it is in the Council's interest to
maximize the perceived legitimacy of its sanctions and other acts.
41
3. Implementation and Effectiveness of Security Council Sanctions
During the first four years following the end of the Cold War, the
Security Council imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on three
countries: Iraq (1990), the former Yugoslavia (1992), and Haiti (1994).
In the dozen years since 1994, the Council has never again imposed
comprehensive economic sanctions. Comprehensive economic sanctions
were the subject of great controversy during the second half of the
1990s, in considerable part due to the widespread perception that
137. Ratner, supra note 126, at 603.
138. See ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL 370 (2004).
139. Id. at372-74.
140. See Jose E. Alvarez, Review Essay: Between Law and Power, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
926, 932 (2005).
141. John Dugard, Judicial Review of Sanctions, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 113, at 83, 90.
142. See Burci, supra note 100. Internal checks include the veto and the conflicting
interests of the five veto-holding members of the Council. For further discussion of legitimacy
issues, see infra note 531.
143. See Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
175, 187 (2005). For an example in the nuclear nonproliferation context, see infra note 531.
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sanctions on Iraq were hurting innocent Iraqis while not commensurately
advancing the purposes for which sanctions had been imposed.' 44 The
debate over the Iraq sanctions experience continues to shape sanctions
policy.
Section V.A of this Article addresses the Iraq sanctions case in detail.
Drawing on information about the Iraqi weapons programs that came to
light following the occupation of Iraq by coalition forces in April 2003,
the Article concludes that the Iraq sanctions were very effective in reduc-
ing the Iraqi regime's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction.
Drawing on post-occupation investigations of the Iraq sanctions, includ-
ing especially the oil-for-food program, the Article also concludes that
the responsibility for the vast majority of the suffering of the Iraqi people
during the sanctions period lies with the Saddam Hussein regime and not
the Security Council.
Concern during the late 1990s over the impact of comprehensive
sanctions on Iraq contributed to the Security Council turning instead to-
wards "targeted sanctions."14 Targeted sanctions are "intended to focus
coercive pressure on those responsible for wrongdoing, while minimiz-
ing unintended negative impacts."'146 Targeted sanctions explicitly seek to
limit the impact of sanctions on the populace at large by focusing sanc-
tions as much as possible on the activities, assets, and tools of particular
individuals and institutions that are responsible for the objectionable be-
havior that prompted the sanctions. 4 7 They aim to do so by denying
"access to specific products or activities that are necessary to the conduct
of an objectionable policy and that are valuable to decisionmaking el-
ites.' 44 The principal types of targeted sanctions the Security Council
has deployed thus far include bans on flights into and out of the target
country; bans on foreign travel by decision-making elites; freezing over-
144. As a French representative to the Security Council put it, the effects of the Iraq
sanctions "should lead the Council to question, in the future, the effectiveness and conse-
quences of broad, indiscriminate sanctions that hurt civilian populations exclusively and
whose human cost clearly exceeded the political benefits that the Council could expect." Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Meets to Consider Humanitarian Situation in
Iraq; Secretary-General Describes 'Moral Dilemma' for United Nations, U.N. Doc. SC/6833
(Mar. 24, 2000). See also, e.g., Cortright & Lopez, supra note 95, at 1 (noting that "[t]he dis-
astrous impact of the sanctions in Iraq has cast a long shadow. Because of their indiscriminate
impact on innocent and vulnerable populations, comprehensive sanctions have become highly
unpopular").
145. See, e.g., Joseph Stephanides, Foreword to SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING Eco-
NOMIC STATECRAFT, supra note 95, at vii, vii.
146. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 95, at 2.
147. Elliott, supra note 97, at 172.
148. David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Reforming Sanctions, in THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 126, at 167, 170.
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seas financial assets connected to the target regime; and embargoes on
trade in specific commodities on which the regime is particularly de-
pendent, including arms, fuel, luxury goods, and key export commodities
such as diamonds. 49 As Part IV will discuss, the nonproliferation sanc-
tions imposed on North Korea and Iran in late 2006 and early 2007 are
textbook examples of targeted sanctions.
Advocates of targeted sanctions are motivated by a variety of con-
cerns. These include moral aversion to harming innocents, deference to
the humanitarian commitments expressed in the UN Charter, and the
belief that targeted sanctions can more effectively maintain or restore
international peace and security, including by making it more difficult
for target regimes to rally domestic and foreign opposition to sanc-
tions. i"0
Targeted sanctions have clearly achieved the goal of avoiding ad-
verse humanitarian impacts. In none of the cases of targeted sanctions
during the 1990s did "vulnerable populations experience severe conse-
quences as a result of UN action.'15 However, targeted sanctions are less
effective than comprehensive embargoes at achieving the primary pur-
poses for which sanctions are imposed. In their survey of the UN
sanctions cases between 1990 and 2001, Cortright and Lopez classified
three (Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Angola) out of the four most comprehensive
sanctions regimes as being at least partially effective while only two out
of the ten targeted sanctions were deemed at least partially effective."'2
Targeted sanctions are less effective for several reasons. To the ex-
tent that the pain of sanctions felt by a country's general population can
spur it to rise up and pressure the regime into compliance, targeted sanc-
tions designed to avoid impacting the general populace may be a missed
opportunity. In addition, as sanctions become more targeted, monitoring
and implementation can become more complex. For example, it may be
easier to stop all cargo from entering a target country than to open thou-
sands of cargo containers in search of specific banned items hidden
among permitted goods. Also, one major category of targeted sanc-
tions-the freezing of overseas financial assets-tends to be rendered
ineffective by slow Security Council action, which often gives potential
targets sufficient time to withdraw their overseas assets before the freeze
153
occurs.
149. Id. at 170-72.
150. See Andrew Mack & Asif Khan, The Efficacy of UN Sanctions, 31 SECURITY DIA-
LOGUE 279, 288 (2000).
151. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 95, at 6.
152. See id. at 8.
153. See Mack & Khan, supra note 150, at 289.
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Furthermore, some types of targeted sanctions, even when imple-
mented to maximum effect, may simply not impose sufficient costs to
coerce targeted decisionmakers. For example, travel bans may be seen as
little more than a nuisance and arms embargoes may not influence gov-
ernments that possess ample arsenals or arms manufacturing
capabilities. 1 4 As Cortright and Lopez conclude, "[c]omprehensive sanc-
tions are more effective than targeted or selective measures. Where
economic and social impacts have been greatest, political effects have
also been most significant.""'
The targeted sanctions movement has rightly drawn attention to the
need to design and implement sanctions that achieve their objectives as
quickly as possible at the lowest possible human cost to the populace at
large. 15 In doing so, however, targeted sanctions supporters have often
prioritized minimizing the cost to the populace over achieving the over-
all objective."' This may be more or less wise, depending on the cost to
the international community of failure to achieve the overridden objec-
tive.
The movement to revisit economic sanctions has led to the estab-
lishment of two types of institutions, both of which have distilled several
important lessons applicable to maximizing the effectiveness of sanc-
tions of any scope. First, "sanctions committees" are now regularly
established by Security Council sanctions resolutions. These committees
report on how to improve the effectiveness of the sanctions, investigate
and report on violations of the sanctions, and regulate and administer
• 158
humanitarian exceptions. Second, a series of sanctions reform research
initiatives have been launched by the Swiss, German, and Swedish gov-
ernments. 159
Implementation has been a significant weakness of most sanctions
regimes. While some countries vigorously implement UN-mandated
sanctions, others do not. 16 In this era of globalization, when the vast ma-
jority of products can be purchased from (and sold to) more than one
154. See Michael Brzoska, From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions, 9
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 519, 531 (2003) (review essay).
155. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 95, at 8. See also, e.g., Elliott, supra note 97, at 181.
156. See Elliott, supra note 97, at 181.
157. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 95, at 2.
158. Burci, supra note 100, at 4.
159. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 148, at 173-74.
160. See, e.g., David M. Malone, Conclusion, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM
THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 126, at 617, 634 ("Mostly, states wish to
be seen as complying, at least formally .... Nevertheless, widespread sanctions-busting relat-
ing to Iraq and a number of other theaters of Council concern ... belie the substance of
compliance as opposed to the process of it.").
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country, it is critical that sanctions are not only formally universal but
also universally implemented. Globalization, the increasing integration
of the international economy, "is a double-edged sword for economic
sanctions," because interdependence both increases a target's potential
vulnerability to disruption of international trade and capital flows and
increases the opportunities for it to evade sanctions. 16 As globalization
proceeds, sanctions implemented by a small number of states become
increasingly ineffective, while universally implemented sanctions be-
come increasingly effective. 62 The sanctions committees and reform
initiatives have found that while some states fail to fully implement sanc-
tions resolutions out of a lack of political will, others fail due to a lack of
capacity. So while one recommendation for reform calls for imposing
sanctions against those who are found to be deliberately violating sanc-
tions, 16 another recommendation calls for the international community
to significantly increase technical assistance and expert advice to states
needing implementation help.64
The development of sanctions committees staffed by experts has im-
proved the administration of each discrete set of sanctions. However, the
Council's creation of a discrete committee for each target state has re-
sulted in "little accumulation of knowledge" at the institutional level.'
65
This problem inspired a recommendation that the UN Secretariat de-
velop a specialized unit in charge of pre-assessment and monitoring of
sanctions regimes. 16 Unfortunately, the Security Council has declined to
adopt these and many other expert recommendations, "sometimes for
political reasons" and "sometimes because their implementation would
have required resources that member states were unwilling to mobi-
lize."'67
IV. THE RELUCTANCE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote that, "[i]f you want to know the
law.., you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
161. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Trends in Economic Sanctions Policy: Challenges to Conven-
tional Wisdom, in INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS 3, 3 (Peter Wallensteen & Carina Staibano eds.,
2005).
162. Id.
163. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 148, at 177.
164. Id.
165. See Chesterman & Pouligny, supra note 106, at 514.
166. Id.
167. See Brzoska, supra note 154, at 524.
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consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a
good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience."' 68 Holmes' "bad man,"
in trying to predict the material consequences of proliferation, or of non-
compliance with the NPT, would consider both the probability of getting
caught and the sanctions likely to be imposed if caught. As discussed in
Part II, it is exceptionally difficult under the basic safeguards agreement
to detect an NPT violation. Part III delineated the Security Council's
legal authority to sanction any proliferant activity, regardless of whether
or not that activity violates the NPT or any other legal instrument. This
Part reviews several key examples of the international community's re-
luctance to impose sanctions for proliferant activity, including even
clear-cut violations of nuclear nonproliferation law.
A. Safeguards Agreements
In the classic article Broken Windows, James Wilson and George
Kelling describe how unaddressed legal violations can foster additional
and more serious legal violations by contributing to a sense of lawless-
ness. 169 The international community's failure to sanction minor NPT
violations by a large number of countries thus raises significant ques-
tions and is worth noting before turning to the failure to address major
nonproliferation violations.
NPT Article III requires that state parties "shall conclude" safe-
guards agreements with the IAEA. Thirty NPT state parties have yet to
conclude such safeguards agreements. 7 In the absence of such agree-
ments, the IAEA has no authority to carry out inspections in these
countries. 7 ' Yet the failure of these countries to comply with this basic
procedural obligation of NPT membership has drawn no response from
168. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rev. 457, 459
(1897).
169. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29.
170. IAEA, NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: Overview of Status, http://
www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/nptstatusoverview.html (updated Mar. 22,
2007).
171. But see Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilat-
eral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 59, 70 (2003) ("[Mlany
states have failed their duty under the NPT to enter into a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA. However, this has not been a matter of major international significance, as virtually all
those noncomplying states have no nuclear materials or equipment that would trigger the ac-
tual application of safeguards."). Although many of the countries without safeguards seem
unlikely to develop nuclear weapons programs in the foreseeable future, one country on the




other NPT states. '72 It is not hard to imagine that the fact that these thirty
countries are in violation of their own basic NPT obligations may make
them less likely to hold proliferants to their obligations. Another flouted
obligation, procedural in nature, is the failure by the IAEA Board of
Governors for over two years to abide by its own governing statute and
promptly report Iranian noncompliance to the U.S. Security Council.'73
The following two Sections analyze how and why the international
community, faced with a series of substantive NPT violations by North
Korea and Iran, failed for years to impose sanctions and then, in 2006
and early 2007, imposed sanctions that were too weak to effectively co-
erce, contain, or deter violations. The final Section analyzes how and
why the international community also failed to effectively sanction the
nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, which gravely damaged the broader
nuclear nonproliferation regime.
B. North Korea
North Korea became a party to the NPT in 1985 and concluded a
safeguards agreement in 1992.14 Inconsistencies soon emerged between
North Korea's initial May 1992 report to the IAEA under its safeguards
agreement and the agency's findings.'75 The IAEA requested-and North
Korea refused to provide-additional information and access to two
North Korean sites. 76 In March 1993, North Korea gave three months'
notice of its intention to withdraw from the NPT. In April 1993, the
IAEA Board of Governors formally declared North Korea in noncompli-
ance with its safeguards agreement and, pursuant to Article XII(c) of the
IAEA Statute, referred the issue to the Security Council.
7
In May 1993, the Security Council, in Resolution 825, called upon
North Korea to comply with its safeguards agreement and "reconsider"
its threat to withdraw from the NPT. 78 The United States proposed that
the Council sanction North Korea, but China made clear it would veto
such a measure. 79 Three U.S. officials who played key roles in the crisis
172. See Asculai, supra note 74, at 9 ("[N]o action other than mention of the fact was
taken.").
173. See infra Section IV.C.
174. IAEA, Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/




178. S.C. Res. 825, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993).
179. See Douglas Jehl, North Korea Says It Won't Pull Out of Arms Pact Now, N.Y.
IMES, June 12, 1993, at Al. But see WIT, PONEMAN & GALLUCCI, supra note 44, at 198-200
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assert that, while China opposed North Korea's nuclear program,8 ° it
also "feared that economic sanctions might trigger the collapse of the
North Korean regime, causing a flood of refugees into its northeastern
provinces." 8 '
The Security Council's failure to impose sanctions in response to
North Korea's noncompliance left the United States and its allies to fash-
ion their own ad hoc response. The United States and North Korea
subsequently concluded the Agreed Framework,'8 2 under which the
United States and several partners agreed to compensate North Korea for
taking certain nonproliferation steps, including some that went beyond
North Korea's NPT obligations, and for committing to other nonprolif-
eration steps. 8 3 As part of the deal, North Korea agreed to remain a party
to the NPT.I 4 North Korea did not agree to come into immediate compli-
ance with all of its NPT obligations, but it did agree to comply once the
United States and its partners delivered specified incentives.'
North Korea, however, never did comply with its NPT obligations,
and in 2002 it was caught violating the Agreed Framework. 86 In January
2003, North Korea once again announced its withdrawal from the NPT,
this time with immediate effect.'87 Shortly thereafter, North Korea an-
nounced that it possessed nuclear weapons.188
A strong response by the international community during this period
might well have stopped North Korea from proceeding further with its
nuclear weapons program. The North Korean regime appears extremely
vulnerable to strong sanctions, so long as they include Chinese and
South Korean participation. 8 9 China supplies between seventy and ninety
(expressing the view that at one point in the negotiations China signaled it might have been
willing to abstain on a "limited" sanctions resolution).
180. WIT, PONEMAN & GALLUCCI, supra note 44, at 31 (asserting "China feared that
nuclear weapons in North Korea might trigger an arms race that could destabilize Asia").
181. Id.
182. Agreed Framework, U.S.-N. Korea, October 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 603, available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/af.asp?print.
183. Id.; see also David Sloss, It's Not Broken, So Don't Fix It: The International Atomic
Energy Agency Safeguards System and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 35 VA. J. INT'L L.
841,871-72 (1995).
184. Agreed Framework, supra note 182.
185. Sloss, supra note 183, at 872.
186 IAEA DPRK Fact Sheet, supra note 174; Andrea Koppel & John King, U.S.: North
Korea Admits Nuke Program, CNN.coM, Oct. 15, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002US/
10/16/us.nkorea/.
187. IAEA DPRK Fact Sheet, supra note 174.
188. See Kessler & Pomfret, supra note 36.
189. See Anna Fifield, The Searchfor Pyongyang's Pressure Point, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2006, at 8 (quoting Rudiger Frank, a North Korean economy specialist at the University of
Vienna as stating: "I don't think there is any more room for more sanctions from the usual
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percent of North Korea's oil needs,'9g and China's brief closure in 2003
of its oil pipeline to North Korea for "maintenance" prompted a quick
and conciliatory North Korean response.' 9' The North Korean regime is
also highly dependent on South Korea, which has, since the mid-1990s,
helped sustain it with more than six billion dollars in humanitarian aid,
investment, and other economic assistance.
92
China, however, remained concerned that significant pressure on
North Korea might cause the North Korean regime to collapse, thereby
flooding China with refugees.' 93 Accordingly, China took the lead in pre-
venting the Security Council from responding to North Korea's
noncompliance with its NPT and Agreed Framework obligations, with-
drawal from the NPT, and announcement of a nuclear arsenal.
For example, China in spring 2003 blocked a Security Council
statement criticizing North Korea for its noncompliance and withdrawal,
declaring that such a statement would "complicate" diplomacy with
North Korea. 94 Russia backed the Chinese position, with Russia's UN
ambassador urging "dialogue" and stating, "I think it is a bad idea to
condemn."'95 Two weeks later, North Korea responded to this forbear-
ance by declaring that it "possesses a nuclear arsenal and might sell
some of it to the highest bidder."'' 96 Again, the Security Council took no
action.
Indeed, for eleven years between 1995 and 2006-a period in which
North Korea continually failed to comply with its NPT safeguard
obligations, cheated on the Agreed Framework, withdrew from the NPT,
suspects. To be effective, China and South Korea have to join."); Peter Ford, Nuclear Test
Hangs Over North Korea Talks, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 18, 2006, at 7 (quoting a
"senior US diplomat" as saying "the Chinese have by far the greatest leverage" and "if the
Chinese decided to. .. stop the oil, that would make a difference").
190. Choe Sang-Hun, Can Sanctions Touch Pyongyang?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 11,
2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/l l/news/north.php; Joseph Kahn &
Helene Cooper, North Korea Will Resume Nuclear Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, at A4
(noting that "Beijing provides an estimated 90 percent of North Korea's oil ... and any sus-
tained reduction in oil shipments could cripple the country's already weakened economy.").
191. Jane Macartney, Anger in Beijing Indicates Rethink Over Former Ally, TIMES
(LONDON), Oct. 10, 2006, at 9.
192. Id. (also noting that South Korea is "coming to a bitter realization that its eight
years of providing aid and engagement have only been rewarded with a nuclear test").
193. See, e.g., Kessler & Pomfret, supra note 36.
194. Colum Lynch & Doug Struck, China Blocks U.N. Statement Condemning N. Korea;
Move Hampers Security Council's Effort to Pressure Pyongyang over Nuclear Weapons Pro-
gram, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2003, at A16. China "opposed any council action that would
increase pressure on Pyongyang," including a proposed "relatively mild statement criticizing
North Korea." Colum Lynch, U.N. Council Stalled on N. Korea; U.S., Allies Suspend Push for
Criticism of Nuclear Efforts, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2003, at A19.
195. Lynch & Struck, supra note 194.
196. Kessler & Pomfret, supra note 36.
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and announced it had manufactured nuclear weapons' 97-the Security
Council issued no resolutions referring to any of these North Korean ac-
tions.' 98 Not until North Korea launched ballistic missiles on July 4,
2006, did the Security Council act.' 99 Resolution 1695 imposed missile-
related sanctions' °° and finally condemned North Korea's "announcement
of withdrawal" from the NPT and "stated pursuit of nuclear weapons. ' '20 '
The resolution also urged North Korea "to return at an early date" to the
NPT,202 a statement rendered somewhat ironic by the Security Council's
three-and-a-half years of tardiness in issuing such a call.
Finally, undeterred by the international community's previous weak
responses, North Korea on October 9, 2006, took another step towards a
nuclear arsenal by testing a nuclear weapon. °3 Less than two days later,
North Korean leaders inaugurated a potentially dangerous new era of
nuclear blackmail, announcing: "We hope the situation will be resolved
before an unfortunate incident of us firing a nuclear missile comes. That
depends on how the U.S. will act."2°4
On October 14, 2006, the Security Council responded to North Ko-
rea's nuclear test by passing what President Bush hailed as a "tough"
resolution. 25 Resolution 1718 determined that North Korea's nuclear test
posed a "clear threat to international peace and security ' 20° and set forth
several decisions as to what measures North Korea must take to maintain
international peace and security. In doing so, the resolution very signifi-
cantly broadened both the range of nuclear activities prohibited to North
197. Id.
198. As Dr. Pierre Goldschmidt, who served as Deputy Director General of the IAEA
from 1999 to 2005, put it in May 2006:
Since 1993 North Korea has been declared every year by the IAEA to be in non-
compliance with its safeguard agreements and reported to the United Nations Secu-
rity Council (UNSC), without the latter deciding to take any action. In 2003, North
Korea notified that it was withdrawing from the NPT (the first time this has hap-
pened in the history of the Treaty) and in 2004 declared possessing nuclear
weapons, without any move from the UNSC ....
Goldschmidt, supra note 77, at 4.
199. See S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006).
200. Id. H 3-4.
201. Id. at pmbl.
202. Id. 16.
203. See Ramstad, Solomon & Fairclough, supra note 25.
204. Official Warns U.S. Actions Could Prompt North Korean Missile, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 10, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/arficles/ap/2006/l0/10/asia/ASGEN_
NKoreaNuclear.php.
205. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis; Bush Comments, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 15, 2006,
at A 19.
206. See S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 12, at pmbl.
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Korea under international law and the IAEA's authority to detect such
activities. For example, in ordering that North Korea "act strictly in ac-
cordance with the obligations applicable to parties" under the NPT, °7 the
resolution essentially reimposed the NPT treaty obligations on North
Korea. By mandating that North Korea "abandon all ... existing nuclear
,,20programmes, '  the resolution exceeded the NPT requirements, which
do not categorically prohibit nuclear programs.2 9 The resolution also
required North Korea to provide the IAEA with "such access ... as may
be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA,' 2 ° thereby giving the
IAEA more authority to detect nuclear activities in North Korea than it
possessed under either the NPT or North Korea's IAEA safeguards
agreement. Thus, Resolution 1718 did not merely require North Korea to
bring itself into compliance with any preexisting legal obligations relat-
ing to nuclear nonproliferation; it imposed new, more expansive legal
obligations .21
The resolution also set forth the measures the Council would employ
to give effect to its decisions. It banned the export to North Korea of
items that could contribute to North Korea's nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons or ballistic missiles programs; heavy military equip-
ment such as battle tanks and warships; and luxury goods.22 The
resolution also banned international travel by, and froze the overseas as-
sets of, individuals associated with North Korea's WMD programs.2 3 In
addition, the resolution authorized all countries to inspect cargo going in
and out of North Korea to detect illicit weapons.2 14
In the leadup to the resolution, Japan had urged the adoption of
"comprehensive sanctions.' 215 Russia and China, however, refused to let
207. Id. 6.
208. Id.
209. See supra Part I.
210. S.C. Res. 1718, supranote 12,16.
211. While North Korea had clearly violated the safeguards obligations of an NPT party,
it is unclear both whether any of those obligations would survive a legally effective with-
drawal from the NPT and whether or not North Korea's 2003 announcement of withdrawal
from the NPT was legally effective. For an argument that the IAEA retains a continuing right
to inspections even against a state which has exercised its right to withdraw from the NPT, see
Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Withdrawal
and the Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 34 VA. J. INT'L
L. 749 (1994). For an analysis of four different possible interpretations of the North Korean
status under the NPT following its withdrawal in January 2003, see Masahiko Asada, Arms
Control Law in Crisis? A Study of the North Korean Nuclear Issue, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECU-
RITY L. 331 (2004).
212. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 12, 8.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Fifield, supra note 189.
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the resolution go forward until it was heavily watered down. As a re-
suit, the resolution is likely too weak to accomplish any of the
substantive sanctions goals: coercion, containment, deterrence, paving
the way politically for future stronger sanctions, creating a legal founda-
tion upon which some senders will immediately build additional stronger
sanctions, or retribution.
The sanctions are likely too weak to convince the North Korean re-
gime that its nuclear weapons program comes at too high a price and
must be relinquished. Having spent vast sums to develop a nuclear arse-
nal, North Korea could hardly be expected to surrender it in exchange
for items that could contribute to building a WMD program that has al-
ready achieved its major goal, heavy military equipment that is far less
necessary for North Korea's defense now that it has nuclear weapons,
international travel for an insular country known as "the Hermit King-
dom," 7 and luxury goods. This is especially true for a leadership that
apparently feels that absent its nuclear arsenal, the United States and its
allies might seek a regime change.28 Nor did Resolution 1718 signifi-
cantly further a populist or other uprising by North Koreans, who have
already suffered far worse under the Kim regime.2 9
Resolution 1718 also did not significantly reduce or contain North
Korea's ability to implement its objectionable WMD policies. While
North Korea may need additional foreign technology to achieve the
manufacture of uranium-based nuclear weapons, it has already achieved
the manufacture of plutonium-based nuclear weapons. 220 Nor were the
sanctions on North Korea sufficiently strong to change the cost-benefit
calculations of, and thus deter, other countries contemplating nuclear
proliferation. Soon after the North Korean sanctions were imposed, Ira-
nian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that Iran would not be
deterred by them.2 Shortly thereafter, Iran announced that it was accel-
erating its own nuclear program.222 In fact, the Iranians reportedly were
216. See, e.g., Warren Hoge, Security Council Backs Sanctions on North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, at Al.
217. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, The Hermit Nuclear Kingdom, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Feb. 10, 2005, at 25.
218. See Ford, supra note 189.
219. See supra note 32.
220. See, e.g., Paul Kerr, New Details Emerge on NK Nuclear Program, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 37.
221. Nazila Fathi, Iran Seems Unmoved by Specter of Sanctions Against North Korea,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, at A14.
222. See Nazila Fathi, Using a 2nd Network, Iran Raises Enrichment Ability, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2006, at A7.
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encouraged in their defiance by the weakness of the North Korean sanc-
tions."'
There was no indication that any of North Korea's principal trading
partners would use the Resolution 1718 sanctions as legal authority to
impose stronger sanctions than those set forth in the resolution itself.
224
Rather, there was considerable concern that North Korea's two largest
trading partners, China and South Korea, might not fully implement the
Resolution 1718 sanctions. 5
Resolution 1718 also seems unlikely to have achieved any meaning-
ful retributive punishment of the North Korean leadership. Depriving the
regime of foreign travel and luxuries seems likely to cause more annoy-
ance than suffering, and surely is not proportional to the grave harm
done by the North Korean test to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The freezing of foreign assets was likely rendered ineffective by the fact
that the Security Council's deliberative process inevitably provided the
targets with sufficient advance warning that they could withdraw their
overseas assets before the freeze was imposed. On the other hand, given
that North Korea's nuclear test may not have violated international law,
retributive punishment may have been an inappropriate purpose for the
sanctions.
In the end, the sanctions imposed on North Korea by Resolution
1718 were weaker than those the Security Council had previously im-
posed in response to many lesser threats to international peace and
security. For example, the North Korean sanctions are weaker than those
imposed on South Africa in response to apartheid226 and on Liberia27 and
228Cote D'Ivoire during their civil wars, and far weaker than those
223. See id. ("A senior Western diplomat in Tehran said Iran went ahead after seeing the
limited sanctions imposed on North Korea after its nuclear test this month. 'They were rea-
sonably reassured that if North Korea can live with the sanctions, they can do better,' said the
diplomat... ).
224. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, China May Press North Koreans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006,
at Al (quoting the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying that "[alil sides need to
consider how to implement Resolution 1718 in a balanced way and not devise ways to will-
fully expand the sanctions").
225. See Jim Yardley, Sanctions Don't Dent North Korea-China Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2006, at Al; Norimitsu Onishi, Questions Grow Over U.N. Curbs on North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at Al.
226. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 418, supra note 112, $ 2 (prohibiting "any provision to South
Africa of arms and related matdriel of all types").
227. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1521, 9i 2, 6, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1521 (Dec. 22, 2003) (pro-
hibiting provision to Liberia of "arms and related materiel of all types," barring "direct or
indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia," and banning import of all "timber prod-
ucts originating in Liberia").
228. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1572, 7, 9, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004) (pro-
hibiting export to Cote d'Ivoire of "arms or any related materiel" for thirteen months,
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imposed on Libya in response to its downing of Pan Am flight 103,229
Sierra Leone in response to its May 1997 military coup,230 the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia during the Bosnian crisis, 23 ' and Haiti in response
to its 1991 military coup. 32 Rather than reaffirming the nuclear nonpro-
liferation regime, the post-test sanctions on North Korea are in fact a
manifestation of its decline.
In February 2007, North Korea entered into an agreement with the
United States, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea under which North
Korea committed to shutting down its Yongbyon nuclear facility in ex-
change for incentives, including 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.233 This
agreement appears to be a small step forward, in that it may help cap the
size of North Korea's nuclear arsenal. But the agreement is nonbinding
(indeed, it was not even signed but simply issued as a joint statement),
freezes only North Korea's plutonium facilities (which were anyway at the
end of their useful lives)23 but not its uranium program, provides little-to-
no assurance that North Korea will agree to effective verification of its
imposing a travel ban of persons to be designated by the Committee as a threat to national
peace and reconciliation, and imposing a foreign asset freeze on various leaders).
229. See S.C. Res. 748, 5 (Mar. 31, 1992) (prohibiting all aircraft travel to or from
Libya and barring the export to Libya of "arms and related materiel of all types"); S.C. Res.
883, H 3, 5, annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (Nov. 11, 1993) (freezing, with some exceptions,
foreign assets of the Libyan government and any Libyan undertaking; prohibiting provision to
Libya of items pertaining to pumping, transporting or refining oil).
230. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1132, 5, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 132 (Oct. 8, 1997) (banning
travel by members of the Sierra Leone military junta, and prohibiting "the sale or supply to
Sierra Leone ... of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related materiel of all
types").
231. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 713, 6 (Sept. 25, 1991) (imposing a "general and complete
embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia"); S.C. Res. 757,
It 4, 5, 7(a), 8(c) (May 30, 1992) (prohibiting all imports from the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (FRY) and all exports, except medicine and certain foodstuffs, to the FRY; barring
provision of funds to government, commercial undertakings, and persons of and within the
FRY; prohibiting all aircraft travel to and from the FRY; suspending scientific, technical, cul-
tural, and sports exchanges with the FRY); S.C. Res. 820, IN 12, 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820
(Apr. 17, 1993) (prohibiting provision in relation to the FRY of all except certain services and
freezing foreign assets of government and commercial undertakings of the FRY).
232. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 841, 5, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993) (prohibiting
the sale or supply to Haiti of "petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related materiel of
all types"; freezing foreign assets of Haiti's government); S.C. Res. 917, 3, 6(a), 7(a), 8,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (May 6, 1994) (banning travel by Haitian coup participants, military,
police, and their immediate families; prohibiting all imports from Haiti; prohibiting all exports
to Haiti except medicines, food, and informational materials).
233. Press Release, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, North Korea-
Denuclearization Action Plan, Press Release 2007/099 (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm [hereinafter February 2007 North Korea
Agreement].
234. Bennett Ramberg, How to Live with a Nuclear North Korea, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Feb. 15, 2007, at 6.
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compliance with the agreed freeze, does not include a North Korean
commitment not to detonate or sell nuclear weapons, risks being seen by
other potential proliferators as rewarding proliferation, and leaves to sub-
sequent negotiations in the indefinite future any North Korean
relinquishment of the nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile material
it already possesses.235 The February 2007 agreement thus leaves nuclear
nonproliferation in a far worse state than if the Security Council had, be-
fore North Korea built its nuclear arsenal, used comprehensive economic
sanctions to make it clear to North Korea that its nuclear weapons program
was coming at too high a price and had to be relinquished.
C. Iran
1. Delayed Response
The international community has responded to two decades of
Iranian noncompliance as weakly as it responded to North Korea's
nuclear weapons program. In 2002, the IAEA "discovered an 18-year
pattern of noncompliance by Iran with its obligations to report all its
• •• ,,211
nuclear activities. Over those eighteen years, Iran built major nuclear
237facilities without telling the IAEA and without IAEA detection.
The first written report in which the IAEA Director General declared
Iran's noncompliance to the IAEA Board of Governors came almost a
year later, on June 6, 2003.238 A subsequent report by the Director Gen-
eral in November 2003 provided more detail on Iran's breach of its NPT
239
safeguards obligations. Pierre Goldschmidt, IAEA Deputy Director
General from 1999 to July 2005, has stated that the Iranian noncompliance
detailed in the IAEA's "damning report to its Board of Governors" in
November 2003 "should have been reported to the UNSC [UN Security
Council] as foreseen in the Agency's statute., 240 Yet the IAEA Board of
235. See Brian Knowlton, Helene Cooper & Jim Yardley, Bush Hails North Korea Pact;
President Sees 'Opportunity,' But Hard-Liners Fault Aid Deal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 14,
2007, at A1; see also February 2007 North Korea Agreement, supra note 233.
236. Pierre Goldschmidt, Decision Time on Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A29. See
News Conference with Alireza Jafarzadeh, Representative of the National Council of Resis-
tance of Iran, Subject: New Information on Top-Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime's
Nuclear Program, FED. NEWS SERV., Aug. 14, 2002; Associated Press, Iran Has Sites to Make
N-arms, Rebels Say, DESERET NEWS, Aug. 15, 2002, at A6.
237. See Nazila Fathi, Iran: Minister Says "Nuclear Spies" Worked for U.S. and Israel,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2004, at Al I (noting that in 2002, an Iranian dissident group "revealed
the existence of a secret nuclear facility in Natanz and a heavy-water complex near Arak. At
the time, the United Nations nuclear monitoring agency was unaware of them.").
238. See IAEA DG Report of June 6, 2003, supra note 27, at 7.
239. See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, Report by the Director General, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003fl5 (Nov. 10, 2003).
240. Goldschmidt, supra note 77, at 5.
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Governors failed to report Iran's noncompliance to the Security Council
until February 2006, over two years later.24' This reporting delay clearly
violated the IAEA's governing statute, which gives the IAEA Board no
choice but to promptly report noncompliance to both the Security Coun-
242
cil and the General Assembly.
Goldschmidt suggests three main reasons for the lack of support on
the IAEA Board for prompt reporting of Iranian noncompliance. First,
many states insisted there was "no evidence" that the undeclared mate-
rial and activities were related to a nuclear weapons program, even
though "they were all well aware that the Agency had neither the author-
ity nor the means required to prove that this could be the case before it is
too late., 243 Second, some states feared that moving the Iran noncompli-
ance issue "out of the IAEA's hands" could facilitate the United States
244taking military action against Iran as it had against Iraq. Third, some
states "fear[ed] that if Iran was referred to the Security Council, Russia
and China would use their veto right to block any resolution adverse to
the Islamic Republic, as was the case for North Korea, with no concrete
outcome whatsoever.' '24' Thus, the IAEA failed to abide by its own non-
compliance reporting requirements in part out of fear that Security
Council inaction would expose the nuclear nonproliferation regime as
toothless.
By the time the IAEA reported Iranian noncompliance to the Secu-
rity Council in February 2006, Iran had been found to be in possession
of documents relating to "the fabrication of nuclear weapons compo-
nents," and the Agency had information regarding Iranian tests "which
could have a military nuclear dimension. 246 While the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany ("the EU-3") and the IAEA fruitlessly negotiated
with Iran during the years between the IAEA's first finding of Iranian
noncompliance and the IAEA's report to the Security Council, Iran
"made stunning advances in mastering all technological aspects of ura-
nium conversion and enrichment without incurring any negative
241. IAEA DG Report of Feb. 27, 2006, supra note 84, at 2.
242. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. XII(C), available at http://
www.iaea.org/About/statute-text.html ("The Board shall report the non-compliance to all
members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.").
243. Goldschmidt, supra note 77, at 5.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Board of Governors Resolution, I 3, 6, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006) [here-
inafter IAEA BOG Iran Resolution of Feb. 4, 2006]; IAEA DG Report of Feb. 27, 2006, supra
note 84, at 8.
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repercussion.27 In fact, Iranian officials have crowed about how the ne-
gotiations between it and the West have bought Iran time to move
forward with its nuclear program.24 ' They insist that this progress has
created "facts on the ground" which are "irreversible. 249
The Security Council finally issued its first resolution with respect to
Iran's nuclear program on July 31, 2006." 0 Resolution 1696 called upon
Iran to take several steps, including suspending enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities, that Iran had already been called upon to under-
take by the IAEA in its Board of Governors Resolution of February
2006. Resolution 1696 also expressed the Security Council's "inten-
tion," in the event Iran had not taken such actions by August 31, 2006, to
"adopt appropriate measures" under Article 41 of the UN Charter "to
persuade Iran to comply."'252 Article 41 authorizes the Security Council to
impose sanctions that do not involve "the use of armed force. 253 The
IAEA Director General, in reports to the IAEA on August 31, 2006, and
November 14, 2006, made clear that Iran had failed to take the steps that
Resolution 1696 required it to perform by August 31.254
On December 23, 2006, in Resolution 1737, the Security Council fi-
nally imposed sanctions on Iran for its nuclear nonproliferation
violations.255 Three months later, in Resolution 1747 of March 24, 2007,
the Security Council responded to Iran's failure to comply with the re-
quirements of Resolution 1737 by slightly augmenting its sanctions on
Iran.256 Prior to assessing the sanctions imposed by Resolutions 1737 and
1747, it is important to consider Iran's economic situation and vulner-
abilities.
247. Goldschmidt, supra note 77, at 8.
248. See Phillip Sherwell, How We Duped the West, By Iran's Nuclear Negotiator, SUN-
DAY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 5, 2006, at 24; Middle E. Media Research Inst., Chief Iranian
Nuclear Affairs Negotiator Hosein Musavian: The Negotiations with Europe Bought Us Time
to Complete the Esfahan UCF Project and the Work on the Centrifuges in Natanz, Aug. 12,
2005, available at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP95705.
249. Elaine Sciolino, U.N. Agency Says Iran Falls Short on Nuclear Data, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2006, at Al (quoting Gholamreza Aghazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organi-
zation).
250. S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
251. IAEA BOG Iran Resolution of Feb. 4, 2006, supra note 246.
252. S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 250, 8.
253. U.N. Charter art. 41. Article 42, which contains the Security Council's authority to
approve military action "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security," was not mentioned in Resolution 1696. Id. art. 42.
254. See IAEA DG Report of Aug. 31, 2006, supra note 28; IAEA, Implementation of the
NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/64 (Nov. 14, 2006).
255. S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
256. S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
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Iran's economy has been boosted, and its negotiating leverage en-
hanced, by the relatively high price of oil. Iran has the second-largest oil
reserves of any country in the world 1 7 and is located in the heart of the
Persian Gulf region, where its military is within striking distance of ap-
proximately two-thirds of the world's total oil reserves. 21 Oil prices
would likely skyrocket if Iranian supplies were cut off or Iran moved to
cut off supplies from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world. Iran's oil
wealth also makes it an increasingly lucrative export market, with total
exports to Iran from Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom
expected to top twenty-two billion dollars in 2006, up from eighteen bil-
lion dollars in 2005 .
However, Iran's heavy dependence on oil export revenues and other
260foreign trade leaves it highly vulnerable to economic sanctions. The
Iranian government draws between forty and fifty percent of its budget
from oil export revenues, 2 1 and some ninety percent of Iran's population
262
receives its income from the state. Remarkably for a country that is
investing so much in nuclear programs, Iran has never developed
sufficient capacity to refine the petroleum it pumps out of its own soil,
and therefore depends on other countries to refine forty percent of theS263
gasoline it needs for internal consumption. Notwithstanding its oil
wealth, Iran's economy has been so mismanaged that the living standard
of the average Iranian today is lower than it was at the time of the264
Islamic revolution in 1979. According to official reports, which may be
understated, unemployment among Iranian young people is at thirty-four
257. Neil King, Jr. & Mark Champion, Embargo Politics: Nations' Rich Trade with Iran
is Hurdle for Sanctions Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2006, at Al.
258. Jefferson Morley, World Opinion Roundup: The Nuclear Politics of Oil, WASH.
POST, June 13, 2006, available at http://blog.washingtonpost.com/worldopinionroundup/2006/
06/thenuclear.politicsof oil.html.
259. King & Champion, supra note 257.
260. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, The Bus is Waiting, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at
A27 ("[I]f China and Russia told Iran that they would join in the toughest possible U.N. eco-
nomic sanctions on Tehran if it persisted in its nuclear program, the ayatollahs would ... back
down.").
261. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OPEC REVENUES: COUNTRY DETAILS (2005),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/orevcoun.htm.
262. See Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations, What Sanctions Mean for Iran's
Economy, May 5, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10590/what-sanctionsmean-for_
iranseconomy.html?breadcrumb=default.
263. Bret Stephens, How to Stop Iran (Without Firing a Shot), WALL ST. J., May 16,
2006, at A15.
264. Bernard Gwertzman, Council on Foreign Relations, Takeyh: Iran's Populace




265percent and rising. Wealthy Iranians have already moved over $200
266billion out of Iran since President Ahmadinejad took office in 2005.
Many Iranians, including student groups, have strongly criticized the
Iranian government for endangering the economy and international rela-
tionships over the nuclear issue; sanctions could strengthen the hand of
these opposition figures.267
Russia has blocked Security Council imposition of strong sanctions
on Iran,26' even though Russia says it opposes Iran developing nuclear269
weapons. Russia's opposition to strong sanctions is apparently driven
270by its desire to continue lucrative deals to sell Iran weapons, nuclear
reactors, and other high-tech machinery.27' Russia may also view Iran as
272
a useful geopolitical counterbalance to the United States. According to
Dimitri Simes, a Russia expert who is president of the Nixon Center
think tank in Washington, D.C., "[i]t is clear that'Moscow will not sup-
port any meaningful resolution that would interfere with Russia's trade
with Iran. 27 ' Alexei Arbatov, the Director of the Center for International
Security at the Russian Academy of Sciences and former deputy chair of
the Russian parliament's defense committee, says that "[tihere is no
doubt that Russia does not want Iran to have nuclear weapons,' 274 but
"Russia has huge political and economic interests with Iran." 275 Arbatov
265. See Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran's Unemployment Crisis, MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURV.,
Oct. 11, 2004, available at http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a47n4ld0l .htm.
266. Stephens, supra note 263.
267. See Golnaz Esfandiari, Iran: Reformist Student Group Calls For Suspension Of
Nuclear Activities, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 19, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/
featuresarticle/2006/04/3684dla3-43d9-4450-be3f-la43f5blafe8.html; Alireza Ronaghi, Iran
Reformists Slam Government's Nuclear Policy, REUTERS, Jan. 7, 2007; Neil King, Jr., Dissent
in Tehran Buoys West, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2007, at A5.
268. See Maggie Farley, U.N. Slaps Iran With Sanctions, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, at
A1; Colum Lynch, Sanctions on Iran Approved by U.N., WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2006, at Al;
Paul Kerr, Security Council Broadens Iran Sanctions, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 2007,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/200704/SecurityCouncil.asp.
269. See, e.g., Mikhail Kamynin, Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russ. Press
Conference (June 10, 2006) ("Russia is actively involved in international efforts to unblock
the problem by diplomatic methods on the basis of a common position on the inadmissibility
of nuclear weapons in Iranian possession.").
270. See Morley, supra note 258; see also King & Champion, supra note 257 (noting
that, in December 2005, Russia agreed to sell Iran a $700 million air defense missile system).
271. See, e.g., Nikolai Sokov, Ctr. for Nonproliferation Stud., The Prospects of Russian
Mediation of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis, Feb. 17, 2006, available at http://cns.miis.edu/
pubs/week/060217.htm.
272. See Alexei Arbatov, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Russia and the Iran
Nuclear Crisis, May 23, 2006, http://www.camegieendowment.org/publications/
index.cfm?fa=print&id=1 8364.
273. King & Champion, supra note 257.
274. Arbatov, supra note 272.
275. Id.
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criticized the Russian position as "self-defeating" because the Russian
position demands that "Iran give away something very dear to it, while
simultaneously removing all tough levers to enforce such a conces-
sion. '
China has joined Russia in opposing strong sanctions on Iran.277
China's stance stems in considerable part from its dependence on Iranian
fuel, as it currently buys eighteen percent of its crude oil imports fromi 271
Iran. In December 2006, amidst the negotiations over Resolution 1737,
China signed a sixteen billion dollar deal to develop Iran's North Pars
gas field and was negotiating a deal to develop Iran's Yadavaran oil
field.279
2. Resolutions 1737 and 1747
Before Russia and China finally agreed to the sanctions imposed on
Iran by Resolution 1737, they managed to both delay the sanctions and
water them down.2" Resolution 1737's tepidness is apparent even in its
handling of the threshold "threat to the peace" determination, which is
nowhere specified but merely implicit in the resolution's affirmation that
the Council is "[a]cting under Article 41 of Chapter VII" and "mindful of
its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
21
'
Resolution 1737 includes several decisions as to the measures that
Iran must take to maintain international peace and security. Principally,
Iran must:
Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. 2
The resolution makes clear that the full force of the Council's
authority stands behind the enrichment-related and reprocess-
ing suspension previously "deem[ed] necessary" by the
IAEA283 and "demand[ed]" by the Security Council.& Iran
previously insisted it had an "inalienable right" under NPT
Article IV to "develop research, production and use of nuclear
276. Id.
277. See Farley, supra note 268; Lynch, supra note 268; Kerr, supra note 268.
278. See William Mellor & Le-Min Lim, To Slake its Thirst for Oil, China Scours Back-
waters of the World, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Sept. 27, 2006, at 25; King & Champion, supra note
257.
279. Ruba Husari, Iran, China Sign $16 Billion Deal for North Pars Gas Field, OIL
DAILY, Dec. 21, 2006 at 5.
280. See Farley, supra note 268; Lynch, supra note 268.
281. See S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 255, at pmbl.
282. Id. I 2(a).
283. IAEA BOG Iran Resolution of Feb. 4, 2006, supra note 246, 1.
284. S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 250, 2.
[Vol. 28:337
Averting Catastrophe
energy for peaceful purposes" and that neither the NPT nor
the IAEA Statute provided a legal basis for requiring Iran to
suspend these activities."' Resolution 1737's binding suspen-
sion conclusively undermines that argument because, as UN
Charter Articles 25 and 103 specify, the obligation to comply
with Security Council decisions prevails in case of conflict
with rights under the NPT or any other treaty.
* Suspend work on all heavy water-related projects.286 Resolution
1737's order to Iran to suspend this work contrasts with the
IAEA's February 2006 resolution, which only "deem[ed] it
necessary" for Iran to "reconsider" its construction of a re-
search reactor moderated by heavy water. 1
7
" Refrain from exporting certain specified nuclear and ballistic
missile equipment and technology.2 8 This provision has no
counterpart in either the IAEA's February 2006 resolution or
Resolution 1696.
" Provide "such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to
be able to verify" the suspensions and "resolve all outstanding
issues, as identified in IAEA reports. '28 9 This provision makes
clear that the full force of the Council's authority stands be-
hind the IAEA's requests for access and cooperation, and
gives the IAEA more access authority (as much additional au-
thority as it "requests") to resolve Iranian nuclear issues than
it had under the NPT and Iran's IAEA safeguards agreement.
Resolution 1737 also sets forth the Council's decisions on several
sanctions measures to be employed to give effect to its mandates. These
measures principally include: 1) restrictions on the export to Iran of cer-
tain specified nuclear and ballistic missile items, materials, equipment,
285. See, e.g., Amy Reed, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, UN Resolution 1696
Moots Iranian Legal Claims, Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/
publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18636. Interestingly, Iran has continued such rhetoric
even since the passage of Resolution 1737. See Bill Varner, UN Imposes First Sanctions on
Iran's Nuclear Program, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 23, 2006 (citing the Iranian Foreign Ministry
as stating that "the new resolution will not be an obstacle in the way of Iran's nuclear pro-
gress" and that "[t]he Iranian nation, by relying on the national abilities and within the
framework of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its undeniable rights, will continue its
program.").
286. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 255, 2(b).
287. IAEA BOG Iran Resolution of Feb. 4, 2006, supra note 246, 1.
288. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 255, 7.
289. Id. 8.
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and technology;2 90 and 2) a freeze of overseas assets of twelve named
officials and ten institutions associated with Iran's proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery sys-
tems.291 In addition, Resolution 1737 requested that the IAEA Director
General provide a report within sixty days on Iranian compliance with
the resolution 292 and committed the Council, in the event that the report
found Iranian noncompliance, to adopting "further appropriate measures
under Article 41" of the UN Charter "to persuade Iran to comply with
this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA. '2 93
On February 22, 2007, the IAEA Director General reported that Iran
had not complied with the requirements of Resolution 1737.94 In re-
sponse to Iran's continuing noncompliance, the Council, in Resolution
1747 of March 24, 2007, slightly augmented the Resolution 1737 sanc-
tions by imposing a ban on the export of arms by Iran295 and extending
the foreign asset freeze imposed by Resolution 1737 to fifteen additional
296
named Iranian officials and thirteen additional Iranian entities. In addi-
tion to these two principal legally-binding measures, the resolution
included several nonbinding requests to member states. Resolution 1747
also requested that the IAEA Director General provide, within sixty
days, a report on Iranian compliance with Resolutions 1737 and 1747.297
Finally, Resolution 1747 committed the Council, in the event that the
report found Iranian noncompliance, to adopting "further appropriate
measures under Article 41" of the UN Charter to "persuade Iran to com-
ply ' 298 The original draft of Resolution 1747 by France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom had included bans on the travel of relevant Iranian
officials and on arms exports to Iran, but these were removed at the be-
hest of Russia and China.299
Standing on their own, Resolutions 1737 and 1747 are too weak to
coerce Iran into compliance, contain Iran's ability to advance its nuclear
weapons program, deter other states from following Iran's lead and de-
veloping their own nuclear weapons program, or retributively punish
290. Id. H 3-6.
291. Id. V 12-15, annex.
292. Id. 123.
293. Id. I 24(c).
294. See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provi-
sions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by
the Director General, IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/8 (Feb. 22, 2007).
295. S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 256, 5.
296. Id. 4, annex I.
297. Id. 1 12.
298. Id. I 13(c).
299. See Kerr, supra note 268.
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Iran.3 0 The two resolutions may, however, prove more effective in paving
the way, both politically and legally, for additional, stronger sanctions.
The primary purpose of the sanctions was coercive.' But as of
mid-April 2007, Resolutions 1737 and 1747 clearly had not succeeded in
coercing Iran into compliance. The Iranian Foreign Ministry derided
Resolution 1737 as "weak"302 and Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear nego-
tiator, stated that Iran's response to Resolution 1737 was to accelerate its
nuclear program by speeding up installation of 3,000 centrifuges at its
Natanz enrichment plant.30 3 The day after the Council passed Resolution
1747, Iran announced that it would reduce rather than increase its coop-
eration with the IAEA,c0 the Iranian foreign minister denounced the
sanctions as "illegal," and President Ahmadinejad said the sanctions
would not halt Iran's uranium enrichment "even for a second.,, 30 Two
weeks after Resolution 1747 passed, Ahmadinejad announced in a
300. See Helene Cooper & Steven R. Weisman, West Tries a New Tack to Block Iran's
Nuclear Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2007, at A3 ("[Flew believe that the sanctions resolution
that passed Dec. 23 has the muscle to sway Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions."); Com-
ment, Bomb and Bombast, TIMES (London), Dec. 28, 2006, at AI4 ("[N]o one is so naive as to
expect that the regime's ambitions will be thwarted by freezing the assets of a handful of Ira-
nian companies and officials."); Farley, supra note 268 "Security Council diplomats ...
privately conceded that they did not expect the bans to have a significant effect."); R. Nicholas
Bums, Under Sec'y for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Conference Call on UN Sanc-
tions Resolution 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/
78246.htm [hereinafter Burns, Conference Call] (stating: "We don't think this resolution is
enough in itself. We want the international community to take further action.").
301. See Bums, Conference Call, supra note 300 ("The aim of sanctions is ... to drive
up the cost to the Iranians of... thumbing their nose at the international community by pro-
ceeding with these nuclear technological programs. [Wie want to let the Iranians know that
there is a big cost to them, and we hope that those Iranians who wish to ... negotiate ... will
then be in a stronger position to argue that's the best case for Iran."); In Quotes: Reaction to
UN Sanctions, BBC NEWS, Dec. 24, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
6206777.stm (quoting a statement from France's Foreign Minister, Philippe Douste-Blazy,
that "our objective remains convincing Iran to conform with its international commitments");
Press Release, Sec. Council, Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt
Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1737, U.N. Doc. SC 8928 (Dec. 23,
2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm (citing Russia's
UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin as saying Russia voted in favor of sanctions because it wants
to send "a serious message" to Iran "to resolve the remaining concerns" over its nuclear pro-
gram, and citing Chinese UN Ambassador Wang Guangya as stating that "[s]anctions were not
the end, but a means to urge Iran to return to negotiations").
302. See Iran Starts Activities at 3,000-Centrifuge Site: Hosseini, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
NEWS AGENCY (Tehran), Dec. 24, 2006, http://www2.irna.com/news/en/view/line-17/
061224709913211 0.htm.
303. Farley, supra note 268; Parisa Hafezi, Iran Says to Install 3,000 Centrifuges at
Natanz, REUTERS, Dec. 24, 2006.
304. Kerr, supra note 268.
305. Nasser Karimi, Iran: Sanctions Won't Halt Enrichment, ABC NEWS, Mar. 26, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/InternationallwireStoryid=2980613.
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ceremony accompanied by chants of "death to America"3 6 that Iran had
made a dramatic leap forward in its nuclear program by beginning to
enrich uranium on an industrial scale and declared a national holiday to
celebrate that fact.
30 7
Iran's flouting of the resolutions is not surprising, as the total costs
imposed on the Iranian leadership by the resolutions are far less than the
costs it would expect to incur from complying with the resolutions' de-
mands. The ban on exporting sensitive technology to Iran is riddled with
exceptions, including a large one for the Russian-built nuclear reactor at
Bushehr. °8 Notwithstanding the exceptions, the ban on exporting sensi-
tive technology to Iran merely prohibits the rest of the world from
helping Iran to develop nuclear weapons. While this is a step forward,
"we won't help" is quite different from "stop, or else."
The asset freezes are expected to have limited immediate impact, as
the Security Council's deliberative process likely provided the targets
sufficient advance warning to withdraw their overseas assets before the
freezes were imposed.3°9 Still, for those targeted Iranian entities wishing
to accomplish significant transactions with overseas buyers or sellers, the
freezes could over time become a meaningful hindrance. The U.S. gov-
ernment is encouraging foreign governments and banks to interpret the
resolutions' financial restrictions as aggressively as possible,30 and the
aggressive use of U.S. banking regulations even prior to the resolutions
succeeded in deterring a few Western banks from doing business with
Iran.3 ' But the resolutions' financial restrictions are so limited in scope
and full of exceptions that it is doubtful that even an aggressive imple-
mentation will have a significant coercive effect. In addition, while
Resolution 1747's ban on arms exports by Iran will hinder Iran's ability
to supply its terrorist proxies such as Hezballah and Iraqi insurgents,
1 2
and thus may usefully contribute to containing Iranian influence in the
Middle East, arms sales have not been a major source of revenue for the
Iranian regime and thus the ban is unlikely to contribute significantly to
306. Robert Tait & Julian Borger, Iran Raises Stakes with Claim of Nuclear Leap,
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 10, 2007, at 1.
307. Nazila Fathi, Iran Says It Can Enrich Uranium on an Industrial Scale, N.Y. IMES,
Apr. 10, 2007, at A3.
308. See Bums, Conference Call, supra note 300.
309. See, e.g., David Cortright, Can Iran's Nuclear Activities Be Thwarted?, USA To-
DAY MAG., May 1, 2006, at 24 ("News reports suggest that Iran is moving financial assets out
of Western banks in anticipation of potential sanctions.").
310. See Cooper & Weisman, supra note 300.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Thorn Shanker, Security Council Votes to ighten Iran Sanctions, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at Al.
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coercing or containing Iran's nuclear program. The weakness of the
sanctions imposed by Resolutions 1737 and 1747 stands in stark contrast
to major Russian and Chinese transactions with Iran that were unaffected
by the sanctions and thus represent leverage lost.3 3
Having spent vast sums to develop a nuclear weapons program, the
Iranian leadership could hardly be expected to surrender it in exchange
for removal of a very limited trade ban and asset freeze. This would be
so even if the Iranian leadership perceived its self-interest in Western
capitalist terms. The Iranian leadership, however, is motivated by nation-
alist and religious convictions that exalt values including martyrdom and
suffering. 314 In comparison with a purely economic calculation, the Ira-
nian regime's ideology causes it to ascribe greater cost to complying
with the sender's demand to shut down the nuclear weapons program
and lesser cost to any suffering that may be imposed by sanctions.
Resolutions 1737 and 1747 are also likely too weak to effectively
contain Iran's nuclear weapons program. The complicated and excep-
tion-riddled ban on exporting sensitive nuclear technology to Iran will be
far more difficult to enforce than would, for example, a comprehensive
trade embargo. In particular, there is concern that Iran will use legal nu-
clear programs at Bushehr as a cover to continue to receive training and
technology useful for its nuclear weapons program."-'
Similarly, the Resolution 1737 and 1747 sanctions are too weak to
significantly change the cost-benefit calculations of, and thus deter, other
countries that might be contemplating nuclear proliferation. A ban on
trade in sensitive nuclear technology and limited asset freeze is simply
not a sufficient disincentive. Indeed, less than two weeks after passage of
Resolution 1737, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak hinted that if Iran
proceeds to attain nuclear weapons, his country will follow suit.
16
313. For example, Russia is in the process of delivering to Iran twenty-nine Tor-M I anti-
aircraft missile systems bought by Iran for $1.4 billion dollars. Russian Anti-Aircraft Weapons
Sales to Syria, Iran on Schedule, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 2, 2007. ITAR-TASS reports
that "[t]he anti-aircraft systems are being stationed around Iran's civilian nuclear sites .... "
Id. In addition, during the week prior to the passage of Resolution 1737, China's national oil
corporation signed an agreement with Iran related to liquefied natural gas worth sixteen billion
dollars. Bums, Conference call, supra note 300. Since Resolution 1737 did not involve fuel
sanctions, it did not cover the Chinese-Iranian deal. Id. The Bushehr nuclear reactor which
Russia is building in Iran and which was exempted from the sanctions is an $800 million pro-
ject. Lynch, supra note 268.
314. See Jay Tolson, Aiming for Apocalypse, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22, 2006,
at 34; Matthias Kuntzel, Ahmadinejad's Demons, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 24, 2006, at 15.
315. See Lynch, supra note 268.
316. Roee Nahmias, Mubarak Hints: We'll Develop Nukes, YNETNEWS (Tel Aviv), Jan. 5,
2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3348600,00.html.
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Resolutions 1737 and 1747 explicitly paved the way for considera-
tion of future stronger sanctions, by committing the Council to adopting
"further appropriate measures under Article 41" of the UN Charter "to
persuade Iran to comply" in the event that the IAEA Director General's
report within sixty days were to find continuing noncompliance.37 How-
ever, these references to Article 41 may also have reduced pressure on
the Iranian leadership. In appearing to limit future additional sanctions to
measures adopted under Article 41 of the UN Charter, Resolutions 1737
and 1747 seem to be ruling out Article 42 military sanctions against
Iran." ' In the meantime, Iran is moving aggressively toward nuclear
weapons capability and may well achieve that capability before the sanc-
tions are ramped up to a level sufficient to coerce or contain it.
The United States has emphasized Resolution 1737's value as a legal
foundation upon which some senders will be able to build additional
stronger sanctions. As Under Secretary Burns put it:
As we worked over the last 18 months to try to convince coun-
tries to be more vigorous on their own, using their own legal
systems or institutions such as the European Union to take more
vigorous action, the constant refrain to us was, well, we can't do
that because the UN Security Council hasn't established a sanc-
tions regime. That has now happened [and] opens the way for
further action outside the Security Council by states that wish to
send a more clear and a tougher measure to the Iranians.3t9
A comprehensive boycott of Iran by the European Union, which
supplies forty-four percent of Iran's imports,320 might quickly succeed in
coercing Iran to cease its nuclear weapons program. As of April 2007,
however, there was no sign-that the European Union planned to impose
vigorous additional sanctions against Iran.
317. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 255, H 23-24; S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 256, 12-
13.
318. See Howard LaFranchi, Will EU and US Be Tougher Now on Iran?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 27, 2006, at 1 (quoting nonproliferation expert Henry Sokolski as saying that
"[s]o much has been grandfathered and exempted [by the resolution] that what can be looked
at in 60 days won't be that interesting"). Following the vote, the French ambassador was asked
by the media: "You say, Ambassador, that if Iran doesn't comply, the Security Council is de-
termined to act. Does that keep the military option open?" The French ambassador responded:
"No, no, it is clear that in this case new measures will be taken under Article 41 of Chapter 7."
Media Stakeout, FED. NEWS SERV., Dec. 23, 2006.
319. Burns, Conference Call, supra note 300.




Resolutions 1737 and 1747 also did not attempt retributive punish-
ment of the Iranian leadership, 32' nor did they achieve such punishment.
Depriving Iran of a few nuclear technology exports and placing a foreign
asset freeze on a handful of its nuclear program officials and entities is
surely not proportional to the grave harm done by Iran to the interna-
tional community's interests in nuclear nonproliferation. In addition, in
light of the Iranian regime's exaltation of suffering and martyrdom, the
very notion of imposing suffering on it in order to achieve retribution
may be fundamentally misconceived.
Resolutions 1737 and 1747 are "textbook example[s] of targeted
sanctions. 32 2 The resolutions target Iranian officials directly involved in
Iran's sensitive programs while avoiding placing any hardships on ordi-
nary Iranians323 and consequently provide the Iranian populace with little
• 324
incentive to pressure the regime into compliance. The resolutions also
aim to deny Iran access to specific products necessary to the conduct of
its objectionable policy. However, Resolutions 1737 and 1747 make far
from full use of the menu of targeted sanctions. There is no ban on arms
or refined petroleum sales to Iran, and even those sanctions that are im-
posed are strikingly narrow in scope. For example, Resolutions 1737 and
1747 focus sanctions on a handful of Iranian officials at the implementa-
tion level of the nuclear weapons program, leaving untouched the
decisionmakers in charge of Iran's nuclear weapons policy. Even with
respect to those officials subjected to sanctions, the resolutions impose
asset freezes but not travel bans. In addition, the ban on sensitive nuclear
exports to Iran is so complex and full of exceptions as to likely render it
nearly ineffective. The Resolution 1737 and 1747 sanctions thus suffer
from the characteristic deficiency of targeted sanctions: even if
implemented to maximum effect, they are highly unlikely to impose suf-
ficient costs to achieve their purposes.
321. For example, the Russian Foreign Minister insisted that the resolution should help
"start talks with Iran, rather than punish Iran." Colum Lynch, Europeans Yield on Iran Sanc-
tions, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2006, at A24.
322. Iran Defiant in the Face of UN Nuclear Sanctions, Foreign Policy Ass'n, Dec. 24,
2006 (on file with author).
323. Press Release, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Statement by Ambassador Ale-
jandro Wolff, Acting U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Adoption of
Security Council Resolution 1747 on Iran, USUN Press Release 064(07) (Mar. 24, 2007),
available at http://www.un.int/usa/07_064.htm ("[T]hese measures we are adopting today are
in no way meant to punish the civilian population of Iran. Resolution 1747 is properly tailored
to target Iranian institutions and officials that support Iran's nuclear and missile programs.").
324. Karimi, supra note 305 (noting that Saeed Laylaz, an Iranian political commentator,
said that "Iranians would continue to shrug off" the sanctions "until [they] hit normal Irani-
ans," and that "the drafters of the U.N. resolution went to great pains to point out that they did
not").
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D. India/Pakistan
The nuclear nonproliferation regime has been undermined not only
by the international community's failure to seriously sanction important
North Korean, Iranian, and rampant procedural violations of the NPT,
but also by its failure to seriously sanction two sets of actions gravely
destructive of the nuclear nonproliferation regime even though they did
not technically violate the NPT: the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear
detonations.
India detonated a single nuclear explosive device in 1974325 but in-
sisted the test was a "peaceful nuclear explosion," and for many years
did not turn the technology demonstrated during the test into a nuclear
326
weapons program.
India changed course in May 1998, after the election of Prime Min-
ister Atal Behari Vajpayee, when it set off five nuclear explosions and
327declared itself a nuclear weapons state. Vajpayee had come to power at
the head of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). George
321Perkovich, in his meticulously researched India's Nuclear Bomb, con-
cludes that domestic political considerations, rather than national
security concerns, drove the Vajpayee government's decision to test-
indeed, Perkovich says the test "had no articulated strategic or doctrinal
• ,329
necessity. These domestic considerations included the desire of the
fervently nationalist new Prime Minister to "satisfy the BJP's hard-line
base" by "asserting the BJP's uniqueness" through "mak[ing] the new
government's mark.'' 3° Another major factor in the decision to test was
the personal ambition of "retirement-aged" Indian nuclear scientists to
cap their careers and "prove their brilliance and prowess."33'
The Indian tests occurred on May 11 and 13, 1998. After India
tested, Vajpayee proudly stated, "We have a big bomb now.' 332 Vajpayee
subsequently told a reporter: "The greatest meaning of these tests is that
they have given India shakti [a Vedic concept of the liberation of en-
ergy], they have given India strength, they have given India self-
325. PERKOVICH, supra note 5, at 178.
326. See id.; Graham, supra note 57.
327. See, e.g., JACQUES E.C. HYMANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERA-
TION 201-02 (2006).
328. PERKOVICH, supra note 5.
329. Id. at 447, 449.
330. Id. at 409.
331. Id. at 447-48.
332. Id. at 420.
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confidence." '333 Vajyapee declared to India's Parliament that nuclear
weapons were "India's due.., the right of one-sixth of humankind. 334
In the days following the Indian tests, the Clinton administration
worked to dissuade Pakistan from responding with its own nuclear
blasts. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made his reluctance to
order Pakistani tests clear, telling Pakistani television on May 16 that
"[t]he ideal thing would still be that Pakistan doesn't have to follow
suit." '335 The Pakistani Finance Minister warned against testing, suggest-
ing that the resultant sanctions could devastate the Pakistani economy.336
Prime Minister Sharif said on May 17 that he would order tests only "if
the international community takes no action against India," but noted
that "[t]he initial reactions from countries have either been nil or very
mild." '337 Indeed, the United States had to lobby hard simply to get the G-
8 group of leading industrial countries to use the word "condemn" in a
joint statement about the Indian tests a week after they occurred.33 The
G-8's failure to take serious action against India strengthened the hand of
hard-liners in Sharif's cabinet who advocated an immediate nuclear
test.3 39 President Clinton personally phoned Prime Minister Sharif five
times to offer incentives and advise of the sanctions the United States
would be required by law to impose if Pakistan proceeded with testing.34 °
In a telephone conversation the night before Pakistan tested, Sharif
told Clinton, "You have said all the right things, but the rest of the world
is filing its fingernails. 34' Sharif explained that the failure of most of the
world to punish India for its detonations made it impossible for him not
to follow suit.3 42 The international community's weak response to India's
333. Id. at 443 (quoting Vajpayee's statement in Prabhu Chawla, Interview with Prime
Minister Vajpayee, INDIA TODAY, May 25, 1998).
334. HYMANS, supra note 327, at 202.
335. See Stephen Kinzer, Nuclear Anxiety: The Neighbor; Pakistan Seems Mixed on
Holding Nuclear Test, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1998, at A8.
336. Stephen Kinzer, Nuclear Anxiety: In Pakistan; No Decision On Testing, U.S. Is
Told, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1998, at A5.
337. Kinzer, supra note 335.
338. See James Bennett, Nuclear Anxiety: The Diplomacy; Summit Talks Shift Focus to
Atom Tests by New Delhi, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1998, at AIO.
339. See Dan Balz, U.S. Urges Pakistan to Forgo Tests; Clinton Plea Issued as Nation
Seems Set on Nuclear Exercise, WASH. POST, May 18, 1998, atA1.
340. Tim Weiner, Nuclear Anxiety: In Washington; After an Anguished Phone Call, Clin-
ton Penalizes the Pakistanis, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at Al.
341. Id.
342. Id. A few days before, Pakistani Information Minister Mushahid Hussain, speaking
on CBS's "Face the Nation," had criticized a mid-May meeting of the G-8 group of leading
industrialized countries for failing to adopt sanctions against India, describing the G-8 deci-
sions on India as "just a mild slap on the wrist, which means that there's no price tag for bad
behavior," and that "[w]e feel that India is getting away with it all." Balz, supra note 339. See
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nuclear tests contributed to, and left Sharif unable to face down, "over-
whelming domestic political pressures" to test.343 Pakistan responded to
the Indian nuclear blasts with its own on May 28 and 30, 1998. '
Although India and Pakistan were not NPT members, their tests did
serious damage to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. George Bunn
condemned the tests as having "violated a global norm against any more
countries with nuclear weapons," and asserted that "[i]f this norm is to
be preserved, violators must suffer serious consequences or the norm
will become a paper tiger.' 345 "Just as national laws will be weakened by
failure to enforce them," said Bunn, "violation of international norms
must produce serious consequences for the violators or others will
choose the same path.''36 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the
chief U.S. interlocutor with India and Pakistan following the tests,
stressed that, in the wake of the detonations, sanctions would "create a
disincentive for other states to exercise the nuclear option [and] keep
faith with the much larger number of nations that have renounced nu-
clear weapons despite their capacity to develop them. 347
Despite the high stakes, and regardless of the Security Council's
broad authority and stated intention to act decisively, the international
community's response to the nuclear detonations by India and then Paki-
stan was extremely weak. As discussed in Part III, the Security Council
had already asserted the legal authority in 1992 to sanction any prolifer-
ant activity, regardless of whether that activity violated the NPT or any
other legal instrument. Yet the Security Council imposed no sanctions in
response to the detonations.
The Security Council responded to the detonations in two statements
by the President of the Security Council34 (one after each state tested)
also Stephen Kinzer, Nuclear Anxiety: in Pakistan; Next-Door Neighbor Demands That World
Powers Shun India, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1998, at A12 (noting that Pakistani Foreign Minister
Gohar Ayub Khan and other Pakistani leaders "strongly hinted that the strength of the world's
response" to India's tests "would shape their decision on whether to detonate nuclear bombs
of their own").
343. See John F. Bums, Nuclear Anxiety: The Overview; Pakistan, Answering India,
Carries Out Nuclear Tests; Clinton's Appeal Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at Al.
344. PERKOVICH, supra note 5, at 433-34.
345. Bunn, supra note 58.
346. Id.
347. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Sec'y of State, Remarks at the Brookings Institution: India-
Pakistan: The Next Critical Steps (Nov. 12, 1998), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
comm/transcripts/19981112a.htm.
348. The President of the Sec. Council, Statement by the President of the Security Coun-
cil, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1998/12 (May 14, 1998) [hereinafter Security Council President
Statement of May 14, 1998]; The President of the Sec. Council, Statement by the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1998/17 (May 29, 1998) [hereinafter Security Coun-
cil President Statement of May 29, 1998].
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and one Security Council resolution.349 Both statements "strongly de-
plore[d]" the tests and urged "restraint" and "dialogue."35 The
resolution, issued nearly a month after the Indian tests and a week after
Pakistan tested, "reiterat[ed]" that "the proliferation of all weapons of
mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and secu-
rity,"35' and expressed grave concern about the tests, but imposed no
sanctions."' The closest the resolution came to imposing a substantive
consequence was its nonbinding statement that it "encourages all States
to prevent the export" to India and Pakistan of equipment, materials, or
technology that "could in any way assist" their nuclear weapons pro-353
grams. In spite of the grave damage done to the nuclear
nonproliferation regime by India for reasons of clearly minor import to
the Indian national interest, the Security Council could not even bring
itself to ban exports to India of nuclear equipment, materials, and tech-
nology.
The G-8 countries eventually did oppose some new lending to India
and Pakistan by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and
the Asian Development Bank.354 However, the G-8 decision was taken at
a meeting on June 12, 1998,"' s a full month after India's tests, and two
weeks after Pakistan tested. In addition, the G-8 sanctions were so full of
loopholes that their deterrent effect on potential future proliferators was
undermined. For example, the lending prohibition excluded "humanitar-
ian" projects."' Furthermore, the sanctions affected only new• 357
commitments, not disbursements of previously agreed loans; as a re-
sult, the actual flow of money from these institutions to India and
Pakistan was not to be affected for several years thereafter,358 by which
time the sanctions had been lifted.359 Pakistan, with a much weaker
economy, felt the sanctions' impact on private sector activity (a largely
349. S.C. Res. 1172, supra note 12.
350. Security Council President Statement of May 14, 1998, supra note 348; Security
Council President Statement of May 29, 1998, supra note 348.
351. S.C. Res. 1172, supra note 12, at pmbl.
352. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 226-232 for a description of the range of
sanctions imposed by the Security Council in other cases.
353. S.C. Res. 1172, supra note 12, 8.
354. See Daniel Morrow & Michael Carriere, The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanc-
tions on India and Pakistan, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1999, at 1, 5.
355. See John F. Bums, Pakistani Rebufffor India, But Talks May Be Closer, N.Y TIMES,
June 13, 1998, at A4.
356. Morrow & Carriere, supra note 354, at 5.
357. Id. at 6.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 10.
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psychological impact on investor confidence) more deeply than India,"6
even though India had tested first and was thus more deserving of sanc-
tions.
Individual countries also responded weakly to the detonations. Four-
teen countries suspended bilateral aid to India and Pakistan," ' but only
362the U.S. and Japanese assistance was of significant magnitude, and
none of the other permanent members of the Security Council cut off
either trade or bilateral aid.16 Five days after India completed testing,
Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov announced that the
tests would not affect Russia's plan to enter into a $2.6 billion contract
for construction of a nuclear power station in India. 64 Adamov declared
that to do otherwise "would be similar to sanctions, which is not Rus-
sia's stand towards India.'' 61 On July 23, 1998, Russia concluded a new
military cooperation agreement with India, including a broad range of
major weapons sales central to a planned $14-16 billion in Russian arms
366sales to India over the ensuing decade. In refusing to impose sanctions,
French President Jacques Chirac stated: "We can see that the tests oc-
curred, and therefore the threat of sanctions did not work. We have to
talk together, and then talk to India and Pakistan, in a more understand-
ing way, even as we make clear that we disapprove of what they have
done., 367 The United Kingdom refused to impose sanctions on India be-
368
cause of its historic ties to that nation.
The United States spearheaded international condemnation of the
tests and imposed economic sanctions tougher than those imposed by
360. Id. at 10-12.
361. Id. at 5.
362. Id.
363. See Thomas W. Lippman, Nuclear Powers Condemn Tests, Urge Restraint on India,
Pakistan, WASH. POST, June 5, 1998, at A35.
364. See Howard Diamond, Russia, India Move Forward with Deals on Arms, Nuclear
Power, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June-July 1998, at 25.
365. Russia Confirms Plan to Build Nuclear Power Station in India, INTERFAX RUSSIAN
NEWS, May 18, 1998.
366. See Diamond, supra note 364; B. Raman, SAPRA India Found., Indo-Russian
Relations: Primakov's Visit, Dec. 7, 1998, http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/research/
nationalsecurity/img_19981207.html.
367. Jim Hoagland, Incentives Considered To End Tests In S. Asia, WASH. POST, May
30, 1998, at Al. Chirac was either unaware of or ignored the fact that the fear of sanctions had
contributed significantly to deterring Indian officials from testing between 1974 and 1998. See
infra Section V.C. Chirac's statement that "the tests occurred, and therefore the threat of sanc-
tions did not work," clearly ignored the fact-evident from Pakistani public statements-that
had sanctions been more robust following India's 1998 detonation, they may well have con-
vinced Pakistan not to test despite its many strong reasons to respond to India's tests with
some of its own.
368. Richard W. Stevenson, 8 World Leaders Urge Suharto to Show Restraint in Han-
dling Indonesian Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1998, at A7.
[Vol. 28:337
Averting Catastrophe
any other country. Yet even the U.S. sanctions were less than whole-
hearted from the very beginning.369 Several sanctions were triggered by
existing U.S. laws370 that had never before been implemented, requiring
the Clinton administration to determine how the laws would be put into
effect. In making those determinations, the Clinton administration "made
a number of decisions to moderate the sanctions' effect., 371 Then, two
months after India's first test, nuclear nonproliferation took a back seat
as Congress passed legislation modifying the sanctions to exempt U.S.
government agricultural credits.372 President Clinton immediately signed
the bill into law, saying it would help avoid "undue burdens on our
farmers" and that "we should look for ways to expand our agricultural
exports, not restrict them. 373
The next major step in the dismantlement of the U.S. sanctions was
the enactment in October 1998 of the India-Pakistan Relief Act,374 which
authorized the president to waive many of the remaining sanctions.
President Clinton quickly exercised that authority.17 The following year,
Congress granted the president broader waiver authority, which he exer-
cised in October 1999. 371 Ultimately, the U.S. sanctions succumbed to a
combination of factors, including lobbying by U.S. companies with
business interests in India and Pakistan, fear of instability in Pakistan, the
failure of most other countries to join the United States in imposing sig-
nificant sanctions, and pressure from the Indian-American community.377
The last of the nuclear nonproliferation sanctions on India and Pakistan
were lifted in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.378
369. See Howard Diamond, India, Pakistan Respond to Arms Control Initiatives, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, June-July 1998, at 24.
370. See Arms Export Control Act § 102(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-l(b) (1994) (popularly
known as the Glenn Amendment) (providing for various sanctions on "a non-nuclear-weapon
state" that "detonates a nuclear explosive device"); Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2(b)(4),
12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(4) (2006) (providing for sanctions on a non-nuclear-weapon state that "has
detonated a nuclear explosive device.., but is not a nuclear-weapon state").
371. Diamond, supra note 369.
372. Id.
373. William J. Clinton, President of the United States, Statement on Signing the
Agriculture Export Relief Act of 1998 (July 15, 1998), available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=56305.
374. India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 901, 112 Stat. 2681-40
(1998) (repealed by, Pub. L. No. 106-79, § 9001(f), 113 Stat. 1284).
375. Robert M. Hathaway, Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South
Asian Nuclear Tests, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 7, 8.
376. See DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
INDIA AND PAKISTAN: CURRENT U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 3 (2002).
377. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 375.
378. See RENNACK, supra note 376, at 4.
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The failure of the international community to impose significant
sanctions in response to the Indian and Pakistani detonations under-
mined the nuclear nonproliferation regime by sending a strong message
to potential proliferators that the price for proliferating is low. 3 79 The
Bush administration's recent nuclear cooperation agreement with India38
further undermined the regime." In implementation of the agreement,
the administration sought and received from Congress changes to the
U.S. laws that prohibit transfer to non-NPT parties of a range of nuclearS•382
technologies and materials. The laws were changed so as to exempt
from the ban U.S. exports of civilian nuclear technology to India.
The U.S. decision to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with a nu-
clear-armed, non-NPT member such as India undermines the basic NPT
bargain made by NNWS to forswear nuclear weapons in exchange for
receiving civil nuclear cooperation. The U.S.-India agreement makes the
NPT look less like a reciprocal bargain and more like a discriminatory
trap for those NNWS parties prohibited by their NPT membership from
following the Indian example and obtaining both nuclear weapons and
civil nuclear cooperation.38 Indeed, some of the language in the U.S.
379. Per Charles Duelfer, director of the U.S. government's Iraq Survey Group which
analyzed Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program following Operation Iraqi Freedom,
"Saddam observed that India and Pakistan had slipped across the nuclear weapons boundary
quite successfully." Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for
Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: Hearing Before the S.
Armed Services Comm., 108th Cong. (Oct. 6, 2004) (testimony of Charles Duelfer, Director,
Iraq Survey Group), available at http://homepage.ntlworld.comjksonc/docs/duelfer-sasc-
20041006.html [hereinafter Duelfer Testimony].
380. See Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh (July 18, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/pr/2005/49763.htm.
381. Kuppuswamy, supra note 19, at 141 ("The speakers at the Wilton Park Conference
feared that in combination with U.S. attempts to deny Iran, which is a signatory of the NPT,
civilian nuclear technology, [the U.S. move towards nuclear trade with India] effectively de-
stroys the NPT."). One group of U.S. private sector experts on nuclear nonproliferation went
so far as to write to members of Congress that the proposed U.S.-India nuclear deal would
place the U.S. in violation of the NPT Article I ban on "in any way" assisting any state other
than an NPT NWS "to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons." See Letter from
Thomas Cochran, Dir., Natural Res. Def. Council Nuclear Program, et al. to Members
of Congress (June 20, 2006), available at www.npec-web.org/Essays/20060620-
LetterOnArticleOne.pdf.
382. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Reversing Ban, Bush Approves Deal with India for Nu-
clear Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2006, at A10.
383. Id.
384. U.S. officials respond to these concerns by maintaining that the U.S.-India agree-
ment commits India to proliferation control measures comparable to those India would be
subject to as an NPT party. See Nicholas Bums, Under Sec'y of State for Political Affairs,
Briefing on the Signing of the Global Partnership Agreement Between the United States and
India, U.S. Dep't of State Press Briefing No. 2005/715 (July 19, 2005), available at http://
www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/49831.htm. However, former IAEA Deputy Director General
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government's announcement of the U.S.-India nuclear deal seemed al-
most designed to erode the nuclear nonproliferation norm. For example,
the State Department "fact sheet" describing the deal stated that the
"agreement to reach full civil nuclear cooperation brings India into the
international nonproliferation mainstream.""' If India can be brought
"into the international nonproliferation mainstream" without becoming a
party to the NPT, where does that leave the NPT? Ali Larijani, Iran's top
nuclear negotiator and secretary of the Iranian National Security Council,
recently noted: "India does not accept the NPT and has nuclear weapons.
But America has no problem with this and is also concluding a long-term
nuclear energy agreement with India."'386 As an Egyptian analyst told the
New York limes in regard to a proliferation-threatening proposal that
Egypt pursue a nuclear program, "Why should the U.S. assist India in its
nuclear program and not Egypt?" '387
V. EXAMPLES OF SANCTIONS OR THE PROSPECT OF SANCTIONS
IMPEDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
This Part examines three cases in which sanctions or the prospect of
sanctions contributed to stopping or slowing the progress of a country's
nuclear weapons program. The first example is Iraq, where, as the world
has learned, UN sanctions succeeded in preventing Saddam Hussein
from reconstituting his nuclear weapons program following the Gulf War
in 1991. The second example is Libya, which was heavily influenced by
UN sanctions in its decision to renounce terrorism and by U.S. sanctions
in its decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. The third
Pierre Goldschmidt has criticized the proposed U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement as
"granting India all the benefits that are reserved for non-nuclear weapon States under the NPT,
without requesting from India any real counterbalancing commitment." Goldschmidt, supra
note 77, at 6. Goldschmidt suggests that if the United States goes ahead and curbs the NSG
export rules "for what the US has unilaterally defined as the 'special case' of India, it is hard
to see why Russia, China and others would not feel free to strike similar deals with countries
such as Pakistan and Iran." Id. at 7. Indeed, the U.S.-India deal is seen in Moscow "as a vic-
tory of US geopolitical and economic policy considerations over strengthening the NPT [and]
many in Moscow would consider Russia entitled to its own foreign policy priorities, which in
some cases may be higher than enhancing the NPT." Arbatov, supra note 272.
385. U.S. Dep't of State, U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation, Fact Sheet No.
2005/720 (July 22, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/49969.htm.
386. See N. Ram, Siddharth Varadarajan & John Cherian, For the U.S., the Nuclear Issue
of Iran is Just an Excuse, THE HINDU, Aug. 7, 2006, available at http://www.hindu.com
2006/08/07/stories/2006080703931 100.htm.
387. Michael Slackman & Mona EI-Naggar, Mubarak's Son Proposes Nuclear Program,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at A14.
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example is India, which was deterred by the prospect of international
sanctions from testing nuclear weapons between 1974 and 1998.
A. Iraq
In the wake of the occupation of Iraq by coalition forces in April
2003, it has become clear that sanctions were extremely effective in co-
ercing and containing the Iraqi government with respect to its nuclear
weapons program. The U.S. government's extraordinary access to Iraqi
territory, documents, officials, and scientists has informed two extremely
thorough and dispassionate reports. The Iraq Survey Group issued one
such report after leading the U.S. government's fruitless post-war efforts
to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, an effort that included numer-
ous site visits, interviews with captured persons associated with WMD
programs, and review of millions of pages of captured Iraqi docu-
ments.3"' The U.S. Joint Forces Command undertook another
comprehensive study of the inner workings and behavior of Saddam's
regime, based on interviews with dozens of captured senior Iraqi military
and political leaders and review of thousands of official Iraqi docu-
389
ments.
Iraq was an original party to the NPT.39 ° In the 1970s, however, Iraq
built facilities, including the Osirak nuclear reactor, that potentially al-
lowed it to produce weapons-grade fissile material.39' The Israeli Air
Force destroyed the Osirak reactor in June 1981.392 In the late 1980s, Iraq
resumed serious efforts to develop a nuclear infrastructure,93 and follow-
ing its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Iraq began an expedited
program "to produce a nuclear weapon. ' 94
388. See IRAQ SURVEY GROUP, COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO
THE DCI ON IRAQ'S WMD (Sept. 2004 & Mar. 2005 add.), available at http:I/
www.gpoaccess.gov/duelfer/index.html [hereinafter IRAQ SURVEY GROUP REPORT].
389. Anthony A. Cucolo III, Brigadier Gen., U.S. Army, Dir. Joint Ctr. for Operational
Analysis & Lessons Learned, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Foreword to KEVIN M. WOODS ET
AL., IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT: A VIEW OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FROM SADDAM'S
SENIOR LEADERSHIP (2006), available at http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/special/iraq/
ipp.pdf. See also Kevin Woods, James Lacey & Williamson Murray, Saddam's Delusions: The
View from the Inside, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2006, at 2.
390. Iraq deposited its instrument of ratification on October 29, 1969. See United Na-
tions, Status, supra note 7.
391. See 2 IRAQ SURVEY GROUP REPORT, supra note 388, Nuclear at 3 (section begins
after Delivery Systems).
392. Id.; Factflle: How Osirak Was Bombed, BBC NEWS, June 5, 2006, http:H
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middleeast/5020778.stm.
393. 2 IRAQ SURVEY GROUP REPORT, supra note 388, Nuclear at 3.
394. Id. at 4.
[Vol. 28:337
Averting Catastrophe
Coalition forces liberated Kuwait in February 1991.'9' On April 3,
1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which, among
other things, ordered that Iraq: 1) not "acquire or develop nuclear weap-
ons or nuclear-weapons-usable material" or related items; 2) "place all
of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for
custody and removal" of the IAEA; 3) submit to "urgent on-site inspec-
tion and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate"
of specified nuclear-related items; and 4) submit to "future ongoing
monitoring and verification" of Iraq's compliance with the aforementioned
396
requirements. The resolution imposed similar requirements for chemical
weapons, biological weapons, and certain ballistic missiles.397 Resolution
687 also specified that the comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on
Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait would be lifted only upon Security
Council agreement that Iraq had completed all actions required by the
resolution with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
ballistic missiles.398
Inspectors operating under Resolution 687 and subsequent resolu-
tions eventually determined that Iraq, for more than a decade before the
invasion of Kuwait, had been pursuing "a secret nuclear weapon pro-
gramme completely separate from its civil nuclear programme declared
to and inspected by the IAEA. 399 Indeed, Iraq "was only six months
away" from a nuclear weapon at the time of its eviction from Kuwait.400
While Iraq's nuclear facilities were damaged during the first Gulf War,4
it was the rigorous inspections and sanctions that followed the war, in
combination with the 1995 defection of key Iraqi weapons official Hus-
sein Kamel,4° that managed to complete the destruction of Iraq's nuclear
395. See imeline: War in the Gulf, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2000, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/861164.stm.
396. S.C. Res. 687, T 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
397. Id. IN 8-10.
398. Id. 22.
399. Goldschmidt, supra note 77, at 4.
400. The Lessons and Legacy of UNSCOM: An Interview with Ambassador Richard
Butler ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June 1999, at 3, 4 [hereinafter Butler Interview]. Ambassador
Butler, an Australian diplomat, led UN inspections of Iraq from 1997 to 1999. Id. at 3.
401. 2 IRAQ SURVEY GROUP REPORT, supra note 388, Nuclear at 4 (noting that "nearly
all of the key nuclear facilities ... were bombed during Desert Storm" and describing the
varying levels of damage suffered by specific key facilities).
402. See, e.g., Iraq: A Chronology of UN Inspections and an Assessment of Their Ac-
complishments, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2002, at 13, 15 [hereinafter Inspections
Chronology] (noting that as a result of Kamel's defection, inspectors learned that "Iraq had
weaponized biological agents, had a more advanced indigenous ballistic missile program than
previously believed, had produced more chemical weapons than disclosed earlier, and had
initiated a crash program in 1990 to try to acquire a nuclear weapon in less than a year.").
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weapons program and keep Saddam from restarting it over the next
403dozen years.
The Iraq Survey Group Report found that "[a]ggressive UN inspec-
tions after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the
[nuclear] program and destroy or surrender components of the pro-
gram."4  The report determined that "Iraq's ability to reconstitute a
nuclear weapons program progressively decayed" during the twelve
years between Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait in 1991 and the coalition
occupation of Iraq in 2003.40' Charles Duelfer, the Iraq Survey Group's
second director, concluded that "the decay that occurred in the Iraqi [nu-
clear weapons] program was a function of the sanctions, and ... the
extraordinary limits put on this regime [by] an extraordinary set of UN
regulations."4 °6
Implementing the inspections and enforcing the sanctions required
persistence, ingenuity, and periodic military pressure by coalition
forces407 in the face of Iraqi government stalling, evasion, obstruction,
deception, and smuggling. 40s Inspections nevertheless succeeded in "un-
covering and eliminating Iraq's nuclear weapons program and most of its
chemical, biological, and ballistic missile systems." 4°9 David Kay, the
Iraq Survey Group's first director, found in retrospect that Iraq's leader-
ship was far more deterred by the fear of weapons inspections than the
United States had realized.41° In addition, sanctions reduced the Iraqi
government's revenue, eroded Iraqi military capability and confidence,
blocked the import of key materials and technologies for producing nu-
clear and other weapons of mass destruction, and provided the United
Nations with leverage to compel intrusive inspections and monitoring.
Rolf Ekeus, chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1997, put
403. 2 IRAQ SURVEY GROUP REPORT, supra note 388, Nuclear at 6 (noting that the Iraq
Survey Group "uncovered no indication that Iraq had resumed fissile material or nuclear
weapon research and development activities since 1991").
404. Id. at 1.
405. Id.
406. Duelfer Testimony, supra note 379.
407. See, e.g., Inspections Chronology, supra note 402 (providing various examples of
Coalition military action and threats which persuaded Iraq to cooperate with inspectors).
408. See Butler Interview, supra note 400 (providing specific examples of Iraqi decep-
tion); 2 IRAQ SURVEY GROUP REPORT, supra note 388, Nuclear, passim (noting that "Baghdad
undertook a variety of measures to conceal key elements of its nuclear program from succes-
sive UN inspectors" and describing various such measures).
409. George A. Lopez & David Cortright, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, FOREIGN
AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 90, 92.
410. James Risen, Ex-Inspector Says C.IA. Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at Al.
411. Lopez & Cortright, supra note 409, at 91.
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it as follows: "Keeping the sanctions was the stick, and the carrot was
that if Iraq cooperated with the elimination of its weapons of mass de-
struction, the Security Council would lift the sanctions. Sanctions were
the backing for the inspections, and they were what sustained my opera-
. ,,412
tion almost for the whole time.
The inspections were so effective in part because they were far more
intrusive than those authorized under the INFCIRC/153 safeguards
agreement. For example, in Resolution 707, the Security Council
ordered Iraq to "halt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for use of
isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes" (e.g., halt all
nuclear power-related activities).4 " The resolution also mandated that
Iraq allow IAEA inspectors "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted
access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of
transportation which they wish to inspect.' 414 The Plan for Future
-• 411
Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance, imposed
by Security Council Resolution 715,416 "installed an elaborate network of
radiological and chemical sensors, cameras, ground-penetrating radar,
and other detection systems, bolstered by aerial surveillance and no-
notice visits to weapons facilities by inspectors.,
417
Iraq forced a halt to the inspections in December 199841 and agreed
to their resumption in late 2002 only under threat of U.S. military ac-
tion.419 El Baradei reported to the Security Council on March 7, 2003
that the new round of inspections, at 141 sites over the course of three
months, found "no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a
nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. 4 20 The Bush administration, in de-
ciding to invade Iraq on March 20, 2003, disregarded these findings,421
412. Id. at 96 (also describing several instances of inspectors "using the pressure of sanc-
tions, and dangling the prospect that they might some day be lifted, to assure compliance").
413. S.C. Res. 707, 3(f), U.N. Doc. SIRES/707 (Aug. 15, 1991).
414. Id. I 3(b).
415. IAEA Dir. Gen., Plan for Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's
Compliance with Paragraph 12 of Part C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and with
the Requirements of Paragraphs 3 and 5 of Resolution 707 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/22872/Rev. 1
(Sept. 20, 1991).
416. S.C. Res. 715, U.N. Doc. S/RES/715 (Oct. 11, 1991).
417. Lopez & Cortright, supra note 409, at 94.
418. Inspections Chronology, supra note 402, at 17.
419. Id. at 18.
420. Mohamed El Baradei, Dir. Gen., IAEA, Statement to the United Nations Security
Council, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update (Mar. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003nOO6.shtml.
421. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, President Bush Addresses the Nation
(Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/
20030319-17.html (address to the nation announcing commencement of the war against Iraq).
Winter 200711
Michigan Journal of International Law
remaining convinced that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruc-S422
tion. The administration relied on assessments of Iraq's intentions and
worst-case assumptions about Iraq's activities during the inspections hia-
tus.423 As Duelfer noted, reliance on Iraq's intentions was colored by the
fact that "fathoming the intentions of the regime ... really boils down to
• ,,424
understanding one person-Saddam Hussein, who was the regime.
This made the task both easier, in that it necessitated an analysis of only
one key target, and harder, in that a totalitarian dictatorship is nontrans-
parent, ultimately guided not by an observable system of checks and
balances but rather by the indiscernible contents of one man's thoughts.
"Even those closest to [Saddam] had mixed understandings of his objec-So 425
tives," says Duelfer, and "[i]n fact, there was uncertainty among some
of [Saddam's] closer advisers about WMD and whether it even ex-
isted.!
42 6
Unlike the Libyans, North Koreans, and Iranians, who for years
falsely claimed they did not have nuclear weapons programs, Saddam
falsely claimed he did. As the authors of the Joint Forces Command
study note:
When it came to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Saddam
attempted to convince one audience that they were gone while
simultaneously convincing another that Iraq still had them.
Coming clean about WMD and using full compliance with in-
spections to escape from sanctions would have been his best
course of action for the long run. Saddam, however, found it im-
possible to abandon the illusion of having WMD, especially
427
since it played so well in the Arab world.
"[O]ur purpose is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live
at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder." Id.
422. Per David Kay, "virtually everyone in the United States intelligence community
during both the Clinton and the current Bush administrations thought Iraq still had the illicit
weapons." Risen, supra note 410. See also, e.g., John Barry & Mark Hosenball, What Went
Wrong, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2004, at 24 (quoting the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraq as concluding that "Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction [WMD] programs
in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions" and that "most analysts" believed Iraq was
"reconstituting its nuclear weapons program").
423. See Barry & Hosenball, supra note 422 ("Once U.N. inspectors left Iraq, Saddam's
malevolent history and intentions took on even greater significance, because the CIA was
suddenly cut off from a critical source of information.").
424. Duelfer Testimony, supra note 379.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Woods et al., supra note 389, at 5-6.
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While the Bush administration on the eve of war in 2003 asserted
that inspections and sanctions had been ineffective and Iraq still had
WMD, post-war investigations reveal that the inspections and sanctions
had for a decade successfully derailed Iraq's WMD program. However,
the inspections and sanctions regime may have been on the verge of col-
lapse in 2003. The reasons for the impending collapse, including a
decrease in international support for the sanctions, are thoroughly de-
tailed in both the U.S. government's Iraq Survey Group Report and the
2005 report of an independent, high-level inquiry committee appointed
by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to investigate the administrationt 429
and management of the Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq.
The Iraq Survey Group Report, IIC, and other investigations reveal
that Saddam had succeeded in grossly manipulating the sanctions re-
gime. The Iraqi government generated billions of dollars in illicit
revenue from abuses of the sanctions regime. 430 It used some of that
revenue to undermine support for sanctions by bribing foreign and UNN. • 431
officials, and it used other revenue to go "on a palace and mosque
building spree in the late 1990s, employing 7,000 construction work-
ers."'432 At the same time, Saddam theatrically exaggerated the impact of
428. See, e.g., Duelfer Testimony, supra note 379. Duelfer states:
Over time, sanctions had steadily weakened to the point where Iraq in roughly the
2000 to 2001 time frame was confidently designing missiles around components
that could only be obtained outside of sanctions .... The sanctions were in free
fall. They were eroding .... There was a crisis in the Security Council .... [T]he
circumstances which allowed the inspectors to be successful to the extent that they
were-I don't think those conditions were sustainable.
Id.
429. Indep. Inquiry Comm. into the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme, About the Commit-
tee, http://www.iic-offp.org/about.htm. The Independent Inquiry Committee (HC) was chaired
by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve, and included Richard
Goldstone of South Africa, former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Id.
430. The IIC estimated that Iraq earned $12.8 billion in illicit revenue from 1990-2003.
1 INDEP. INQUIRY COMM. INTO THE U.N. OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME, THE MANAGEMENT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FoOD PROGRAMME 36 (2005), available at http://www.iic-
offp.org/documents/Sept05/MgmtV1.pdf. For estimates by other investigations, see Indep.
Inquiry Comm. into the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme, Comparison of Estimates of Illicit
Iraqi Income During UN Sanctions, Feb. 3, 2005, http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/
ComparisonofEstimates.pdf.
431. See Doreen Carvajal & Andrew Kramer, Report on Oil-for-Food Scheme Gives
Details of Bribes to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at AI0; Warren Hoge, The Many Streams
That Fed the River of Graft to Hussein, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A10; Warren Hoge,
PanelAccuses Former U.N. Official of Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2005, at Al.
432. 1 IRAQ SURVEY GROUP REPORT, supra note 388, Regime Strategic Intent at 21 (first
section in volume).
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the sanctions on average Iraqis433 and blamed the sanctions for depriving
the average Iraqi of resources Saddam was himself siphoning off. These
reports make clear in retrospect that, especially after 1996, when the Oil-
for-Food Programme was implemented, the vast majority of the suffer-
ing attributed to sanctions was due to the Iraqi regime's manipulations
and not the sanctions themselves. 434 Future sanctions designed to repli-
cate the Iraq sanctions' success in halting Saddam's nuclear weapons
program must avoid both harm to innocent civilians and the potential for
manipulative behavior by the target country's leadership. Important les-
sons in this regard are contained in the IIC Report and a detailed U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the Oil-for-Food
Programme.
B. Libya
Libya announced on December 19, 2003 that it had "decided of its
free will to get rid of [WMD] materials, equipment and programs, and to
become totally free of internationally banned weapons., 436 The an-
nouncement capped months of secret negotiations between Libya, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.4" Libya proceeded to allow a
433. See, e.g., David Rieff, Were Sanctions Right?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 27, 2003, at
41 (describing numerous examples of how "Saddam Hussein orchestrated a kind of traffic in
suffering-all meant for the television cameras' including ordering hospitals to accumulate
children's corpses in the morgue until "a sufficient number of bodies accumulated" and then
"'authorities would stage a mass funeral, railing against the sanctions, even though as often as
not there was no connection between a particular child's death and the sanctions.' ").
434. See, e.g., KENNETH KATZMAN & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: IRAQ: OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM, ILLICIT TRADE, AND
INVESTIGATIONS 6 (2006) ("There is a consensus among U.N. officials and outside observers
that the [Oil-for-Food-Program] eased substantially, but did not eliminate, severe economic
hardship in Iraq."); INDEP. INQUIRY COMM. INTO THE U.N. OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME, THE
IMPACT OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME ON THE IRAQI PEOPLE 177-78 (2005), available
at http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/SeptO51WGImpact.pdf (crediting the Oil-for-Food
Program with "preventing widespread hunger," concluding that the "likelihood of reduced
mortality is indicated," and noting that child mortality rates in Iraq were extraordinarily high
before the imposition of sanctions).
435. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNITED NATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM INDICATE THE NEED To STRENGTHEN UN INTERNAL CONTROLS AND
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES (2006); see also U.N. Sanctions After Oil for Food: Still a Viable Dip-
lomatic Tool?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats and Int'l
Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d0671 Lt.pdf (statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director, Int'l Affairs
and Trade Team, Gov't Accountability Office).
436. Libyan Call Against Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at A1O (quoting from a
statement by the Libyan Foreign Ministry).
437. Patrick E. Tyler & James Risen, Secret Diplomacy Won Libyan Pledge on Arms,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al.
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team of British and American government experts to enter the country
and completely dismantle its WMD infrastructure by April 2004."' The
U.S.-U.K. team shipped out of Libya more than 1,000 tons of sensitive
documents and nuclear and missile components. 439 The inspection team
also watched as more than 3,200 unfilled chemical weapons shells were
laid out in the Libyan desert and crushed by tanks and bulldozers." °
Libya's announcement that it was relinquishing its WMD programs
came four months after its agreement, also with the United Kingdom and
United States, to accept responsibility for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and pay $2.7 billion in compensa-
tion to victims' families.44' Both the WMD and the Pan Am 103
concessions resulted from a combination of economic sanctions, effec-
tive intelligence gathering, and the implicit threat of force. The dramatic
success of the effort to convince Libya to live up to its international obli-
gations contains important lessons.
Muammar Qaddafi came to power in a 1969 coup. 44 During the
1970s and early 1980s, Libya was reportedly involved in the killing of
Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics and the assassination in
1973 of a U.S. ambassador to Sudan;443 allegedly provided aid to terrorist
groups including the Irish Republican Army, the Palestinian Abu Nidal
organization, Italy's Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, Spain's ETA
Basque separatists, and West Germany's Baader-Meinhoff Gang;444 was
accused by President Reagan of dispatching assassination teams to mur-
der top U.S. officials;" 5 and sent troops into Chad in 1983 with the aim
of overthrowing its government." 6 The United States responded by
438. Judith Miller, Gadhafi's Leap of Faith, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2006, at AI8.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. See Felicity Barringer, Libya Admits Culpability In Crash of Pan Am Plane, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at A6.
442. Bruce W. Jentleson & Christopher A. Whytock, Who "Won" Libya?, INT'L SECU-
RITY, Winter 2005-06, at 47, 56.
443. Id.
444. See id.; Scott Anderson, The Makeover, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 19, 2003, at 28
(during Anderson's interview with Qaddafi, Qaddafi appeared to admit his support for "armed
action" by the Irish Republican Army); Ray Takeyh, The Rogue Who Came in from the Cold,
FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2001, at 62, 68; see also Milton Viorst, The Colonel in His Laby-
rinth, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 60, 66-67 (when the Viorst asked Qaddafi "if Libya
was responsible for the many terrorist incidents of which it was accused in the 1980s," Qad-
dafi "issued no denial," instead stating: "These incidents that you mention belong to the past,"
and "[a]ll these things are of the past, an era that is over.").
445. Lee Lescaze & George Lardner Jr., Reagan: "We Have Evidence" of Libyan Plot,
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1981, at Al.
446. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Sees Chad as a Portent of Qaddafi's Ambition, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1983, at A6.
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banning arms sales to Libya beginning in 1978, limiting dual-use exports
to Libya beginning in 1979, closing Libya's embassy in Washington
from May 1981 on, and limiting aviation exports to Libya beginning in
October 1981.447 Beginning in 1982, the United States banned crude oil
imports from Libya and restricted exports to Libya of sophisticated oil
and gas drilling equipment. 44' Finally, in January 1986, President Reagan
barred most remaining U.S. trade and financial transactions with Libya
and froze Libyan government assets in U.S. banks.449
These unilateral U.S. economic and diplomatic sanctions failed to
moderate Libya's terrorist activities. Because Libya remained free to
trade with the rest of the world, the cost of the sanctions to Libya re-
mained small. Libya was reportedly involved in sixty terrorist attacks
between 1981 and 1986, fifty-two of which were between 1984 and
1986. One such attack occurred on April 5, 1986, when a bomb ex-
ploded in the La Belle Disco in West Berlin, a known gathering place for
U.S. military personnel.4 1' Three people, including two U.S. soldiers,
452
were killed, and seventy Americans were wounded . On April 13, 1986,
following a West German announcement that it found "incontrovertible
evidence" of Libyan involvement in the disco attack,453 the United States
launched an air strike against Qaddafi's residence and various other Lib-
yan locations.45 4 This one-time airstrike also did not succeed in
moderating Libya's terrorist activities.455 On December 21, 1988, a Lib
yan bomb destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,
456killing 270 people, and on September 19, 1989, a Libyan bomb de-
stroyed a French airliner, UTA Flight 772, over Niger, killing all 171
persons onboard.457
In November 1991, after issuing indictments in the Pan Am 103
case, the U.K. and U.S. governments demanded that Libya surrender for
trial the two Libyan government officials charged with the crime, accept
responsibility for their actions, disclose information and evidence re-




450. See Stephen D. Collins, Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanc-
tions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya), 27 STUD. CONFLICT &





455. Id. at 9.




garding the crime, pay appropriate compensation, and commit to ceasing
418
all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups. In
January 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 731, which con-
demned the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings and urged Libya to
comply with French, British, and U.S. requests relating to the attacks.459
In March 1992, the Security Council, in response to Libya's failure to
comply with Resolution 731, adopted Resolution 748, which ordered
Libya to comply with the requests and imposed various sanctions on
Libya until such compliance occurred. 46° The sanctions included a ban on
flights destined for or originating in Libya; a ban on the supply of air-
craft, aircraft parts, or servicing to Libya; and an arms embargo.46'
The UN sanctions had an immediate impact on Libya's willingness
to comply with its obligations relating to Pan Am 103. For example,
Libya, which had previously ruled out extraditing the bombing suspects,
now offered to turn them over to a third country such as Germany or
462Switzerland. Still, in light of Libya's refusal to comply fully, the Secu-
rity Council tightened sanctions in November 1993 by passing
Resolution 883, which included a freeze on various Libyan assets abroad
and a prohibition on the export to Libya of oil pumping, transport, andS 461
refining equipment.
The strong, universal sanctions imposed on Libya by the Security
Council in 1992 and 1993 were followed by a dramatic reduction in Lib-
yan support for terrorism. The Qaddafi regime moved to end its supportS . 464
for terrorist organizations, including by expelling the Abu Nidal or-
ganization and extraditing suspected terrorists to various countries.465
Indeed, there have been no reported acts of Libyan sponsored terrorism
since 1993.
Libya reached a compromise with the United States and the United
Kingdom over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects, and, on April 5, 1999,
466it transferred them to The Hague for trial. The United Nations sus-S 467
pended its sanctions a few days later, but the United States made clear
458. See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Statement Announcing
Joint Declarations on the Libyan Indictments (Nov. 27, 1991), available at http://
bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1991/91112702.html.
459. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S1RES731 (Jan. 21, 1992).
460. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992).
461. Id.
462. Collins, supra note 450, at 13.
463. See S.C. Res. 883, supra note 229.
464. See, e.g., Jentleson & Whytock, supra note 442, at 68.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 70.
467. Ban Lifted, Libya is Set to Retool Oil Works, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1999, at A 17.
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that permanent removal of the UN sanctions would come only after
Libya took certain additional steps, including compensation payments to
the families of the Pan Am 103 bombing victims, acceptance of respon-
sibility for the attacks, and renunciation of support for terrorism.468
The trial of the two Libyan government officials concluded on Janu-
ary 30, 2001, with one suspect convicted of murder for the bombing and
given a life sentence, and the other acquitted of all charges and re-
leased.469 Libya and lawyers for the families of the Pan Am 103 victims
reached agreement in August 2003 that Libya would pay $2.7 billion in
• ,470
compensation ($10 million per victim), and Libya formally accepted
responsibility for the bombing in a letter submitted to the Security
Council.47' The Security Council lifted its sanctions on Libya on Sep-
472tember 12, 2003.
The United States held firm, however, and made it clear that it would
not lift its own sanctions until Libya addressed a number of remaining
U.S. concerns, including with respect to Libya's nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons programs.473 Negotiations between the United King-
dom, United States, and Libya over Libya's WMD programs had already
474been secretly underway for months. The seizure in October 2003 of a
ship bound for Libya carrying sophisticated nuclear technology pur-
chased from the A.Q. Khan network, the key supplier to the Libyan
nuclear weapons program-and the interception and subsequent sharing
with Libya of a conversation about Libya's nuclear weapons program
between Khan and the head of Libya's nuclear program-enabled the
United States and United Kingdom to increase the pressure on Qad-
dafi.4 7 ' The discoveries provided proof of the sophistication and illicit
nature of the Libyan nuclear program and made it clear that the United
476States would be satisfied with nothing less than its full dismantling.
Libya announced the deal to eliminate its WMD programs in brief
statements by the Libyan Foreign Ministry and Qaddafi on December
468. See, e.g., James P. Rubin, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing
(Apr. 5, 1999), available at http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1999/99-04-05.std.html.
469. Collins, supra note 450, at 14.
470. Lockerbie Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at A12.
471. Barringer, supra note 441.
472. Felicity Barringer, Pan Am 103's Bereaved Watch U.N. Lift Libya Sanctions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at A2.
473. See Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Will Keep Penalties Against Libya, Officials Say, N.Y
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2003, at A12.
474. Peter Slevin & Glenn Frankel, Libya Vows to Give Up Banned Weapons; Bush and
Blair Hail Results of Nine Months of Secret Talks, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2003, at Al.
475. Judith Miller, How Gadhafi Lost His Groove, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2006, at A14.
476. See Jentleson & Whytock, supra note 442, at 74.
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19, 2003. In their own announcements that day, President Bush and Brit-
ish Prime Minister Tony Blair described in greater detail the contents of
the agreement,477 which included elimination of Libya's nuclear, chemi-
cal, and biological weapons programs and immediate inspections and
478
monitoring to verify these actions . On September 20, 2004, with the
Libyan WMD programs completely and verifiably dismantled, President
Bush lifted the U.S. trade embargo on Libya,479 and on May 12, 2006,
the United States formally rescinded Libya's designation as a state spon-
sor of terrorism. s
What accounts for the international community's success in convinc-
ing Libya to abide by its international obligations to forsake its support
for terrorism and rid itself of weapons of mass destruction? Strong eco-
nomic sanctions, the implicit threat of force, and effective intelligence
gathering were all key elements.
Economic sanctions had a significant impact on the Libyan econ-
omy, especially after the Security Council made them universal. The
sanctions' impact on Libya's ability to purchase replacement parts for its
most sophisticated machinery crippled the Libyan air force and even-
482tually ground down Libya's petroleum extraction industry. Production
by Libya's oil industry declined from a peak of 3.3 million barrels a day
in the late 1970s to 1.1 million in 1999.483 The World Bank estimated that
the UN sanctions cost Libya eighteen billion dollars in oil revenue,4 4 and
during this period the Libyan economy entered a long recession, result-
485ing in thirty-percent unemployment and a fifty-percent inflation rate.
The Qaddafi regime, which "depended for its survival on buying the
477. Remarks on the Decision by Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi of Libya to
Disclose and Dismantle Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1835 (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
12/20031219-9.html; Blair Lauds 'Bold and Historic Decision' By Tripoli, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Dec. 20, 2003, at International News, 5 [hereinafter Blair Lauds] (containing excerpts
from an announcement by U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair).
478. Jentleson & Whytock, supra note 442, at 67.
479. Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Lifts Trade Embargo On Libya in Return for Promise on
Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at A7.
480. Memorandum for the Secretary of State on Rescission of Libya's Designation as a
State Sponsor of Terrorism, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 929 (May 12, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060515-5.html.
481. Collins, supra note 450, at 11.
482. Viorst, supra note 444, at 71-72 (quoting Hammouda el-Aswad, head of Libya's
National Oil Corporation).
483. Patrick E. Tyler, Libyan Stagnation a Big Factor in Qaddafi Surprise, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2004, at A3; Viorst, supra note 444, at 71-72 (quoting Hammouda el-Aswad, head of
Libya's National Oil Corporation).
484. Collins, supra note 450, at 12.
485. Id.
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population's acquiescence," became the target of demonstrations, "at
least two military coup attempts and an Islamic insurgency.,4" As with
Iraq, the sanctions also reduced Libya's ability to develop WMD, includ-
ing by making the process more time-consuming and expensive. 4" Libya
was unable to acquire a precursor chemical essential to the manufacture
of binary chemical weapons, 4" and top-quality suppliers refused to sell
Libya certain dual-use technology it sought for its biological weapons
program, ultimately forcing Libya to import "shoddy merchandise at
exorbitant prices. 489
The extent to which the U.S. war against Iraq impacted Libya's deci-
sions to comply with its international legal obligations has been the
subject of heated debate.490 As one prominent commentator stated in Janu-
ary 2004, "pundits are quick to claim that the leaders of Libya ... are
cooperating because they fear the same fate that befell Saddam Hussein
[but] [t]here is little direct evidence to support this conclusion .... [I]t is
money that matters.' ' 49' Three years later, however, sufficient evidence
has surfaced to support a conclusion that the implicit threat of force had
at least some impact on the Libyan leadership's decision to comply with
its international obligations. For example, a declassified cable to Wash-
ington from the U.S. Embassy in Egypt dated September 20, 2001
conveyed reports from Egyptian and other Arab diplomats that, after
September 11, a fearful Qaddafi called "every Arab leader on his Rolo-
dex," asking them to "weigh in with Washington. 492 The cable stated that
"Qadhafi had sounded hysterical in his telephone call to King Abdullah
[of Jordan], as if only the King's personal intervention would prevent
U.S. action.' 493 During these first few days following the September 11
486. Takeyh, supra note 444, at 65.
487. See Miller, supra note 438.
488. Miller, supra note 475.
489. Miller, supra note 438.
490. For a summary of the key protagonists and their positions, see Jentleson & Why-
tock, supra note 442, at 47-48. Jentleson and Whytock, in a thorough and balanced analysis,
ultimately conclude that "force was a factor [but] not the only factor, though, and probably not
the most important one." Id. at 75.
491. Joseph Cirincione, Op-Ed, The World Just Got Safer, Give Diplomacy the Credit,
WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2004, at B4.
492. See Cable from U.S. Embassy Cairo, Sudan and Libya Want Egyptian and Other





attacks, Libya turned over to the United States key intelligence informa-
tion on al Qaeda.494
Eighteen months later, as the United States and the United Kingdom
prepared for their March 2003 invasion of Iraq, Muammar Qaddafi's
son, Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, secretly met with U.K. officials and conveyed
to them his father's readiness to make a deal on WMD.495 Three days
later, on the day the war commenced, U.K. officials flew to Libya, met
496
with Muammar Qaddafi himself, and received the same message.
In September 2003-one month after Libya entered into the com-
pensation agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and three months
before Libya's public announcement that it would comply with its non-
proliferation obligations-Qaddafi reportedly phoned Silvio Berlusconi,
then Prime Minister of Italy, and said, "I will do whatever the Americans
want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.' 497 Libya's
December 2003 WMD compliance announcement came just six days
after Saddam Hussein's humiliating capture by U.S. forces.498 In January
2004, Libyan Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem told the Washington Post
that, "[i]f stronger powers want us to end our atomic program, we have
to do it. We have other priorities. 499
The effective gathering and deployment of intelligence, as reflected
in the October 2003 ship interdiction and November 2003 sharing of an
intercepted conversation between Libya and A.Q. Khan, also signifi-
cantly influenced Libya's decision to comply. Catching Libya red-
handed gave the United States leverage and convinced Libya it could not
successfully hide even a part of its nuclear programs. Prior to these de-
velopments, Libya had continually downplayed the extent of its nuclear
program and insisted, both publicly and in its secret negotiations with
U.K. and U.S. officials, that the program's purpose was peaceful.59 The
494. Bernard Gwertzman, Council on Foreign Relations, Qaddafi, Desperate to End
Libya's Isolation, Sends a 'Gift' to President Bush, Dec. 22, 2003, http://www.cfr.org/
publication/6617/ (interview with Lisa Anderson, Libyan expert).
495. GORDON CORERA, SHOPPING FOR BOMBS 174 (2006); Blair Lauds, supra note 477
(quoting Blair as stating: "Libya came to us in March ... to see if it could resolve its weapons
of mass destruction issue.").
496. CORERA, supra note 495, at 174-76.
497. Robin Gedye, UN Should Fight for Rights, Says Berlusconi, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Sept. 4, 2003, at 16.
498. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. Forces Uncover Iraqi Ex-Leader Near Home Town;
Detention Could Lead To Trial on Charges of War Crimes, Genocide, WASH. POST, Dec. 15,
2003, at Al ; Samia Nakhoul, Surrender Widely Seen As a Total Humiliation; "No Muslim Will
Ever Forget These Images ", WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2003, at A26.
499. Daniel Williams, New Faces Herald Hopes for New Libya; Ministers Under Gad-
dafi Signal Reforms Meant to End Isolation, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2004, at A14.
500. CORERA, supra note 495, at 182-86.
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Libyan leadership apparently hoped to engineer a deal in which it would
forsake a part of its nuclear program and retain the rest unbeknownst to
its interlocutors.: ° Only after the disclosure of the intercepted conversa-
tion did the Libyans finally admit to the full scope of their program,
turning over a nuclear weapon design they had received from the A.Q.
Khan network' °2 and paving the way for Libya's announcement that it
would fully and verifiably comply with its nonproliferation obligations.
C. India
Although Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee ultimately chose to en-
gage in nuclear weapons testing in utter disregard of sanctions, two of
Vajpayee's predecessors were clearly deterred from testing by the pros-
pect of sanctions. Less information is available about the Indian nuclear
weapons program than about the Iraqi and Libyan programs, which were
laid bare and dismantled by international weapons inspectors. George
Perkovich makes a compelling case, however, that "international pres-
sures and sanctions on technology imports following the 1974 test ...
limited India's interest in developing and deploying nuclear weapon ca-
pabilities. '"503 Perkovich explains that the nonproliferation regime
"impeded the technological development of the Indian nuclear program,
while the desire to avoid further international political and economic
recriminations caused Indian leaders to choose a policy of self-restraint"
between 1974 and 1998.' 04
For example, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rejected the Indian nu-
clear establishment's requests to follow up the "peaceful nuclear
explosion" of 1974 with additional tests and the development of nuclear
weapons.05 Gandhi's refusal was motivated in part by the political and
economic pressures the international community placed on India in re-
sponse to the 1974 test."' In 1995, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha
Rao strongly considered ordering additional nuclear tests, going so far as
to authorize test preparations.507 U.S. intelligence experts noticed the
preparations, however, and they were reported in the American media."8
The resulting international furor helped convince Rao that Indian tests
would result in sanctions costly enough to outweigh the value of test-
501. Id.
502. Id. at 190.
503. PERKOVICH, supra note 5, at 452.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 224.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 365-71.
508. Id. at 368.
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ing. °9 Reportedly, Rao asked his economic advisers how nuclear tests
would affect the economy and was told that sanctions would increase
inflation (which had contributed heavily to previous election losses).
"This intensified Rao's doubts about conducting tests," and he did not
proceed with them. °
The Gandhi and Rao decisions reflect the potential for sanctions to
deter proliferant activity even in the absence of any threat of force. In the
Rao case, the deterrent effect was maximized by detection of the prolif-
erant act in the planning stage. In contrast, the Vajpayee tests are a
reminder that sanctions costs sufficient to deter two leaders of a particu-
lar country can be insufficient to deter a third who is motivated by
nationalism or other ideologies that downplay economic costs.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED AND NEXT STEPS
This Article has analyzed six cases of interaction between nuclear
proliferants and the international community. This Part will first derive
three key lessons from these cases and then suggest how these lessons
can be applied to restoring the nuclear nonproliferation regime's ability
to prevent proliferation.
A. Lessons Learned
1. Nuclear Proliferation Detection Mechanisms
Must Be Strengthened
First, the NPT's mechanisms for detecting violations are danger-
ously weak and must be strengthened. Under the current arrangements,
an NPT member state weighing whether to develop nuclear weapons
would inevitably calculate the likelihood of getting caught cheating as
slim. Iran managed to conceal nuclear facilities, materials, and activities
from the IAEA for eighteen years before an Iranian dissident group re-
vealed them in 2002. Libya successfully hid its nuclear weapons
program from the IAEA for over a decade. Iraq also kept a nuclear
weapons program secret from the IAEA for more than a decade, coming
within six months of a nuclear bomb before Iraq invaded Kuwait in
1990. Yet the IAEA still largely depends for verification on the weak
tools contained in the INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements. Enhanced
verification and monitoring authorities, such as those contained in the
Additional Protocol, would significantly improve the IAEA's capabilities
509. Id. at 370.
510. Id. at 370-71.
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to detect violations. Improved monitoring and verification are imperative
if the nuclear nonproliferation regime is to regain its capability to pre-
vent proliferation.
2. Strong Sanctions Can Stop or Slow
a Nuclear Weapons Program
A second lesson is that strong sanctions can stop or slow the pro-
gress of a nuclear weapons program. The international community
learned, in the wake of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, that the IAEA's spe-
cial inspections regime for Iraq, coupled with stiff sanctions, destroyed
Iraq's nuclear weapons program and kept it from restarting. The sanc-
tions helped convince Saddam not to rebuild his nuclear weapons
program, contained his ability to reconstitute it, and provided critical
leverage to ensure Iraqi cooperation with UN inspections and monitor-
ing. Sanctions also induced Libya's government, a regime formerly
"synonymous with international terrorism,"5 ' to forsake terrorism and
completely and verifiably relinquish its nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons programs. The sanctions on Libya both coerced Qaddafi, in-
cluding by threatening his grip on Libya, and contained his ability to
develop WMD. The impact on Qaddafi of the military actions against
Saddam exemplify how actions undertaken against one country can deter
another. Fear of sanctions also helped dissuade various Indian govern-
ments from engaging in additional nuclear tests between 1974 and 1998.
In order to be sufficiently strong to stop or slow the progress of a
nuclear weapons program, sanctions should be widely and effectively
implemented and specifically designed to match both the sanctions'
goals and the characteristics of the target regime. The need for wide, and
ideally universal, implementation is exemplified by the case of Libya,
which increased its terrorist activities in response to unilateral U.S. sanc-
tions in the early 1980s and decreased its terrorist activities following the
imposition of UN sanctions in the early 1990s. As noted previously,
globalization, the increasing integration of the international economy, "is
a double-edged sword for economic sanctions," because interdependence
increases a target's potential vulnerability to disruption of international
trade and capital flows while also increasing the opportunities for it to
evade sanctions."2 As a result, sanctions implemented by a small number
of states become increasingly ineffective, while universally implemented
sanctions become increasingly powerful." 3
511. Collins, supra note 450, at 16.




The many avoidable problems associated with the Iraq sanctions re-
gime underscore the need for careful design and rigorous
implementation of sanctions. Future sanctions regimes will benefit from
the lessons learned from the investigations of the Iraq sanctions, the
work of the various sanctions committees, and the sanctions reform re-
search initiatives launched by the Swiss, German, and Swedish
governments. Sanctions may need to differ depending on whether their
purpose is to coerce, contain, deter, create a legal or political foundation
for additional stronger sanctions, or some combination thereof. Sanc-
tions may also need to be specially tailored in light of the ideology of
their target. For regimes such as Iran's, with ideologies that downplay
economic prosperity and exalt values such as martyrdom and suffering,
sanctions may need to cause relatively greater pain before they have a
coercive or deterrent effect. Indeed, with such regimes sanctions may be
ineffective unless they either contain the regime or cause the regime to
fear that noncompliance would endanger its grip on the population it
rules.
3. The International Community's Persistent Failure to
Impose Strong Sanctions Encourages Proliferation
A third lesson is that the international community too often has been
unwilling to impose strong (and in some cases any) sanctions on
proliferators. The Article reviewed three cases-Iran, India/Pakistan, and
North Korea-in which there is evidence that strong sanctions could
have curbed proliferation. Since the Iranian leadership is motivated at
least in part by nationalism and a religious conviction that exalts
martyrdom and suffering, effective sanctions would likely have to cause
the regime to fear losing its grip on power. There is evidence that Iran's
economy is sufficiently vulnerable that strong sanctions could have such
an impact and thus induce the regime to halt its nuclear weapons
program. Yet the international community failed to sanction Iran for four
years after discovery of Iran's two decades of noncompliance with its
NPT safeguards agreement. Iran used those four years to advance its
nuclear program considerably. Iran's more recent failure to comply with
the requirements of the IAEA Board and the Security Council has thus
far resulted in sanctions too weak to coerce or contain Iran or deter other
potential proliferants. The weakness of the sanctions imposed on Iran
stand in stark contrast with the billions of dollars of European, Russian,
and Chinese trade with Iran that was unaffected by the sanctions and
thus represents leverage lost.
Had tougher sanctions been imposed on India following its 1998 nu-
clear detonations, Pakistan may have refrained from testing. The weak
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sanctions that were imposed by some of the international community on
India and Pakistan following their 1998 tests were soon lifted. Indeed,
the United States is now providing India with the benefits of NPT mem-
bership without India having to undertake the obligations. The small
price India and Pakistan have paid for their nuclear proliferation has not
gone unnoticed by other potential proliferators.
The North Korean regime depends for its survival on trade with
China and South Korea, making it an ideal target for strong economic
sanctions. But North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and announce-
ment that it possessed nuclear weapons were not even met with a
condemnatory Security Council resolution, let alone sanctions, and the
sanctions imposed following North Korea's nuclear weapons test were
too weak to coerce or contain North Korea or deter other potential pro-
liferants. In fact, the weak response to North Korea's nuclear program
seems to have emboldened the Iranian leadership. As the New York Times
editorialized on October 12, 2006, three days after North Korea deto-
nated a nuclear weapon, "Welcome to the age of impunity."
A state currently weighing whether to develop nuclear weapons is
bound to conclude that the likelihood of getting caught violating the nu-
clear nonproliferation regime-and of being seriously sanctioned if
caught-are both low. As Elihu Root, the 1912 Nobel Peace Prize laure-
ate, Secretary of State, and first President of the American Society of
International Law, stated almost a century ago, "International laws vio-
lated with impunity must soon cease to exist."
' 1 4
B. Next Steps
The disappearance of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is a fright-
ening prospect. The diffusion of nuclear weapons technology since the
1960s means that President Kennedy's feared number of fifteen or
twenty nuclear-weapons-possessing states could rapidly be attained and
surpassed.5 15 Each additional state in possession of nuclear weapons in-
creases the risk that such weapons will be used-in anger or by
accident-at a cost of hundreds of thousands of deaths.
514. Elihu Root, The Outlook for International Law, 9 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PRoc. 2, 9
(1915).
515. See Joseph Cirincione, Proliferation Threats and Solutions, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 339, 342-43 (2005) (discussing the potential collapse of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime and noting that such a collapse could occur quite rapidly, as "there are
two to three dozen countries that could build nuclear weapons quickly but have made the po-
litical decision not to do so.").
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1. The Challenge of Amending the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The nuclear nonproliferation regime needs to be enhanced before it
is too late. Unfortunately, the NPT is nearly impossible to amend for-
mally. With the exception of its 1995 extension, the treaty has not been
formally amended since its entry into force. Of the seven NPT Review
Conferences since the treaty's entry into force, three-those in 1980,
1990, and 2005-were so contentious they ended without even an agreed
concluding statement.5!1 6 The near-impossibility of formally amending
the NPT is due in part to this contentiousness, which has beset the
treaty's formal review mechanism. An even greater obstacle is NPT Arti-
cle VIII.2, which requires that any amendment be approved by "the votes
of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties
which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency." '' In
other words, every member of the IAEA Board of Governors has a veto
over any NPT amendment. In 2007, there are thirty-five members of the
IAEA Board of Governors, including several countries with questionable1." • 518
commitment to nonproliferation.
The simplest and speediest way to make legally binding changes to
the nuclear nonproliferation regime is through a UN Security Council
resolution. Passage of a Security Council resolution requires only the
support of nine of the fifteen Security Council members, including the
concurring votes (affirmative vote or abstention) of the five permanent
members of the Council.59 "Amending" the nuclear nonproliferation re-
gime through a UN Security Council resolution would be consistent with
an important new Security Council practice: the adoption under Chapter
VII of "global legislative resolutions" that impose universally binding
obligations of general application for an indefinite period of time on all
UN member states in response to threats of a global nature. This new
practice is distinct from more traditional resolutions, which impose bind-
ing obligations that seek to address, and last for the duration of, a
particular dispute or situation.2 °
516. See Wade Boese, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Meeting Sputters, ARMS CON-
TROL TODAY, July-Aug. 2005, at 22, 22; Carlton Stoiber, The Evolution of NPT Review
Conference Final Documents, 1975-2000, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall-Winter 2003, at
126, 126.
517. NPT, supra note 3, art. VIII, para. 2.
518. See IAEA, Board of Governors, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/Board/
index.html. Members of the Board in 2006-07 include Cuba, India, Libya, Pakistan, and
Syria. Id.
519. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
520. See Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global Legislator": Ultra Vires or Ultra
Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 542, 542 (2005).
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The two preeminent examples of "global legislative resolutions" are
Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1540. Resolution 1373, unani-
mously adopted on September 28, 2001, obligated all states to take
various measures to combat terrorism, including preventing the financing
of terrorist acts, freezing terrorist funds, refraining from providing "ac-
tive or passive" support to terrorists, and denying safe haven to
terrorists."' Resolution 1373 filled a gap in international law left by
stalled efforts to negotiate a comprehensive convention against interna-
tional terrorism and the failure by many states to become party to the
twelve existing international conventions and protocols related to terror-
ism.522 In drafting Resolution 1373, the Council drew provisions from
those existing anti-terrorism conventions and made them binding on all
states. 5 3 Resolution 1540,524 unanimously adopted in April 2004,525 effec-
tively filled several gaps in the NPT, including the NPT's failure to fully
526prohibit assisting terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons and failure to
require physical protection of sensitive nuclear materials. 27
521. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
522. Rosand, supra note 520, at 546-51.
523. Id. at 581.
524. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
525. Wade Boese, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution on Denying Terror-
ists WMD, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2004, at 34, 34.
526. The only prohibition in the NPT that seems to address acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons by nonstate actors, such as terrorists, is the provision in Article I that each NWS
"undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons." See NPT, supra note
3, art. I. Nonstate recipients appear not to be included in the broader obligation on each NWS,
set forth in the very next phrase of Article I, "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce
any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons." Id. In
addition, the NPT contains no similar prohibition on NNWSs assisting, encouraging, or induc-
ing the manufacture or other acquisition of nuclear weapons. See NPT, supra note 3. Nonstate
recipients are also excluded from the Article 111.2 requirement on every NPT party, including
NNWSs, not to provide, in the absence of safeguards, certain fissionable or related material
"to any non-nuclear-weapon State." Id. art. II, para. 2. Most of these gaps in the NPT were
remedied by paragraph I of Resolution 1540, which "[d]ecides that all States shall refrain
from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire,
manufacture, possess, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means
of delivery." S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 524, 1. The NPT's failure to adequately address
terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons is a result of the fact that "[w]hen the NPT was con-
cluded in 1968, the drafters did not contemplate the danger of nuclear terrorism." See William
C. Potter, The NPT Review Conference: 188 States in Search of Consensus, INT'L SPECTATOR,
July-Sept. 2005, at 19, 24.
527. Article III safeguards, notwithstanding their name, do not require physical protec-
tion measures of the kind that might prevent a terrorist group from stealing weapons-usable
nuclear material. See NPT, supra note 3, art. III. Nor does any other NPT provision require
such measures. This gap is addressed by paragraph 3 of Resolution 1540, which "[d]ecides"
that "all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to
prevent the proliferation" of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and to that end shall
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2. Enhancing the IAEA's Ability to Spot Violations
Designing a Security Council resolution that would greatly enhance
the IAEA's ability to spot violations of the NPT is relatively simple.
Making all states subject to the strictures of INFCIRC/153 and the cur-
rently optional Additional Protocol would be a vast improvement over
the current state of affairs. According to El Baradei, "our experience in
Iraq before the Gulf War, and our recent experience in Iran and Libya,
have ... highlighted the importance to verification of the additional pro-
tocol ... that provides the Agency with significant additional authority
with regard to both information and physical access. 5 28 "Without the
authority provided by the protocol," says El Baradei, "our ability to draw
conclusions is mostly limited to the non-diversion of material already
declared, with little authority to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear
material or activities.' " 9 As of January 2007, however, only seventy-
eight of the 189 NPT member states had entered into Additional Protocol
agreements. 30 To avoid this problem, a new resolution could directly im-
pose on all member states the IAEA authorities contained in the
INFCIRC/153 and Additional Protocol agreements, and thus clearly en-
hance the IAEA's ability to spot NPT violations.53'
3. Helping Ensure Violations are Effectively Sanctioned
How to help ensure that states caught violating the nuclear nonpro-
liferation regime are effectively sanctioned is considerably more
challenging. Any changes must address the two major motivations driv-
ing the opposition to strong sanctions of many states and other
international players that are avowedly opposed to nuclear proliferation.
The first motivation is the humanitarian concern that comprehensive
sanctions will inevitably cause so much harm to innocent members of
the population of the targeted country as to exceed the benefits of
achieving the sanctions objective. The second motivation-which influ-
ences some of the same and many different critics-is a lack of
"[d]evelop and maintain" measures to "secure such items in production, use, storage or trans-
port" and "physical protection measures." S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 524, 1 3.
528. Mohamed El Baradei, Dir. Gen., IAEA, Keynote Address at the Carnegie Interna-
tional Non-Proliferation Conference (June 21, 2004), available at http://www.nci.org/04nci/
06/ElBaradei%20Camegie%20speech%20062104.htm.
529. Id.
530. IAEA, Strengthened Safeguards System, supra note 82; United Nations, Status,
supra note 7.
531. In order to maximize the perceived legitimacy of, and thus voluntary compliance
with, the "amending" resolution, it should be adopted by consensus, as were both Resolution
1373 and Resolution 1540, and following consultation with a broad range of non-Council
members. See Rosand, supra note 520, at 581.
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willingness to sacrifice the sender's own short-term profits for whatever
long-term benefits sanctions might bring. Both motivations lead their
proponents to support either targeted sanctions or no sanctions whatso-
ever.
Targeted sanctions are clearly well suited to minimizing humanitar-
ian impacts on the population of the target state and minimizing
sanctions costs to the senders. Targeted sanctions, however, are less ef-
fective than comprehensive embargoes at achieving the primary purposes
for which sanctions are imposed. To the extent that sanctions pain felt by
a country's general populace can spur it to pressure a regime into com-
pliance, targeted sanctions designed to minimize impact on the general
populace are a missed opportunity. In addition, targeted sanctions are
generally more complicated and thus more difficult to monitor and im-
plement effectively. Finally, targeted sanctions, even when implemented
to maximum effect, may simply not impose sufficient costs to coerce,
contain, or deter decisionmakers.
a. Addressing Humanitarian Opposition to Sanctions
Humanitarian advocates of targeted sanctions rightly draw attention
to the need to design and implement sanctions so as to achieve the objec-
tives as quickly as possible at the lowest possible human cost to the
populace at large. In doing so, however, the targeted sanctions movement
often prioritizes minimizing costs to the populace over achieving the
overall objective. This may make sense when the overall objective is, for
example, reversing a coup d'6tat, as with the Security Council sanctions
on Haiti and Sierra Leone. From a moral and practical perspective, the
humanitarian cost of the sanctions to a country's populace may arguably
not be worth the benefits of restoring democracy in that particular coun-
try.
However, if the overall objective is preventing nuclear proliferation,
an achievement that may save literally millions of lives, the international
community should, if necessary, be willing to exact a very heavy price.
Humanitarian advocates of targeted sanctions will likely respond to this
by pointing to the sanctions maintained against Iraq during the 1990s for
counterproliferation reasons, arguing that those sanctions accomplished
little and bear the blame for the suffering of innocent Iraqis. However, as
this Article demonstrates, while this argument may have carried weight
prior to 2003, it no longer does. Historical data that have come to light
during the occupation of Iraq make clear that sanctions did succeed in
depriving Saddam of nuclear weapons, and the vast majority of the suf-
fering attributed to the sanctions was due to the Iraqi government's
manipulations and not the sanctions themselves. Moreover, future sanc-
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tions designed to replicate the Iraq sanctions' success in halting Sad-
dam's nuclear weapons program can minimize both harm to innocent
civilians and the potential for manipulative behavior of the target coun-
try's leadership by implementing the lessons contained in the IIC and
GAO reports.
This Article hopefully will help allay humanitarian concerns about
strong counterproliferation sanctions. In addition to correcting outdated
perceptions of the Iraq sanctions, this Article has demonstrated that 1)
far from causing pointless pain, sanctions stopped or slowed the Libyan
and Indian nuclear weapons programs; 2) strong sanctions could have
stopped or slowed the Pakistani, North Korean, and Iranian nuclear pro-
grams; 3) targeted sanctions are less effective than comprehensive
sanctions; and 4) recent advances, such as the sanctions committee and
sanctions reform initiatives, can enable strong sanctions to achieve their
objectives more quickly and at lower costs to the general population of
the target country.
b. Addressing Unwillingness to Sacrifice Short-Term Profits
for Long-Term Benefits of Sanctions
The most difficult challenge facing the nuclear nonproliferation re-
gime, and one of the most difficult challenges facing the entire collective
security system underpinning the UN Charter, is the lack of willingness
on the part of many states-in particular Russia and China-to sacrifice
their short-term profits for the long-term benefits sanctions bring. As this
Article has demonstrated, proposals to impose strong counterprolifera-
tion sanctions on North Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan foundered for
this very reason.
China has refused to seriously sanction North Korea in considerable
part because it fears the economic cost of a flood of refugees should the
North Korean regime collapse.532 China has opposed strong sanctions on
Iran in large part because it does not want to have to pay higher oil and
gas prices elsewhere.533 Russia has opposed strong sanctions on Iran in
large part because it wants to continue profiting from sales to Iran of
hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons, nuclear reactors, and other
532. See supra Section IV.B; see also, e.g., Anthony Faiola & Maureen Fan, North Ko-
rea's Political, Economic Gamble, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2006, at A12 ("China and South
Korea have poured billions of dollars in aid and investment into the North, effectively prop-
ping up Kim's government under the assumption that any collapse there would send millions
of desperate refugees pouring across the country's borders. The risk of such an economic
calamity, they have gambled, has outweighed the risk of a nuclear-armed North Korea.").
533. See supra Section IV.C; see also Mellor & Lim, supra note 278; King & Champion,
supra note 257.
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goods.'" Russia also opposed sanctions on India largely because it
wished to move forward with a $2.6 billion nuclear reactor sale to In-
dia 35 and with plans to sell roughly fifteen billion dollars in arms to
India over the ensuing decade.536 U.S. sanctions on India and Pakistan
took a back seat to the pecuniary interests of American farmers, with
Congress less than two months after the detonations rushing a sanctions-
lifting bill to the floor so that American wheat farmers could bid on a
$37 million sale to Pakistan.5
37
To the extent sanctions help prevent nuclear proliferation-and ex-
perience with Iraq, Libya, and 1974-98 India shows that they do-
sanctions help prevent future costs. Sanctions serve as investments in
averting the costs of nuclear 9/11 s-more than half a million lives and
over one trillion dollars in damage per bomb detonated in a major city-
as well as averting the costs of arms races that ensue as a proliferant's
neighbors feel compelled to develop their own nuclear arsenals and en-
hance their conventional militaries and homeland security defenses.
Sanctions also help prevent the costs to the sender state, target state, and
broader international community of military intervention designed to
prevent nuclear proliferation before it occurs.
Unfortunately, key members of the international community, includ-
ing such potential sanctions-imposing bodies as the Security Council and
EU, have been failing to appropriately balance present lost profits
against the future costs of arms races, catastrophic nuclear attacks, and
military intervention. In practice, when future dangers of a somewhat
uncertain magnitude and timing compete against the present costs of
sanctions, the present certain costs too often hold sway. The voice of
businesspersons who stand to lose contracts now tends to outweigh the
interests of unknown, perhaps even as yet unborn, persons who will lose
their lives and livelihoods to nuclear proliferation later. This is particu-
larly true in situations where sender states with the most to lose in short-
term profits are not the states that would reap the greatest long-term
benefits from sanctions imposition. For example, while strong sanctions
against Iran would cost Russia and China much more than they would
the United States, the United States is considered to be at far greater risk
from an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Thus, sanctions that would benefit the
entire international community in the long term might not be imposed
534. See supra Section IV.C; King & Champion, supra note 257.
535. See supra Section IV.D; Diamond, supra note 364.
536. See supra Section IV.D.
537. See supra Section IV.D; Eric Schmitt, Senators Back Sale of Wheat to Pakistanis,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1998, at Al (noting that food exports were exempted from the sanctions).
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because of the particular countries which would have to bear their short-
term costs.
This tendency to sacrifice long-term benefits in favor of short-term
profits undermines the efficacy of the collective security system on
which the UN Charter is based. Under the collective security system,
states renounce the temptation to take unilateral, preventive forceful
action against a potential aggressor in return for a guarantee that the
collective will come to their rescue if they are attacked. This bargain is
particularly tenuous with respect to nuclear weapons, where an attack
could cause enormous and indeed irreparable damage before any rescue
could occur.539 The rescue must therefore come before the attack, in the
form of sanctions sufficient to coerce or contain the potential proliferant.
If such sanctions are not forthcoming, the proliferant's foremost
potential victims will be very tempted to take preventive forceful action.
Thus, the Russian and Chinese veto of serious sanctions against Iran
may force the United States and Israel into a choice between a
preventive strike or facing the risk of an Iranian nuclear arsenal.
If there is a simple solution to the "short-term profits" challenge to
counterproliferation sanctions, this author has yet to discover it. The
hope here is that by identifying the problem and providing some pre-
liminary thoughts as to directions in which solutions might be sought,
others might be inspired to contribute to addressing the challenge. The
following paragraphs suggest three directions in which solutions might
be pursued: pre-set sanctions, a system for cost-shifting, and case-by-
case interaction between the permanent five members of the Security
Council (the P-5).
i. Pre-set Sanctions
In domestic criminal law, the balancing of present costs against fu-
ture dangers occurs differently than with Security Council resolutions.
Legislatures set penalties for criminal violations on a generally applica-
ble basis ahead of time, not on a case-by-case basis after the fact. Judges
may be authorized by the legislature to impose sentences on individual
offenders from within a range of potential penalties, but they are rarely
given complete discretion. The legislature sets the parameters of the ap-
propriate punishment for a criminal offense at a time when the identity
538. Thus Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter provide that member states must wait
to exercise their right of self-defense until "an armed attack occurs against" them and may
exercise that right only "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." See Thomas M. Franck, Collective Security and UN Reform:
Between the Necessary and the Possible, 6 Cm. J. INT'L L. 597, 601 (2006).
539. Id. at 602.
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of future offenders, and therefore all the costs of punishment, are still in
the future and thus more likely to be efficiently balanced. Similarly, pre-
set sanctions for proliferation might better reflect the balance between
the value of preventing a nuclear attack and the costs to both the senders
and the target of imposing counterproliferation sanctions. Pre-set sanc-
tions might also reduce the prospect of proliferants attempting to use
threats of violence to deter Security Council members from voting for
sanctions. In addition, pre-set sanctions might contribute to deterring
future proliferation. For example, by identifying in advance types of
sanctions that would affect specific groups within target states, those
groups would be spurred into lobbying against proliferation even before
sanctions were imposed.54°
The most effective way to pre-set such sanctions would be through
an amendment to the UN Charter, an unlikely prospect. Alternatively, the
Security Council could pass a resolution expressing its intent to impose
particular sanctions for specified future proliferation activity. Although
the initial resolution could not legally constrain the contents of subse-
quent resolutions, it would set an important political baseline. As another
alternative, the P-5 could reach an agreement between themselves to
support specified sanctions on proliferators in particular future circum-
stances.54' It is far from clear, however, that such an advance
commitment would in fact lead to the imposition of stronger sanctions.
The League of Nations Charter provided that "should any Member of the
League resort to war.., all other Members of the League" would imme-
diately subject the warring member to comprehensive economic
sanctions,5 42 but League members nevertheless failed to impose sanctions
in response to blatant aggression. 4 1 Pre-set sanctions might ultimately
prove to be a part of the solution, but further work will be needed to
identify an appropriate mechanism for promulgating such pre-set sanc-
tions and applying them to actual nuclear nonproliferation violations.
540. On the other hand, it could be more difficult under a preset system than under the
current one to adjust sanctions in specific cases to minimize humanitarian costs or take into
account any mitigating circumstances that might make the proliferation (or step towards it)
seem less blameworthy.
541. Professor Thomas Franck has suggested that the P-5 negotiate a sidebar agreement
between themselves that would enumerate a few crucial situations in which the veto would not
be used to block initiatives supported by a voting majority of the Council. Franck, supra note
538, at 609. A similar instrument could be used to record P-5 agreement on pre-setting prolif-
eration sanctions.
542. Covenant of the League of Nations art. 16.
543. See, e.g., F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 161-64, 243-45 (1986) (de-
scribing the League's failure to sanction Japan's annexation of Manchuria and its failure to




Article 50 of the UN Charter provides that if preventive or enforce-
ment measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any
other state "which finds itself confronted with special economic prob-
lems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right
to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those prob-
lems." No funding assistance is guaranteed,5"' but requests for
consultation with the Security Council pursuant to Article 50 have been
made in at least three cases: the sanctions on Rhodesia, Yugoslavia, and
Iraq.545 The requesting states have predominantly been developing coun-
tries that neighbor the target states. Developing countries, with their
poorer and often relatively fragile economies, are considered less able to
bear sanctions CoStS.
54 6
In connection with the Iraq sanctions, a total of twenty-one govern-
ments appealed for assistance pursuant to Article 50, claiming a total
estimated loss of thirty billion dollars. 7 Although the UN took some
steps that alleviated the burden on Jordan, which suffered the most from
the Iraq sanctions, the principal mechanism for aiding states adversely
affected by Iraq sanctions was a non-UN body, the Gulf Crisis Financial
Coordination Group, which provided eleven countries, including Jordan,
with a total of about nine billion dollars in grants or concessional
loans.5" Jordan did not feel it was adequately compensated, and a
number of other adversely affected countries received nothing.
The P-5 would likely avoid characterizing any sanctions-impact as-
sistance they might provide each other as falling under Article 50, so as
to avoid strengthening other states' claims for redress under Article 50,
claims which the United States in particular has tended to oppose.5 1 Still,
the P-5 might draw on some of the methodologies developed, in connec-
tion with Article 50 claims, for fairly and accurately determining the
544. See Margaret P. Doxey, United Nations Economic Sanctions: Minimizing Adverse
Effects on Nontarget States, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, supra
note 95, at 183, 184; WhiadystIlaw Czaplifiski, The Position of States Specially Affected by
Sanctions in the Meaning of Article 50 of the United Nations Charter: The Experience of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 113, at 335, 335.
545. Doxey, supra note 544, at 187-91.
546. Id. at 183-84.
547. Id. at 187.
548. Id. at 188-89.
549. Bisher H. Al-Khasawneh, Consultation Under Article 50 of the United Nations
Charter: The Experience of the Middle East, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 113, at 325, 332.
550. Doxey, supra note 544, at 189.
551. See id. at 192.
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impact of sanctions on non-target states and identifying means of effi-
ciently redressing such losses.552 Using such methodologies, the P-5
could develop amongst themselves a system or practice of compensating
whichever states among them might, with respect to a particular set of
nuclear proliferation sanctions, bear the brunt of short-term costs but
receive relatively few long-term benefits. 53 Such an arrangement, were it
to become public, would no doubt be criticized as elitist and exclusion-
ary for limiting compensation to P-5 states. Yet it would be far preferable
to the current state of affairs, wherein certain P-5 states are prone to ve-
toing sanctions of global benefit based on short-term costs.
iii. Case-by-Case Use of Economic Carrots and Sticks
Finally, and most simply, P-5 members and other individual states
that expect to reap disproportionately the long-term benefits of a particu-
lar set of sanctions might consider offering economic benefits (such as
grants, loans at concessional rates, debt relief,-and trade concessions) to
those P-5 members that might otherwise be inclined for short-term eco-
nomic reasons to veto such sanctions. U.S. diplomats already engage in
such horse-trading to some degree, but are limited in doing so by Con-
gress' control over the federal budget, tariff rates and the like. In the
United States, consideration should be given to congressional "fast
track" or other arrangements that would facilitate the ability of the
United States to offer economic incentives in exchange for P-5 sanctions
votes that would redound to the long-term benefit of the United States.
In addition, P-5 members inclined for short-term economic reasons
to veto sanctions of broader long-term benefit could be threatened with
the withdrawal of existing discretionary economic benefits. The threat
could come from the government of the particular state that expects to
benefit from the sanctions or from its people (the latter would avoid any
potential problems with WTO rules). Stanford University economists
recently found that the informal American consumer boycott of French
wine in the wake of French opposition to the Iraq war resulted at its peak
in a twenty-six percent slump in sales, costing France over $100 mil-
lion. In 2005, the United States imported $243 billion in Chinese
merchandise (including a heavy proportion of consumer items including
552. See id. at 186, 197.
553. In developing such a system or practice, care would have to be taken to avoid creat-
ing a moral hazard whereby a P-5 member such as Russia might be emboldened to strike even
broader deals with rogue states knowing it would be bailed out in case sanctions are imposed.
554. Larry Chavis & Phillip Leslie, Consumer Boycotts: The Impact of the Iraq War on




toys, games, and apparel) and $15 billion from Russia (including a con-
siderable proportion of consumer items including precious stones and
vodka)."' If American consumers decide that Russian and Chinese un-
willingness to seriously sanction North Korea and Iran is contributing to
the likelihood of a future nuclear attack on a U.S. city, the reduced sales
of Russian and Chinese-made goods may come to outweigh the value of
those countries' economic stakes in North Korea and Iran.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The nuclear nonproliferation regime worked well for its first 25
years, converting the spread of nuclear weapons from an act of national
pride into an act of international outlawry. Today, however, the nuclear
nonproliferation regime is on the verge of collapse.
Drawing from six case studies and historical data that has recently
become available, this Article derives three key lessons applicable to re-
storing the nuclear nonproliferation regime's capacity to prevent
proliferation. The Article illustrates how the regime's weak verification
authorities have caused it persistent difficulty in catching violators, and it
suggests how to strengthen these authorities. The Article also demon-
strates how strong sanctions have in the past succeeded in stopping or
slowing the progress of illicit nuclear weapons programs. In addition, the
Article describes the international community's recent failures to seri-
ously sanction states caught violating the nuclear nonproliferation
regime.
The regime as it exists now has little remaining capacity to coerce,
contain, or deter violations. An NPT member state currently considering
whether to develop nuclear weapons can only conclude that the IAEA's
verification and monitoring authorities are too weak to promptly and
reliably catch it cheating and, even if it is caught, it will receive light
sanctions at worst. If the nuclear nonproliferation regime is not soon en-
hanced, it is likely to collapse, with grave consequences for international
peace and security.
In light of the exceptional difficulty of amending the NPT, this Arti-
cle proposes that enhancements to the IAEA's verification and
monitoring authorities be made through a UN Security Council resolu-
tion, and it identifies precedents for such an approach. The Article also
addresses the two major motivations driving the opposition to strong sanc-
tions of many states that are avowedly opposed to nuclear proliferation.
555. National Trade Data, TradeStats Express, http://tse.export.gov/ (TradeStats Express
website of the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce).
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It argues that "humanitarian" opposition to strong sanctions on nuclear
proliferators may be based on outdated information and contributes to
updating the historical record. The Article also draws attention to and
analyzes the blocking by Moscow and Beijing of Security Council adop-
tion of sanctions against proliferators because of the short-term cost to
Russia and China of such sanctions, even though the sanctions costs may
be a good long-term investment for the international community as a
whole. The Article suggests several directions in which a solution to this
problem might be found, including pre-set sanctions, a P-5 cost-shifting
agreement, and case-by-case negotiations within the P-5.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime is at a tipping point, with its vi-
ability in the balance. If a nuclear 9/11, or a series of them, someday
occurs, it will be because the international community failed to enforce
and repair the nuclear nonproliferation regime while it still could. The
time to act is now. Humanity's future may depend on it.
